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The thesis examines China’s employment of strategic deception in the acquisition and 
development of its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning.  By examining China’s national 
goals, strategy and propensity to employ deception, this thesis aims to: 
1. Explain how China’s national goals and strategy drove it to develop an aircraft 
carrier. 
2. Explain the aircraft carrier’s role in China’s maritime strategy. 
3. Explain how China employed deception in the acquisition and development of 
the aircraft carrier. 
4. Assess the implications of China’s use of strategic deception in developing its 
first aircraft carrier. 
5. Assess the future roles of China’s first aircraft carrier.  
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A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
On 25 September 2012, the Liaoning “辽宁” was commissioned into the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as the People’s Republic of China’s first aircraft carrier.  
From a military capability perspective, the carrier was notable for its understatement—it 
was built from a 1980s era Soviet legacy design and it wasn’t the first modern carrier in 
the East Asia region.1  It had yet to integrate its organic aircraft onboard and even the 
Chinese government downplayed the carrier’s military significance, stating that it was 
meant for “scientific research and military training”.2   
However, from a public relations perspective, the Liaoning’s commissioning was 
a major news event that generated international and regional interest far greater than the 
carrier’s ostensible military capabilities.  The symbolic significance of China’s first 
aircraft carrier and the strategic implications of this military development were the 
unspoken elephants in the room (or on the pier) that sunny day on 25 September 2012 in 
the naval port of Dalian—the cradle of the PLAN.  It was also not lost on the media that 
the timing of the Liaoning’s commissioning preceded the 63rd anniversary of the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 2012.  Both President Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao, were in attendance at the Liaoning’s commissioning, further 
underlining the symbolic significance of the event.3 
A notable reference from China’s state media coverage of Liaoning’s 
commissioning is the relatively innocuous reference to Liaoning’s launch after “years of 
refitting and sea-trials.”4  For informed observers, “re-fitting and sea trials” is poor cover 
for the storied transformation of the Liaoning from a rusting, disemboweled ex-Soviet 
                                                 
1 Japan’s Hyuga-class light carriers (2009), India’s INS Viraat (1987) and Thailand’s HTMS Chakri 
Naruebet (1996) preceded the Liaoning in the Western Pacific region. 
2 “China’s first aircraft carrier commissioned,” Xinhua (China), 25 September 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131871538.htm. 
3 “Chinese President attends aircraft carrier ‘Liaoning’ handover ceremony in Dalian,” Xinhua 
(China), 25 September 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2012-09/25/c_131872638.htm. 
4 “Chinese President attends aircraft carrier ‘Liaoning’ handover ceremony in Dalian,” Xinhua. 
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hulk into the pride of the PLA Navy and the military embodiment of China’s rise to great 
power status.  The staid reference also obscures the successful employment of deception 
by China to protect the development of her first aircraft carrier with Churchill’s famed 
“bodyguard of lies.”  This study aims to demystify and decipher China’s strategic 
deception regarding the Liaoning and provide insights into how the fast rising political 
and military heavyweight of the East handles strategy and employs deception.  
Henceforth, reference to China’s deception stratagem relating to the Liaoning shall be 
referred to as the Liaoning deception in this work.   
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis studies the acquisition and development of Liaoning from a strategic 
perspective and seeks to understand how China employed deception to protect the birth 
of its first aircraft carrier.  To improve understanding, this study lays out the significant 
phases of the Liaoning Deception and details how China managed the deception ploy 
from inception to fruition.  It studies the main factors driving the Liaoning deception—
China’s national and military strategies.  The Liaoning deception is also analyzed for its 
veracity and effectiveness.  Finally, the study looks at how the Liaoning deception 
informs us about China’s intentions for the role of the aircraft carrier Liaoning in the 
future. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The methodology of this thesis and the rationale for selecting the Liaoning as a 
study case are explained in Chapter II.  This thesis begins by equipping the reader with an 
understanding of China’s maritime strategy and national strategic goals to make sense of 
China’s desire for an aircraft carrier.  The concept of deception is introduced to the reader 
with a specific focus on Chinese strategic deception to allow for comprehension about the 
nature and method of Chinese strategic deception.  The theory of analysis of competing 
hypotheses by intelligence scholar Richards J. Heuer will be used to analyze the Liaoning 
deception and make assessments about the competing hypotheses regarding the 
 3 
Liaoning’s role and purpose.5  China’s aircraft carrier program exhibits several 
characteristics that make it a suitable case study for understanding how China employs 
strategic deception in the development of its military capabilities.  Among other reasons, 
the huge signature of an aircraft carrier makes it extremely difficult to hide and the nature 
of its capabilities is easy to estimate.  These immutable characteristics only elevate the 
importance of deception in protecting the actual intent of this military capability. 
Chapter III begins by examining China’s strategic psyche and national security 
goals.  These provide us with a macro-perspective on the drivers behind Chinese strategic 
thinking and their formulation of national security goals.  It lays the foundation for the 
deeper examination of maritime strategy and strategic deception in the later chapters. 
Chapter IV lays out China’s maritime strategy based on contemporary evidence 
examined in other studies.  Examining maritime strategy and goals would facilitate 
understanding how the aircraft carrier capability would be of utility in achieving those 
goals.  Understanding China’s maritime strategy will improve our ability to analyze the 
Liaoning deception—why it was necessary, what its intent was and whether it has yet 
unfulfilled objectives.  
Chapter V examines deception as a military stratagem to facilitate understanding 
its employment in various guises in contemporary Chinese strategy.  This study will also 
highlight the differences between Western and Eastern concepts of deception.  By 
Western, the authors refer to the Western European and American understanding of 
deception, along the lines espoused by Daniel and Herbig in Strategic Military 
Deception.6  Western understanding of deception perceives it as a separate branch of 
strategy that is executed in the shadows and burdened with a sinister reputation of 
dishonesty and deceit.7  This contrasts with the Eastern tradition that views deception as 
an inseparable part of strategic calculus and the perfect execution of which is not only a 
                                                 
5 Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Central Intelligence Agency: Centre for 
Study of Intelligence, 1999), 102. 
6 Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, Strategic Military Deception (New York: Pergamon, 
1982), xii. 
7 Scott A. Boorman, “Deception in Chinese Strategy” in The Military and Political Power in China 
in the 1970s, ed. William W. Whitson, 313-328 (New York: Praeger, 1972). 
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matter of pride but a means to avoid conflict altogether.  The Chinese understanding of 
deception is alluded to in historical Chinese works like Sun Tzu’s Art of War and 
examined in Sawyer’s The Tao of Deception.8  Deception in China has long historical 
tradition and is exemplified by the vernacular terms and stories linked to deception as a 
concept.  The Thirty-Six Stratagems that are popular in Chinese cultural and literary 
traditions provide a convenient way to gain insight into the psyche of Chinese deception.9  
Their wide range of applicability facilitates the employment of distinct deception 
methods.  This chapter explains how relevant elements of the Thirty-Six Stratagems can 
be used to interpret the Liaoning Deception.  Understanding the difference between 
Eastern and Western conceptions of deception will allow a more nuanced understanding 
of deception as employed by the Chinese.  Thus, Chapter V focuses on deception as a 
military strategic concept and the Chinese understanding and application of deception in 
particular. 
Chapter VI studies the acquisition and development of the Liaoning in detail, 
tracing it from inception to early 2013.  The Liaoning Deception could have been 
conceptualized with the intent of hiding the true purpose of the acquisition of a 
disemboweled, rusted and incomplete hulk from Ukraine.  After unveiling the carrier to 
the world, the Liaoning Deception could involve masking the true operational roles of the 
aircraft carrier and downplaying its capabilities.  These possibilities are explored to gain a 
better understanding of how China hides the growth and development of an important 
and extremely visible capability using stratagem. 
Having gained an understanding of the Liaoning Deception, competing 
hypotheses pertaining to the purpose of the Liaoning will be examined in Chapter VII.  
The objective of the analysis is the falsification of alternate hypotheses based on evidence 
gathered and the assessment of the true role of the Liaoning.  The first hypothesis 
proposes that the Liaoning is intended for training and research purposes and will not 
                                                 
8 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Deception (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basic Books, 2007), 1. 
9 Haichen Sun, The Wiles of War (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1993).  The 36 Stratagems are 
individually explained in the The Wiles of War and are studied as part of the Chinese language in Chinese 
elementary school as well as in the Chinese military.   
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lead maritime operations for the PLAN.  The second hypothesis proposes that the 
Liaoning is not merely intended for training and research, and will be an operational 
platform of note in the PLA Navy’s order of battle. It will also form the cornerstone 
around which China will build a major capability based on aircraft carriers.  The third 
hypothesis proposes that the Liaoning is but a poorly conceived naval project that will 
fail to achieve its training and research, and operational goals.  The theory of competing 
hypotheses will be applied and relevant evidence available until early 2013 will be 
analyzed. 
The last chapter will compile the implications of this study for China, the East 
Asia region and the U.S.  It will also suggest lessons learned from the Liaoning 
Deception case to facilitate a deeper understanding of China’s future strategic moves. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study examines China’s aircraft carrier program and how deception supports 
China’s strategic goals.  This will be achieved through an understanding of China’s 
strategic goals, maritime strategy, deception ploys and deception management.  This 
study does not intend to make critical assessments of China’s aircraft carrier from 
engineering, financial or doctrinal perspectives. 
Although an understanding of China’s maritime strategy is necessary for 
understanding China’s deception strategy, this study does not critique China’s maritime 
strategy.  The study is focused on China’s aircraft carrier capability and its management 
of interested parties’ perceptions about the aircraft carrier.  China’s maritime strategy will 
be examined only to provide a strategic background to understanding China’s intent for 
the aircraft carrier Liaoning. 
E. CHINESE LANGUAGE CONVENTIONS USED 
As this thesis makes frequent reference to Chinese language sources, names and 
terms, it is important to note the type of convention used by the authors for the 
romanization of Chinese words and the type of Chinese script used for Chinese characters 
in this work. 
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For romanization of Chinese, this work uses the Pinyin convention which is the 
standard for the U.S. and Chinese governments, United Nations and most media 
organizations.  The Library of Congress’s guidelines for the Pinyin standard will be 
adopted for this work.10  This departs from the older Wade-Giles system of romanization 
which was in widespread use until the 1980s.  An example would be the name of the 
Chinese communist leader Mao Tse-Tung.  Wade-Giles convention romanizes his name 
as “Mao Tse-Tung”.  The Pinyin convention romanizes his name as “Mao Zedong”.  The 
Chinese characters for his name are “毛泽东”.  
When non-Pinyin references are more widely known, they are retained for ease of 
comprehension.  An example would be the strategist Sun Tzu. Wade-Giles convention 
romanizes his name as “Sun Tzu”.  Pinyin convention romanizes his name as “Sunzi”.  
The Chinese characters for his name are “孙子”.    To facilitate cross-referencing, works 
that utilize the older Wade-Giles convention will still be referenced using that system.  
All other Chinese references in this work will be romanized under the Pinyin convention. 
For Chinese characters in this work, simplified Chinese script will be used.  The 
Chinese script is divided into the traditional and simplified scripts.  Simplified Chinese 
script was instituted by China’s leader Mao Zedong in the 1950s as part of efforts to 
simplify Chinese script and increase literacy in China—it involves the reduction in the 
number and complexity of Chinese characters.  Today, traditional Chinese script is used 
in Taiwan, Hong Kong and much of the Chinese diaspora.  Simplified Chinese script is 
used in China, Malaysia and Singapore.  The debate over the merits of simplification and 
preservation of traditional Chinese script is an ongoing issue.  The choice of simplified 
Chinese script in this work is to facilitate study by a non-Chinese audience who is likely 
to have been schooled in simplified Chinese.  Whenever feasible, initial references to 
Chinese names and sources will be followed by their Chinese characters. 
                                                 
10 Phillip Melzer, “Library of Congress Pinyin Conversion Project: New Chinese Romanization 
Guidelines,” Library of Congress, 3 November 1998, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDY SELECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the methodology behind this thesis, its organization and 
case study selection.  The purpose of this thesis is to decipher China’s employment of 
strategic deception in the acquisition and development of its first aircraft carrier—the 
Liaoning.  This study draws on both ancient and contemporary history to study China’s 
deception as the authors believe that Chinese strategic psyche is heavily influenced by its 
own perception of history and China’s place in the larger constellation of global 
civilizations.  The secretive nature of deception also means it is best studied ex post so 
that it can be studied retrospectively on the basis of known events and actions.  
Ultimately, this thesis strives to improve understanding of China, its strategic culture, its 
use of strategic deception and hopefully inform future engagements with this fast rising 
Eastern power. 
The linkages between the critical elements involved in the Liaoning deception are 
laid out in Figure 1 on the following page.  The three elements that directly impacted the 
Liaoning deception are China’s national strategic psyche, its tradition of employing 
deception, and its military goals and strategy.  This thesis proposes that the nature and 
motivation of China’s national and military strategies drove the need for an aircraft 
carrier —while its cultural propensity for deception drove the employment of strategic 




Figure 1.  Relationship of Elements of Liaoning Deception 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis proposes that the acquisition and development of China’s first aircraft 
carrier Liaoning was a deliberate strategic deception ploy that was driven by China’s 
national and military interests.  The veracity of this hypothesis will be examined in this 
thesis by an examination of the environment (history, culture), structures (state, military) 
and strategy (national, maritime, deception); as well as a detailed examination of the 
evolution of the Liaoning’s acquisition and development.  The questions that this thesis 
will answer: Was the acquisition and development of the Liaoning a deception? What 
were its motivations? How was it executed? What are the implications of the Liaoning 
deception? 
C. ANALYSIS  
The hypothesis will be analyzed in two parts.  This first part will be a three 
pronged look at China’s national goals and strategy; its military goals and strategy; and 
its deception goals and strategy.  These three levels of analysis are complimentary and 
inter-related as each preceding level directly influences the next level below.  This 
analysis explains how policy goals at the national and military levels drive the 
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formulation of strategy and how those strategies lead to the development of an aircraft 
carrier capability.  The goals of deception and China’s strategy of employing deception 
are then applied to the national goal of acquiring a carrier.  Combined, they form a 
coherent and mutually reinforcing strategic deception strategy. 
The second part of analysis investigates the intricacies of the Liaoning deception.  
This involves a detailed study of the critical events and timeline of the Liaoning 
deception.  It also highlights China’s publicly stated positions regarding carrier 
development in the lead up to the Liaoning’s commissioning.  The disparity between 
word and deed will be investigated and assessment made on the evidence and possible 
reasons for such a disparity.  The theory of analysis of competing hypotheses will be 
applied to the Liaoning case for greater clarity about the Liaoning’s future role. 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
The approach taken by this thesis makes the following assumptions about the 
entities being analyzed.  While there may be evidence to the contrary of the assumptions 
made, the authors felt that these assumptions were reasonable and would serve more good 
than harm in facilitating analysis of the Liaoning case. 
With regard to the Chinese government, its military and the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy, the assumption was made that these were unitary actors at their respective 
levels.  This meant that leadership and policy guidance flowed through their respective 
chains of command and were heeded and executed.  This thesis does not account for 
rogue actors acting on their own —independent of national policy goals and objectives. 
It was also assumed that the entities of interest in this thesis were rational actors 
that acted in accordance with their respective interests at the organizational and national 
levels.  This assumption is critical because the basis of our argument about the 
motivations behind strategic deception is driven by national self-interest.  
The final assumption is that contemporary Chinese strategic culture is influenced 
by China’s civilizational history and its various political and thought leaders through 
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time.11  This thesis does not conduct any empirical test of the relationship between 
strategic culture and history.  Rather, it accepts that linkage and makes associations 
between the two.  The thesis provides many instances where anecdotal evidence 
suggesting a linkage between the two is discussed. 
E. KEY APPROACHES 
1. Centrality of Chinese National Culture and History 
To study Chinese strategic deception, our approach first pursued an understanding 
of the broader historical and cultural background that influenced all three critical 
elements of our thesis - Chinese strategic psyche, Chinese tradition of deception and the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) heritage.  The reasons for the importance and 
broad influence of history and culture in China are myriad and explained only briefly 
within the scope of this work.  However, a few critical reasons bear identification: 
• Chinese history has been quite meticulously recorded and is easily 
accessible to the population through traditional and modern media.  Many 
of the old methods of passing down stories through theatre and literature 
are now supplemented by websites, videogames and movies.  New 
generations are exposed to it not just in school but society at large. 
• Chinese history is actively studied in a society that still places great 
emphasis on education.  The nature of the Chinese language, with its rich 
verbal tradition and unified written script rooted in history and culture, 
makes learning it as a language as much a study of history as it is 
linguistics.  
• The Chinese people are fond of their civilizational history.  Although this 
is hardly limited to the Chinese since any people tracing their 
civilizational roots to a rich history are no less justified in feeling a sense 
of deep pride, few civilization have been as introspective and inward 
looking as China.  While other civilizations have tended to expand 
outward, the Chinese were content to build up their Middle Kingdom and 
consolidate their civilization with minimal outward expansion.  Central to 
this tendency was the perception that the Middle Kingdom was the center 
of civilization and all else that revolved around it was inferior.12   
                                                 
11 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 22. 
12 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 10. 
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The influence of history and culture on many facets of Chinese national life has 
therefore been significant.  Even while the present Chinese generation builds upon the 
present for the future, the present in also influenced and guided by its past.  Chapter III 
on China’s Strategic Psyche and Chapter IV on China’s Maritime Heritage and Strategy 
explain how they directly impact on China’s deployment of the Liaoning deception. 
2. China’s Strategic Psyche 
In studying China’s strategic psyche in Chapter III, the thesis examined facets of 
China’s history relevant to the formulation of strategy and assessed to be key 
characteristics of China’s strategic thinking.  Four key features were assessed to be of 
significance to the study of strategic deception involving the Liaoning.  While these 
features were by no means exclusive to China, their combination and the depth of their 
influence on China’s strategic psyche was assessed to be significant. 
3. China’s Goals and Strategies 
Policy documents published by China’s government and policy statements from 
China’s leaders were the primary sources for the identification of China’s national goals.  The 
relevance of those goals was compared with the state of national development in China and 
its national priorities.  An overarching national strategy predicated on “China’s peaceful 
development” was identified from a 2011 White Paper from China.13  The thesis probed 
deeper into national security goals in the maritime arena as this was the primary area of 
interest relevant to China’s aircraft carrier capability.  Policy statements from China’s 
Defence White Papers were studied for insights into China’s maritime policy goals.   
4. China’s Maritime Strategy 
Believing in the salience of China’s history on its contemporary developments, 
China’s heritage in the strategic maritime arena was studied.  It illustrated the strategic 
irrelevance of maritime capabilities in China’s predominantly land-warfare dominated 
history.  The rising importance of the PLAN from the late 20th century was studied 
                                                 
13 China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, 6 September 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm. 
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through an examination of its increasing relevance to China’s national strategy and its 
improving capabilities.  With the PLAN’s increasing prominence in national security, the 
appointment of Liu Huaqing as PLAN Commander was highlighted as he represented an 
important milestone in the modernization of the PLAN and the genesis of China’s 
maritime strategy.  Known as the father of China’s aircraft carrier program, Liu’s pivotal 
role in influencing the PLAN’s carrier capability was examined.14 
5. China’s Strategic Deception 
China’s employment of strategic deception with regard to its aircraft carrier 
development was examined through the influence of three lines of inquiry.  The first was 
China’s propensity to employ strategic deception in peace to achieve its strategic goals.  
The second was the influence of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s hide and bide strategy.  
The third was the influence of elements of the Thirty-Six Stratagems that advocated 
various means in which to employ deception. 
F. SELECTION OF CASE STUDY 
The case of the Liaoning was selected as it satisfied the following criteria that not 
only facilitated research but made her a compelling case for the study of strategic 
deception: 
• The Liaoning represented a significant strategic capability for China as its 
first aircraft carrier, thus there was significant academic and professional 
interest in her genesis.    
• As a significant national capability, the Liaoning served as a useful test 
case because its genesis was a result of deliberation about national and 
maritime goals and strategy.  Study of the Liaoning deception not only 
provides insight into deception at the strategic level but also improves 
understanding about China’s maritime ambitions. 
• Material concerning the Liaoning was both abundant and accessible, thus 
making the research effort manageable. 
                                                 
14 Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update,” Naval War 




• There was significant evidence that the acquisition and development of the 
Liaoning was shrouded in purposeful deceptions about her true purpose. 
• The development of the Liaoning is but one of many significant 
developments made by China in the area of engineering, science and 
technology with military applications in the first decade of the new 
millennium.  As a significant military and naval capability, the Liaoning 
therefore serves as a useful platform to integrate developments in other 
areas.  
G. EXAMINATION OF THE CASE STUDY 
The Liaoning case study is first examined through a chronological study of the events 
that transpired in the acquisition and development of the aircraft carrier and associated 
capabilities.  This initial investigation seeks to highlight the discrepancies between China’s 
statements and known developments of the Liaoning.   The second phase of analysis 
proposes a plausible deception ploy that was employed in the Liaoning deception.  This is the 
triple-layered cover story that the authors believe was central to the deception ploy involving 
the Liaoning.  The final phase of analysis proposes various measures employed by China to 
manage the Liaoning deception until it achieved its final purpose. 
H. POSTULATING ABOUT THE LIAONING’S TRUE ROLE 
The last analytical chapter employs Richards Heuer’s analysis of competing 
hypotheses to postulate the Liaoning’s true role in the PLAN and as part of China’s 
maritime strategy. 15  It will investigate three competing hypotheses: 
1. The Liaoning is intended for training purposes and does not signal China’s 
interest in building a major capability based on aircraft carriers. 
2. The Liaoning is not merely intended for training and will be an operational 
platform of note in the PLA Navy’s order of battle.  It will also form the 
cornerstone around which China will build a major naval capability based 
on aircraft carriers. 
3. The Liaoning is a poorly conceived naval project that will fail to meet its 
training, research or operational goals. 
                                                 
15 Richards J. Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counter-Deception: A Cognitive Process 




A conclusion on the most probable hypothesis will be arrived through the 
application of Heuer’s theory which involves the falsification of hypotheses based on the 
availability of contrary evidence. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The thesis concludes with an exploration of the implications of the findings of this 
study and recommendations for the tracking of future capability developments by China.  
Through the analyses provided in the thesis, the authors hope to improve understanding 
about China’s strategic psyche, its employment of strategic deception and the intricacies 
of China’s deception regarding the Liaoning.  Through the deciphering of the Liaoning 
deception, enlightened policies can be formulated for dealing with the rising Chinese 
dragon in the East. 
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III. CHINA’S STRATEGIC PSYCHE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
GOALS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the motivation behind the Liaoning Deception, it is necessary to 
understand China’s perceived need for a major naval capability like the aircraft carrier. 
Naval capability is driven by China’s strategic maritime goals which are determined by 
China’s national security goals, which in turn are driven by national strategic goals. This 
chapter thus sets out to explain China’s national security goals and explain their relation 
to her strategic maritime goals. It begins with a foray into five millennia of Chinese 
history and tradition to appreciate the strategic psyche of China and identify several traits 
that influence Chinese conception of strategy. This is followed by an examination of the 
national security goals of present-day China and how they relate to its maritime strategy. 
Before proceeding, the qualification must be made that this chapter attempts to 
cover a lot of ground in very few pages. Much more comprehensive articles and books 
have been written on any given section of this chapter, so this chapter barely scratches the 
surface of its topics. Despite the lack of depth, this chapter attempts to identify critical 
and relevant features of the topics discussed for the uninitiated reader to make sense of 
the logic and causation of our hypothesis about Chinese strategic deception that will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. This chapter does not summarize the extant arguments 
and perspectives for the topics highlighted. Interested readers are highly encouraged to 





Table 1.   Chronology of Chinese Civilization 
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B. STRATEGIC PSYCHE OF THE CHINESE NATION 
Modern China claims unbroken lineage to five millennia of tumultuous but 
continuous civilizational history (Table 1), seeking in its heritage not only deep 
nationalistic and civilizational pride but also reference to classical principles of strategy 
and statesmanship that continue to shape the thoughts and actions of modern Chinese 
leaders.16  Although many nations also justifiably claim long and eventful histories, few 
have preserved their written, oral and cognitive traditions as the Chinese civilization has, 
and fewer still actively use this heritage as a fundamental fountain of knowledge, 
experience and wisdom for society and its leaders.17  In fact, respected statesman 
Kissinger assesses that China is singular because:  
In no other country is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a 
major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a 
millennium-old event—–nor that he would confidently expect his 
colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions.18 
Understanding this state of Chinese civilizational self-awareness is paramount to 
making the first step towards an understanding of the Chinese strategic psyche. Chinese 
strategy involves the utilization of “history as a mirror to guide the present”—not just 
recent contemporary history but civilizational history going back millennia.19  Although 
it may seem that ancient history is irrelevant to the strategic considerations of a modern 
nation-state, in the case of China, there is good reason to appreciate the importance of 
Chinese civilizational memory and culture in shaping modern Chinese strategic psyche. 
This appreciation is important because unless one can put himself into the shoes of his 
adversary, attempts to understand the adversary would be futile. By understanding that 
the Chinese strategic psyche is not only driven by modernity but also antiquity opens up 
                                                 
16 Classical Chinese texts, strategists, intellectuals and leaders like the Daode Jing (道德经), Sun 
Tzu’s Art of War , Confucious (Kongzi孔子), the Qin emperor Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇), even the Mongol 
conqueror Genghis Khan are an important part of Chinese consciousness and often quoted and used as 
references for intellectual discussions, policy formulation and decision-making. 
17 C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966): 2. 
18 Kissinger, On China, 2. 
19 Shi Naian, The Water Margin: Outlaws of the Marsh (Hong Kong: Tuttle Publishing, 2010), 
xxxvi. 
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an entire realm of possibilities that may explain Chinese strategic motives where 
contemporary explanations have faltered. 
The second aspect of Chinese strategic psyche that requires understanding is also 
concerned with the temporal—but concerns not of looking backward in time as the first, 
but forward in time not just in years, but decades, even generations. The two temporally 
divergent perspectives (looking back and casting forward) are intimately related and it 
can be argued that the first influences the second. Due to the fact that the Chinese have an 
extended retrospective view of their civilization, they also adopt a long term perspective 
when considering the future. Chinese cognizance of the ebbs and flows of their own 
history tempers their hunger for rapidly-achieved but short-lived success.20  Instead, the 
Chinese are wont to scheme protracted “multi-year maneuvers” that may not consist of 
singular decisive battlefield victories but rather an eclectic orchestra of political, military, 
economic and diplomatic actions that are designed to shape the whole strategic 
environment and render the adversary’s military prowess ineffective.21 
The third aspect of Chinese strategic psyche is a product of the strategic patience 
that undergirds their extended temporal perspective—the employment of the indirect 
approach. Kissinger observed that the Chinese “stressed subtlety, indirection, and the 
patient accumulation of relative advantage.”22  He illustrated this Chinese quality by 
contrasting the intellectual games of strategy favored by Chinese and Western 
civilizations—Weiqi23 (围棋) and chess respectively. The Western game of chess is 
designed around the direct strategic approach. Game play commences with the set-piece 
array of forces on either side and evolves towards decisive engagements targeted at the 
opponent’s center of gravity and elimination of key pieces, with victory achieved by 
capture of the opponent’s king. In Weiqi, all pieces are of equal value and immobile - and 
                                                 
20 Guanzhong Luo. Three Kingdom,abridged ed.,  trans. Moss Roberts (New Jersey: University of 
California Press, 2004), 1.  One of the four Chinese classics, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms opens 
with: “The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.”  
21 Kissinger, On China, 23. 
22 Kissinger, On China, 23. 
23 The Chinese translation of Weiqi literally means “Envelopment Chess”, in reference to the 
gameplay where both sides stake territory on the board and attack the other side through envelopment of 
the opponent’s pieces.  
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forces do not begin arrayed for decisive battle. The game begins with the board empty 
and game play involves the placement of immobile pieces on the board. Victory is 
dependent upon the domination of space on the board through strategic encirclement. 
Multiple engagements can take place anywhere within the battle-space and the 
significance of battle outcomes is often difficult to assess, with each side making gains of 
relative advantage rather than absolute ones. Victory is achieved through indirect means 
and strategic ambiguity and flexibility about the center of gravity of one’s efforts is 
critical to success.24 
    
Figure 2.  At Left, is a Game of Weiqi; at Right, is a Game of Chess. (Photos by Eu Yen 
Kong and Kuei-Lin Yu) 
The telling contrast between these strategic games provides a glimpse into 
Chinese strategic appreciation of the indirect approach.   Sun Tzu alluded to the indirect 
strategy in his treatise when he said: “Those adept in warfare can conquer the enemy 
without fighting battles, capture cities without laying siege to them, and annex states 
without prolonged warfare.   They can preserve their own forces whole and intact while 
struggling for the mastery of the entire Empire. They can win a victory without wearying 
their men. All this is due to strategy.”25 
Liddell Hart, the West’s proponent of indirect warfare said of the indirect 
approach to warfare:  
                                                 
24 Kissinger, On China, 25. 
25 Ta-Wei Yu, Sun Tzu on the Art of War (Taiwan: Li Ming, 1991), 68. 
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“In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct 
approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, 
whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender’s hold by upsetting his balance.”26 
Both Sun Tzu’s and Hart’s justifications for the wisdom of the indirect approach 
makes sense for China as it attempts to enhance its strategic position in an Asia-Pacific 
environment that is dominated by the U.S. (in Japan and South Korea) and in the face of 
obstacles that could conceivably be erected by its strategic competitors in the region and 
beyond. China’s employment of the indirect approach to strategy would not only make its 
strategic goals more achievable, it would also mask them from detection and disruption 
by virtue of their indirect lines. The employment of strategic deception by the Chinese is 
also a manifestation of the indirect approach. 
Last, Sun Tzu advised that “to win a war by defeating the enemy on the battlefield 
is not the most desirable.  To vanquish the enemy without resort to warfare is the ultimate 
victory.”27  This proposes that strategic defeat of one’s adversary is of greater value than 
simple military defeat on the battlefield.  Therefore, in the Chinese formulation of 
strategy, military victory is never the most important, nor most salient consideration. 
Other influential factors such as diplomacy, economics, geography and society are 
considered and coordinated to secure lasting strategic victory. This does not mean that 
military action is unimportant in Chinese strategic thought, it emphasizes that the Chinese 
would consider military action in concert with other means to achieve their strategic 
goals.28  
In summary, the Chinese strategic psyche possesses four relevant characteristics 
and their influence will be referred to throughout this thesis. 
1. History serves as a mirror to guide present strategy formulation. 
                                                 
26 B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), 239. 
27 Translation is authors’ own after examination of other translations and in consideration of 
applicability to the discussion on China’s strategic psyche. Original Chinese text is below. 
 “是故百战百胜，非善之善者也；不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也.” 
28 Andrew Scobell, “Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory versus the Fortune Cookie?” Strategic 
Insights, v.6, issue 10 (November 2005): 6, last accessed 3 June 2013, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11404. 
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2. Strategic patience and a very long term perspective inform planning and 
execution. 
3. The indirect approach to strategy and warfare is prevalent. 
4. Multi-faceted strategic victory is valued more than battlefield military 
victory. 
C. CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS 
As the largest and arguably most successful communist nation today, it is far too 
easy to paint opinions about the Chinese nation in its infamous communist red—the 
primary color pre-dates its nationalistic communist associations and still symbolizes 
prosperity, blessings and positive energy for the Chinese people. Modern China has come 
to embrace both sides of its crimson identity—a fervent nationalism as well as a booming 
economy. This heady mix can fuel the aggressive nationalist ambitions as easily as it can 
improve the lives of 18% of the world population (China’s 1.3 billion out of the world’s 
6.9 billion). 29  Where does the civilization that for millennia had considered itself to be 
superior in all important aspects (culture, education, sciences, governance, warfare) see 
its own destiny in the context of the current geo-strategic environment?30  That is the 
question of this section. 
In March 2013, Xi Jinping was confirmed as the President of the People’s 
Republic of China and de-facto leader of the world’s most populous nation.  Xi’s 
frequent references to the “China Dream” or Zhongguo Meng (中国梦) provide insight 
into what he perceives to be the national strategic goals of China.31  The “China Dream” 
can be interpreted literally or figuratively. From a cultural and civilizational perspective, 
the China Dream can be interpreted as a revitalization or rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation, the dawning of a new era of prosperity, happiness and strength.32  The literal 
interpretation of the China Dream sets it up as a direct response to the contemporary 
                                                 
29 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: China,” updated 7 May 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 
30 Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, 7. 
31 Russell Leigh Moses, “Now Sharper, Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ Marks Departure From Past,” 
Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/04/03/now-sharper-xi-jinpings-
china-dream-marks-departure-from-past/. 
32 Moses, “Now Sharper, Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ Marks Departure From Past.” 
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challenges faced by China—social tension and unrest due to inequitable wealth 
distribution, negative effects of unfettered economic development, and regional and 
global security challenges.33  Thus, the China Dream literally desires to achieve the 
following national goals for China. 
First, the China Dream aims to create a more equitable society—with more 
equitable wealth distribution in society and economic development within China. This is 
essential for the political survival of the Chinese Communist party because of the 
widespread and deep social unrest that can arise from a disaffected populace if the 
majority of the populace does not benefit from the economic gains.34  
Second, sustainable and environmentally responsible development improves 
quality of living in China. Environmental damage, pollution and regional income 
disparities are obvious by-products of China’s rapid economic development and have 
become major national concerns. Addressing sustainable development furthers China’s 
credentials as a responsible country. 
Third, China’s development into a major military power is not merely driven by 
the pursuit of national status as a major power. It is also driven by the need to defend her 
sovereignty in regional territorial disputes and to protect her sprawling commercial 
interests that are increasingly spread around the globe.35  Thus, national pride and 
economic interests are both of importance in guiding the development of China’s 
military. 
Having assessed the China Dream and its national strategic goals, we are in a 
better position to assess China’s national security goals. One source for China’s security 
policy is official pronouncements about China’s policy and principles for dealing with 
other nations and her declared security interests. China has periodically released policy 
                                                 
33 Moses, “Now Sharper, Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ Marks Departure From Past.” 
34 David Pilling, “Xi Must Show He Can Deliver the ‘China Dream’,” Financial Times, 25 Apr 
2013: 7. 
35 Jeremy Page, “For Xi, a ‘China Dream’ of Military Power,” Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, 
13 March 2013: A.1.  
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statements pertaining to issues of regional and global interest that serve as a rich source 
of insight into China’s national security objectives.  
In September 2011, China published the White Paper “China’s Peaceful 
Development” in which “China declared solemnly again to the world that peaceful 
development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make itself 
strong and prosperous, and make more contribution to the progress of human 
civilization.”36  China’s commitment to peace serves national goals as well as more 
altruistic desires for world peace and civilizational progress—with national goals being 
the primary objective, and humankind’s betterment a convenient by-product. A peaceful 
environment allows for China to devote resources to national economic growth and 
support not just a prosperous populace but the construction of a powerful military that 
will give the Chinese nation strength.   
Tracking the rise of China in the post Deng era, the Chinese have largely been 
truthful in their statement—building a strong and prosperous nation have indeed been their 
goals and the strategy of peaceful development their method. However, to assume that China 
is inherently pacifist would be naive. Although Chinese assertiveness has largely been 
confined to regional territorial disputes, China has demonstrated resolve and a willingness to 
up the military ante in order to achieve her policy objectives— particularly with Taiwan, 
Japan and Vietnam.37  This suggests that the preservation of territorial integrity and assertion 
of territorial rights is an important national strategic goal.    
On 16 April 2013, China released its eighth Defense White Paper and the first 
policy paper since new Chinese President Xi Jinping took over the reins from Hu Jintao 
                                                 
36 China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council. 
37 Taiwan: From 2000 to 2008, cross-straits relations were tense due to the election of a pro-
independence Taiwanese President.  China passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 which formalized non-
peaceful means as a policy option in response to a declaration of independence by Taiwan. 
Japan: On-going naval confrontations at sea over the disputed Senkaku Islands or Diao’yu Tai 
(钓鱼台) between China and Japan have caused relations between the traditional rivals to extremely tense. 
Vietnam: In June 2012, Vietnam passed laws placing the Spratly and Paracel Islands under 
Vietnamese jurisdiction.  At the same time, China passed laws establishing the prefecture of Sansha City 
which encompasses the Spratly, Paracel and Zhongsha islands. Both countries have called the other’s 
moves illegal and invalid; keeping tensions between the two traditional antagonists still high. 
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in March 2013.   The first section of the paper outlined the “new situation” and “new 
challenges” that confront China today and serve as the backdrop for “new missions” for 
China’s armed forces. In reference to the “new situation” faced by China, the paper 
highlighted “signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism” in 
the world.38  It also noted that the Asia-Pacific region had become a significant area for 
global economic development as well as “strategic interaction between major powers.”39  
It is important to note that the aforementioned situations identified in the Defense White 
Paper were seen as exceptions to the broader landscape of peace and development as the 
“underlying trends of our time” and that “international forces are shifting in favor of 
maintaining world peace.”40  This is important as it demonstrates that China is self-aware 
about its own role in perpetuating the necessary conditions for development and progress 
of not just China, but the region and the world. 
The “new challenge” for China is safeguarding its “national unification, territorial 
integrity and developmental interests.”41  Those three terms are coded references to 
Taiwan, territorial disputes with regional countries and China’s burgeoning global 
economic interests. Three threats specifically identified in the White Paper were 
separatism, extremism and terrorism. These threats can be matched with each of the three 
challenges respectively—separatist sentiments in Taiwan, extreme nationalism in Japan 
and India, extreme religious beliefs in Tibet and Xinjiang that undermine territorial 
integrity and threaten economic interests.  
What is really “new” in the strategic situation for China?  Many of the threats that 
challenge China today are not “new” because the Taiwan issue, regional territorial 
disputes and unrest in its restive provinces have been extant issues for China. We believe 
the “new” paradigm stems from three major factors. First, the U.S. re-balancing of its 
military forces to the Pacific has increased U.S. presence and increased China’s sense of 
                                                 
38 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, 16 April 2013, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm. 
39  The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council. 
40  The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council. 
41  The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council. 
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insecurity. Second, improved Chinese military and national capabilities and their global 
reach have caused a corresponding expansion of the Chinese strategic outlook regionally 
and internationally.42  Third, the Chinese economy is now a major component of the Asia 
Pacific economy and an important driver for the recovery of the developed world’s 
lackluster economies. China’s international stature has been rising throughout the new 
millennium, and watershed events like the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the growth of 
China’s economy to be second only to the U.S. have served only to underline China’s 
ascension to the world stage as a political, economic and military power. When the 
collective outcome of these developments is contrasted with the “old” Chinese paradigm 
that was a lot more insular and less assertive internationally, we begin to understand why 
the Chinese perceive this era as a “new” and exciting one. 
The “new” paradigm that pervades Chinese strategic self-perception derives much 
from recent positive strategic developments for China coupled with increased emphasis 
on the Asia-Pacific region by the United States. This Chinese self-perception while not 
inherently dangerous has the potential to fuel Chinese military development and political 
assertiveness as a rising China flexes its political and economic muscle in East Asia, 
backed by an increasingly capable military force. Despite Chinese assurances that it does 
not seek hegemony, its assertiveness on issues like territorial disputes and U.S. presence 
in the region can be expected to grow stronger with time as China grows more confident. 
Zheng Wang explained the roles that the psychology of the Chinese civilization and its 
institutional memory play in China’s self-perception of its ‘China Dream’—which is 
constructed within the narrative of civilizational rejuvenation (fuxing复兴) rather than 
just being a mere national dream of a new generation of political elite.43   
With our understanding of China’s strategic psyche, national consciousness and 
national strategic goals, we can analyze the national security goals of China. In its 2013 
Defense White Paper, China identified five fundamental operational principles for its 
armed forces:44 
                                                 
42 From 2000 to 2013, China developed its indigenous satellite navigation system, launched its first 
manned space flight, successfully tested an anti-satellite missile, deployed its Navy for counter-piracy 
operations in the Horn of Africa and most recently launched its first aircraft carrier.   
43 Zheng Wang, “Not Rising, but Rejuvenating: The “Chinese Dream,” The Diplomat, 5 February 
2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/05/chinese-dream-draft/. 
44 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,Information Office of the State Council.  
 26 
1. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; and 
supporting the country’s peaceful development. 
2. Aiming to win local wars under conditions of informationization and 
expanding Chinese military preparedness.45 
3. Provide comprehensive security and effective conduct of military 
operations other than war. 
4. Deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations. 
5. Acting in accordance with laws, policies and military discipline. 
Combining our understanding of the “China Dream,” China’s own assessment of 
her strategic challenges and position; and the operational principles for her armed forces; 
we assess China’s national security goals as borne out in her Defense White Paper as the 
following (in descending order of priority):  
1. Defending national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity 
2. Supporting national economic and social development 
3. Safeguarding world peace and global security46 
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS AND THE 
MARITIME DOMAIN 
In concert with her national security goals and the fundamental operational 
principles of her armed forces, China articulated the diverse roles expected of its armed 
forces. This section examines the link between the roles of China’s armed forces and the 
maritime domain; and serves as a prelude to the next chapter on China’s maritime 
strategy and how the aircraft carrier fits therein. 
  
                                                 
45 Informationization refers to information-based warfare for China. 
46 Michael D. Swaine, “Does China Have a Grand Strategy?” China: Contemporary Political, 
Economic, and International Affairs (New York: NYU Press, 2007), 40. This goal appears too altruistic to 
be true and perhaps may be code for “attaining geopolitical influence as a primary state in the Asia-Pacific 
region and possibly beyond” – as postulated by Swaine in his work on China’s grand strategy objectives. 
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Table 2.   Roles of China’s Armed Forces 
Roles of China’s Armed Forces 
 
 First Priority Second Priority Third Priority 
Defending national 
sovereignty, security and 
territorial integrity 
 
Supporting national economic 
and social development 
Safeguarding world peace and 
regional stability 
Sub-Tasks 
Safeguard border and coastal 
security 
Participate in national development Participate in UN peace keeping 
operations 
Safeguard territorial air security Participate in emergency rescue and 
disaster relief 
International disaster relief and 
humanitarian aid 
Maintaining constant combat 
readiness 
Maintain social stability Safeguarding the security of 
international SLOCs 
Carry out scenario based 
exercises and drills 
Safeguard maritime rights and 
interests 
Joint exercise and training with 
foreign armed forces 
 Protecting overseas interests  
Source: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 16 April 2013. 
An analysis of the roles of China’s Armed Forces shows that in each of the three 
priority categories, there are roles that require maritime capabilities because they either 
take place in the maritime domain or the seas provide the best or primary means of 
approach. The roles in blue font require sea control to be established and the ability for 
China to project maritime forces into the areas of concern. The roles in red font require 
maritime support (not necessarily amounting to sea control) because the maritime domain 
may be an important part of such operations (territorial air security and disaster relief) or 
because the maritime domain may constitute a major component of such efforts (naval 
exercises and training). These maritime-related roles have been organized into a separate 
table below. It is clear that the maritime capability of China’s PLAN will need to be 
capable of large-scale blue water operations to fulfill some of the national security roles 
that have been identified. 
Table 3.   Maritime Roles of China’s Armed Forces 
Roles where Sea Control is required Roles where Maritime Support may be required 
Safeguard border and coastal security Safeguard territorial air security 
Safeguard maritime rights and interests Participate in emergency rescue and disaster relief 
Protecting overseas interests International disaster relief and humanitarian aid 
Safeguarding the security of international SLOCs Joint exercise and training with foreign armed forces 
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Examining the roles where sea control will be required, the correlation of these 
roles with control of the maritime domain is clear. For safeguarding border and coastal 
security, some measure of security can be established ashore. However, a shored-based 
strategy would be defensively static and unable to influence the maritime domain where 
threat vectors may ingress or egress. To effectively perform coastal security, China needs 
to be able to establish control over a defined maritime space for a defined temporal 
period, or at the very least deny that maritime space to its adversaries.47  These roles are 
easier to support from ashore with a brown-water maritime force because the maritime 
space is only a means of access to shore-based interests.   In order to safeguard maritime 
rights/interests overseas and the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) that may be 
located far from the coast, China will require a longer range, higher endurance, more 
capable blue-water force that can operate far from the coast at extended periods.48 
For the roles where maritime support may be required and sea control not 
necessarily achieved, the requirements for long range, high endurance are not as 
important as the ability of the maritime platforms to support the roles. Safeguarding 
territorial air security includes maritime airspace that requires ships with effective aerial 
surveillance radars and surface to air weapon systems. Whether supporting disaster and 
humanitarian relief operations domestically or abroad, the PLAN will need to be able to 
move large quantities of material at short notice and facilitate access to inaccessible 
areas.   Joint exercises and training require the least overheads in terms of specialized 
capabilities—but navies in particular are especially valuable for such interactions due to 
their self-contained nature (minimal requirements for physical relocation of men and 
material) and the long tradition of naval cooperation and exercise at sea. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a glimpse into the various elements that influence 
China’s strategic considerations. Important elements of Chinese strategic psyche were 
                                                 
47 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 
159. 
48 The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council. 
 29 
examined. China’s national strategic goals were laid out by examining statements made 
by the latest generation of Chinese leaders on the “Chinese Dream,” as well as China’s 
policy for peaceful development. China’s national security goals were identified based on 
the latest Defense White Paper and the roles of China’s armed forces examined for their 
relation to the maritime domain. By studying the macro-level influences at the cultural, 
national and strategic levels that influence strategic goals, this chapter sets the stage for 
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IV. CHINA’S MARITIME HERITAGE & STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines China’s contemporary maritime strategy and the role of 
aircraft carriers in that strategy.  It begins with a brief study of China’s maritime heritage 
to understand the historical evolution of what is currently known as the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  Knowledge of China’s maritime heritage contributes to 
the understanding of PLAN’s development trajectory and the evolution of Chinese 
maritime strategic thought.  The source and substance of current Chinese maritime 
strategy will be examined before the role of the aircraft carrier in complementing that 
strategy is explained.  The objective of this chapter is to explain the utility of the aircraft 
carrier to China’s maritime strategy and verify its credentials as a critical naval capability 
for China.  
B. MARGINALIZATION OF CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
EARLY CHINESE HISTORY 
The history of warfare throughout Chinese history has predominantly been a 
history of land warfare.  For imperial China, the inland plains and valleys were where 
empires were made and emperors crowned.  The vast seas served only as conduits for 
trade and exploration.49  In post-imperial republican China, the seas became the medium 
through which dominance was exerted by Europe and Japan along China’s coast through 
trade and naval power.  Even then, the existence of Chinese civilization was never 
seriously threatened by China’s maritime weakness.  Finally, the Communists under Mao 
defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) through their campaigns in China’s hinterland before 
taking the coast and forcing the KMT across the Taiwan Straits. This historic Chinese 
view of the utility (or lack thereof) of maritime power is shaped by Chinese strategic 
perspective on the centrality of their civilization and their geopolitical history.  An 
understanding of these perspectives provides the foundation from which we can 
understand modern China’s perspective on the utility of maritime power and command of 
the sea.  
                                                 
49 None of the four major capitals of Chinese civilization (Chang’an, Loyang, Nanjing and Beijing) 
were located on the coast, all were inland cities. 
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For millennia, land warfare has been the dominant type of warfare that 
determined possession of the monopoly of power that emanated from the Chinese 
emperors.  Maritime power and naval warfare only played minor roles in Chinese history.  
Even though imperial China possessed advance maritime science that surpassed that of 
any civilization between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, and sent vast imperial armadas 
halfway around the globe, imperial China’s interest in the strategic value of the seas 
never materialized.50  The seas offered little strategic value for imperial China.  The main 
threats to the dynasties came overland from the Asian interior to the north and the west—
all the crucial battles were fought on land.51  When imperial navies did prosper (in the 
Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties), their missions were limited to coastal defense and 
control of maritime trade.52  By the time the Qing dynasty felt seaborne pressure from 
European and Japanese fleets in the nineteenth century, the imperial navy had fallen far 
behind in contemporary naval capabilities and could do little to protect the Chinese 
coasts—contributing to the fall of the last imperial Chinese dynasty. 
The post-imperial period of China was marked by a period when China was 
known as the “sick man of the East” (Dongya Bingfu东亚病夫) for its weakness and 
inability to defend itself against both Western powers and the Japanese—whose main 
access to China were through the Chinese coastal cities where the superior foreign navies 
reigned unchallenged.  This painful memory of national subjugation and decline 
facilitated through domination by foreign navies would return to influence Chinese 
strategic considerations when China designed her maritime strategy. 
Japan invaded China through Manchuria in 1937.  Japanese maritime dominance 
in East Asia following her defeat of the Russian fleet at the 1905 Battle of Tsushima and 
Japanese subjugation of Port Arthur returned to haunt China.  The eight years of 
resistance by both Chinese Nationalists and Communists was fought exclusively on land 
in China's interior as the Japanese Navy controlled China's coasts with impunity.  Again, 
                                                 
50 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 3.  The fifteenth century Ming dynasty eunuch admiral Zheng He 
(郑和) took his vast fleet of ships as far as the Middle East and Africa – showcasing “Chinese shipbuilding, 
voyage management and navigation ability well beyond European capabilities.”  
51 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 4.  
52 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 4. 
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in a battle for national survival, maritime strategy played no significant role except to 
serve as a painful reminder of China’s weakness in the maritime arena. 
After Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Chinese civil war between the Nationalist 
KMT and Communists was fought in China's interior where Communist strongholds 
dominated and moved to the coast as KMT forces were pushed back.  In 1949, when 
KMT forces withdrew to Taiwan, the Communists did not possess the maritime 
capabilities to pursue them decisively across the Taiwan Strait.  Once more, China’s 
maritime capability was outstanding for its irrelevance and ineptness. 
The formative years of modern day China were therefore dominated by a 
succession of land wars that drove the Japanese invaders back and pushed the Nationalist 
KMT forces to Taiwan.  The operational strategy, structure and capabilities of the PLA 
were therefore focused for warfare on land and not at sea.  But the salience of the seas on 
China's national security would not be totally forgotten.  The tumultuous period between 
the last Chinese imperial dynasty and communist triumph in China were sandwiched 
between two significant failures of maritime capability that allowed foreign navies free 
reign on China's coastline and the Nationalist KMT forces to escape to Taiwan. 
C. NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNIST CHINA 
The fortunes of the PLAN improved from 1949 as the Chinese nation grew in 
stature domestically and internationally.  In 1953, Mao Zedong raised the hopes of 
China’s budding maritime force when he declared that “We must build a strong navy for 
the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggression.”53 
In 1949, the first PRC Navy was formed mainly from the defected Nationalist 
KMT Second Coastal Defense Fleet.  Its role was to establish law and order on coastal 
and riverine waters, help capture offshore islands occupied by the KMT forces and 
prepare for the capture of Taiwan.54  During the formative years of the PLAN, Soviet 
assistance in equipment acquisition, system design and doctrine formulation were 
                                                 
53 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea,10. 
54 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 17. 
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significant and would remain so until the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.  Elimination of the 
KMT forces in Taiwan was still a major pre-occupation of Mao and drove the design and 
mission of the early PLAN. 
The outbreak of the Korean War and the successful amphibious landings in 
Incheon by U.S. led United Nations forces in 1950 led to strategic reconsiderations about 
naval capabilities by China.  However, Chinese strategic development was hampered by 
Mao’s ideological insistence on the principle of “People’s War” and the 1959 dismissal 
of Peng Dehuai who commanded Chinese forces in Korea and who was the chief 
proponent for China’s strategic review.55  Thus PLAN modernization and strategic 
refocus gave way to China’s strategic focus on developing nuclear weapons and 
recovering from the disastrous “Great Leap Forward.”  An important development was 
the birth of the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) in 1952 whose role was maritime air 
defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine operations.  Nevertheless, the PLAN’s strategic 
focus remained on maritime defense in coastal waters.  In 1953, the PLAN Marine Corps 
was stood up with a single regiment’s strength.56  In 1955, Taiwan cited continuing 
threats from China to pressure the U.S. to enter into a mutual defense treaty, thereby 
creating a significant obstacle to future Chinese invasion of Taiwan.  Not coincidentally, 
the division strength PLA Marine Corps was disbanded in 1957 despite the renaissance 
for amphibious forces elsewhere brought on by the successful Incheon landings in 
1950.57  The deconstruction of the PLA Marine Corps can be attributed to the U.S. -
Taiwan mutual defense treaty, as well as the fact that by 1955, China had retaken the 
offshore islands that it could from the KMT: Hainan (海南), Wanshan (万山), 
Zhoushan(舟山), Yijiangshan (一江山) and Dachen (大陈).58  Therefore, the raison 
d’etre for the PLAN Marine Corps was no longer valid—not until almost two decades 
later for islands farther down south in the South China Sea. 
                                                 
55 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 20. 
56 Neng Tong, Zhong’gong Haijun Xieshi (中共海军写实) [ (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 
1999), 250. 
57 Tong, Zhong’gong Haijun Xieshi (中共海军写实). 
58 Kissinger, On China, 156. 
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The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 threw back military modernization plans for the 
whole PLA force, hitting the hardware-oriented PLAN hard.59  A short war with India in 
1962 and military operations in Tibet continued to emphasize land-based warfare at the 
expense of the PLAN. Mao’s ideology of “People’s War” continued to hamper naval 
modernization as technology and hardware were seen as inferior to ideologically-driven 
soldiers.60  Even the 1970 deployment of China’s first Soviet-designed ballistic missile 
submarine (without nuclear missiles) did not increase modernization or resources 
available to the PLAN as nuclear weapons were a national military project and did not 
benefit the PLAN as a whole.61  Most critically, this period of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76) retarded technological development in general and the PLAN would fall 
further behind in important developments in naval warfare that included the utilization of 
guided missiles for anti-surface, anti-air and anti-submarine warfare; computerization, 
command, control and intelligence (C3I) and automation in sensors and propulsion.62  
China would take decades to catch up in terms of both hardware upgrades and the 
professional education of its sailors. 
The development of the PLAN under Mao was marked by general under-
development and confinement to defensive maritime roles once Taiwan secured U.S. 
defense guarantees.  The strategic role of the PLAN in China’s national security strategy 
was marginal and only gained some importance with the 1970 deployment of China’s 
first ballistic missile submarine.  The PLAN was doctrinally backward and had missed 
major naval warfare developments.  It was thus technologically behind its naval 
contemporaries and was in no shape to effectively project force into the Asian-Pacific 
region.  Unfortunately for the PLAN, domestic political, social and economic turmoil 
derailed its development under Mao.  
                                                 
59 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 22. 
60 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 23. 
61 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 23. 
62 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 23. 
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D. CHINA’S CONTEMPORARY NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Mao’s death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's tenure marked the rehabilitation of 
China into the international system and the rebirth of the Chinese economy.  China had 
plugged back into the world and was growing rapidly in many strategic areas.  With 
internal stability and growing wealth, China looked to develop its air force and navy to 
create a modern and balanced military force.  In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for “a 
strong navy with modern combat capability.”63  Most significantly for the PLAN, Mao’s 
doctrine of “People’s War” was increasingly pushed back by recognition of the 
importance of technology and military hardware. 
In the 1970s, Soviet naval prowess was at its height and Japanese naval 
capabilities were also improving.  Fortunately and ironically, China was now re-engaging 
in bilateral relations with the U.S. by Nixon’s 1972 visit.64  In the context of the Cold 
War, the formidable U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet was a more than adequate deterrent against 
the Soviet Pacific fleet.  China also believed that the terms of the U.S. – Japan treaty 
would keep Japan’s naval ambitions in check.65  In 1974, the PLA’s marginally 
successful naval action against South Vietnamese naval forces in the Paracels (Xisha 
西沙66) proved to be of strategic importance but not because the small islets that were 
now under Chinese control.  Rather, the incident strengthened Chinese strategic 
awareness about the importance of building credible force projection capabilities in the 
PLAN and awakened China’s interest in protecting what it saw as its traditional 
sovereign territorial interests in the South China Sea.  As a result, the PLAN’s disbanded 
Marine Corps was reestablished in 1979 and assigned to the South Seas Fleet together 
with the PLAN’s amphibious assets.  In 1980 the South Seas Fleet conducted a major 
                                                 
63 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 10. 
64 Kissinger, On China, 255. 
65 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 25. 
66 The Paracels are known by China as Xisha or “Western Sands”. In addition, Macclesfield Bank 
is known by China as Zhongsha (中沙) or “Central Sands” and the Spratlys are known as Nansha (南沙) or 
“Southern Sands”.  Collectively, China terms the island groups as Sansha (三沙) or the “Three Sands”. 
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fleet exercise focused on the seizure and defense of islands in the South China Sea—an 
exercise that has become a regular fixture in the PLAN training cycle.67 
Cole credits three significant events in the 1980s that enhanced PLAN 
development.  First was Deng Xiaoping’s scathing review of the PLA’s performance in 
the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. 68  Even though the PLAN was not directly involved in 
that war’s operations, it benefited from the institutional review within the military to 
become more operationally effective.    Second was the 1985 determination that the 
Soviet Union no longer posed a nuclear threat to China.69  This resulted in the PLA’s 
distancing from the continental strategy that marginalized the PLAN.  The PLA was to 
prepare for “small wars on the periphery” instead and China’s extensive maritime 
periphery improved the PLAN’s ability to obtain resources within the PLA.70  Third was 
the 1982 appointment of Liu Huaqing (刘华清) as PLAN commander.  He promulgated a 
maritime strategy for the PLAN that allowed it to progress into modernity.  He also led a 
widespread reorganization of the Navy, Marine Corps, research and development, and 
training systems.71  During this period, the PLAN acquired extensive Western military 
technology and in 1988 successfully launched an intermediate range ballistic missile to 
confirm its ability to deploy strategic nuclear weapons at sea.72  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989 removed a major land threat and provided further impetus for the 
PLA to improve maritime capabilities.  It also opened up the possibility of acquiring 
former Soviet technology with greater ease. 
In the 1990s, in addition to force modernization, the PLAN began long-range 
deployments to East and South Asia and sent a task group to visit the Western 
Hemisphere as well.  The first Gulf War in 1990 demonstrated the superiority of U.S. 
                                                 
67 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 25. 
68 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 26. 
69 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and oversaw a slew of reconciliation measures with 
China – including a reduction in USSR forces along the Sino-Soviet border, resumption of trade and 
cooling of border disputes. 
70 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 26. 
71 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 26. 
72 Chong-Pin Lin, “China’s Military Modernization: Perceptions, Progress and Prospects,” Security 
Studies, Volume 3, Issue 4, 1994, 726. 
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technology in overcoming conventional force advantages and prompted China to 
reevaluate its military development.  The peaceful handover of Hong Kong to China in 
1997 enhanced the importance of maritime security for China’s economy and prompted 
Jiang Zemin to urge the PLAN to “build up the nation’s maritime Great Wall.”73  
E. THE PLAN FORGES AHEAD IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
The new millennium saw the PLAN fully emerge from its brown water Navy 
roots and deploy modern capabilities with an operational reach that extended beyond the 
Asia Pacific.  It seemed that the PLAN had finally made up for its lost decades in the 
naval wilderness and had gained the confidence to operate alongside its modern naval 
contemporaries.  Within its own maritime area of operations, the PLAN was also 
increasingly assertive and confident.  Encouraging military modernization in 2006, Hu 
Jintao advised the the PLAN to “endeavor to build a powerful People’s navy that can 
adapt to its historical mission during a new century and new period.”74   
The PLAN embraced regional and extra-regional operations with increasing 
frequency and significance—participating in a multitude of bilateral exercises with Asian 
and Western navies that enhanced its professionalism.  In 2008, the PLAN deployed its 
first three-ship task group to the Gulf of Aden to participate in United Nations sanctioned 
counter-piracy operations.   This marked the first time that Chinese naval ships were 
deployed for military operations outside the Asia-Pacific.  China has since maintained a 
constant presence of PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese shipping 
interests.75  In 2011, the frigate Xuzhou was dispatched from China’s counter-piracy task 
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group to successfully support non-combatant evacuation of Chinese nationals from 
Libya—thus demonstrating the operational agility and readiness of the PLAN.76 
The PLAN also became the face of an increasingly assertive China in the Asia 
Pacific maritime arena.  In areas where its sovereignty was perceived to be challenged, 
the PLAN had been unapologetic in asserting its freedom of action towards regional 
rivals Taiwan, Russia, Japan, Philippines and Vietnam.  Sovereignty dispute incidents 
involving Chinese ships in the Asia Pacific started to increase.  In 2007, China 
established ‘Sansha City’ (三沙市) on one of the disputed Paracel islands in the South 
China Sea to assert its sovereignty.77 
Not only has China been increasingly assertive about maritime rights towards its 
regional neighbors, it has also challenged the U.S. hegemon in the Asia Pacific.  Table 4 
below shows the various incidents in maritime East Asia that have involved China.  
These incidents when assessed in toto reflect China’s willingness to assert its sovereignty 
and challenge what it perceives to be U.S. freedom of action within China’s area of 
influence. 
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Table 4.   Maritime Incidents Involving China 
2001 April. Hainan Island incident: Mid-air collision between Chinese interceptor and 
U.S. surveillance plane.1 
2006 China’s State Oceanographic Administration’s Marine Surveillance force begins 
regular patrols in the South China Sea. 2 
China issues demarches to oil companies about exploration in South China Sea.3 
2007 November.  U.S. Navy ships’ port call requests into Hong Kong rejected by 
China.4 
2009 March. USNS Impeccable harassed by Chinese ships and aircraft in South China 
Sea.5 
May. USNS Victorious harassed by Chinese ships and aircraft in Yellow Sea.6 
China submits map with “nine-dashed line” to the United Nations Commissions 
on Limits of  Continental Shelf.7 
June.  Chinese submarine collides with USN destroyer’s towed array sonar off 
Subic Bay.8 
2010 August. First Chinese midget submarine plants flag on bottom of South China 
Sea.9 
November.  PLAN South Sea Fleet conducts amphibious assault exercise in South 
China Sea. 
2011 May.  Chinese ships cut cable of Vietnamese oil exploration ship in South China 
Sea.10 
 
2012 March.  Second Chinese midget submarine plants second flag on bottom of South 
China Sea.11 
July.  China establishes Sansha City and sets up military garrison on Yongxing 
Island in the Paracels.12 
December.  Chinese province issues rules allowing interception of ships in South 
China Sea.13 
2013 January.  PLAN ship locks fire-control radar on Japanese ship off Senkaku 
Islands.14 
Sources: 
1 Shirley A. Kan et al., China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Policy Implications, CRS 
Report RL30946 (Washington , D.C: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 10 October 
2001). 
2 Michael D. Swaine, China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, 4 April 2013, U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, last accessed 4 June 2013, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/04/maritime-disputes-must-be-carefully-managed/fxea#. 
3 Swaine, China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, 4 April 2013, U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/04/maritime-disputes-
must-be-carefully-managed/fxea#. 
4 “China tells more U.S. vessels to keep out,” Central News Network, 30 November 2007, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/11/30/china.us/. 
5 Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College 
Review, Summer 2009, Vol.62, No.3. 
Continued on next page. 
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Continued from previous page. 
6 Barbara Starr, “Chinese Boats harassed U.S. ship, officials say,” Central News Network, 5 May 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html. 
7 Beckman and Tara Davenport, “CLCLS submissions and claims to the South China Sea,” South 
China Sea Studies, last modified 16 August 2011, http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/conferences-and-
seminars-/second-international-workshop/608-clcs-submissions-and-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-by-
robert-c-beckman-a-tara-davenport. 
8 Barbara Starr, “Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. navy ship,” Central News Network, 12 
June 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/. 
9 “China plants flag beneath South China Sea,” United Press International, 26 August 2010, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/08/26/China-plants-flag-beneath-South-China-Sea/UPI-
27691282870074/. 
10 Jane Perlez, “Dispute flares over energy in South China Sea,” The New York Times, 4 December 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/asia/china-vietnam-and-india-fight-over-energy-
exploration-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0. 
11 Stephen Chen, “Submarine plants flag on ocean floor,” South China Morning Post, 30 March 2012, 
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12 Austin Ramzy, “China’s newest city raises threat of conflict in South China Sea,” Time, 24 July 
2012, http://world.time.com/2012/07/24/chinas-newest-city-raises-threat-of-conflict-in-the-south-china-
sea/. 
13 Jane Perlez, “Alarm as China issues rules for disputed area,” New York Times, 1 December 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/world/asia/alarm-as-china-issues-rules-for-disputed-sea.html?_r=0. 




China’s military technology made substantive strides in the first decade of the 
new millennium —deploying capabilities that have the potential for strategic effects.  The 
Beidou global positioning navigation system became operational in 2000.  China’s anti-
satellite missile was successfully demonstrated in 2007 to serve warning.  China 
deployed its first anti-carrier ballistic missile as a deterrent to U.S. carriers in 2009. 78  In 
2012, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier.  Thus, the rash of technological and 
capability advancements by China in the first decade of the new millennium were nothing 
short of extraordinary. 
The significance of the PLAN to China’s national security has been enhanced in 
the new millennium by its expanded roles, capabilities and operational effects.  
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 In April 2013, Xi Jinping advised the PLAN to “enhance its preparedness for 
combat” when he made a highly symbolic visit to the PLAN’s Southern Fleet shortly 
after he took office in March 2013.79   
What accounts for the unprecedented growth in the PLAN’s capabilities after the 
1980s and what maritime strategy drove its deployment?   
F. CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY 
Liu Huaqing who served as PLAN commander from 1982 to 1988 has been 
identified as the father of the modern PLAN due to his influence on its modernization, 
development and strategic deployment.  ‘China’s Mahan’ has been recognized as the 
intellectual engine behind China’s maritime strategy that provided the foundation for the 
PLAN’s modernization, expansion and relevance to China’s national security.80  
 In 1985, Liu launched China’s maritime strategy and explained that the top 
objectives were to protect territorial sovereignty, legal maritime rights and natural 
resources in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.81 The critical pillars 
of Liu’s maritime strategy that are relevant to this thesis are: 
• Offshore Defense (近海防御).  Defining offshore operations as occurring 
within the first island chain, Liu extended beyond the near-coast defense 
(近岸防御) limitation common in China’s naval heritage, yet limited 
unwise over reach that would challenge the global ocean-faring 
capabilities of the Soviet or U.S. navies.82 
• Strategic Defense. A strategic maritime defense line will be maintained 
through offensive naval operations to engage threats far from the Chinese 
coast.  This strategic defense line can stretch to the second island chain if 
the PLAN’s capabilities are up to the task. 
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Figure 1: China's Strategic Island Chains83 
Liu’s strategic foresight was not the only factor that led to the adoption of this 
ambitious maritime strategy for the PLAN.  The strategic environment in the mid-1980s 
that supported this maritime strategy also played an important role.84 External factors 
included fundamental changes in China’s external security environment—like the 
diminished strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union, the rising capabilities of regional 
navies and increasing national interest in maritime resources.  Internal factors included 
the “loosening of doctrinaire views in the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping’s investment of 
political capital in modernizing the Chinese military,” and China’s rapidly growing 
economic wealth.85 
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It is no coincidence that Liu’s maritime strategy fits with the latest outline of the 
roles envisaged for the PLAN and China’s current national security goals that were 
outlined in Chapter II.86  The post 1980 evolution of the PLAN was planned with Liu’s 
maritime strategy as a guide.  Thus, the PLAN’s capabilities today are a result of 
calculated strategic planning and execution, resulting in the PLAN’s fulfillment of the 
strategic functions for which it was designed. 
China’s maritime strategy also deals with a legion of potential threats to its 
“national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.”87  “National 
unification” refers to China’s espoused desire to re-unite with Taiwan, China has termed 
pro-independence Taiwanese elements as separatist forces.  “Territorial integrity” refers 
to disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands; with the Indians over Arunachal Pradesh 
and Aksai Chin; and with some Southeast Asian states over the Spratly and Paracel 
islands in the South China Sea.  It is noteworthy that of the three major territorial disputes 
engulfing China today, two are maritime in nature—Senkaku and the South China Sea.  
“Development interests” include maritime resources located in disputed areas in the East 
China Sea and South China Sea; and the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) that 
ensure the safe movement of goods and resources critical to China’s globalized economy. 
Given the trajectory of the PLAN’s development in the new millennium, the 
salience of Liu Huaqing’s outward looking maritime strategy, and China’s maritime 
strategic interests, the inclusion of aircraft carriers into the PLAN’s order of battle should 
have come as no surprise to observers. 
G. SALIENCE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TO CHINA’S MARITIME 
STRATEGY 
Navies are built around ships of various sizes and ability—the tension between 
size and vulnerability remaining unchanged even as naval warfare has advanced.  Despite 
the reach of orbiting satellites and long-range missiles, the enduring power of presence on 
the high seas remains synonymous with command and control of the maritime domain.  
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Modern naval warfare takes place in the air, on the surface and under the waves.  The 
carrier and submarine campaigns of the Second World War, Falklands War and Cold War 
continue to remind us that no matter how high-tech militaries may become, the ability to 
fight effectively in all three mediums is essential to strategic success.  In China’s case, 
the PLAN has developed into a modern navy with ships and submarines of varying size 
and capability.  The most glaring omission in the PLAN order of battle until 2012 was the 
absence of an aircraft carrier. 
Understanding the PLAN’s difficult transition from a backward coastal force to a 
sea-going naval fleet towards the end of the 20th century, it is hardly surprising that an 
aircraft carrier capability was not developed earlier.  The aircraft carrier is an extremely 
resource-intensive capability—not only is the ship itself an engineering monstrosity, 
operations onboard the aircraft carrier require a level of professionalism and skill within 
the Navy that cannot be built overnight and require mastery of other aspects of naval 
operations that will support an aircraft carrier.   Aircraft carriers do not operate in 
isolation because they are such vulnerable high value targets that they require additional 
ships normally found in a carrier battle group to secure an air, surface and sub-surface 
protective bubble around the carrier.  The PLAN therefore had to reach a substantive 
level of maturity before it could realistically conceive of operating an aircraft carrier.  
Not only did the PLAN need sufficient numbers of vessels to form a carrier battle group, 
they needed to be sufficiently capable in multi-dimensional naval warfare to be effective.  
The PLAN’s meteoric development after the 1980s is assessed to have brought it to the 
force size and capability levels sufficient to operate an aircraft carrier.88  Taking the next 
developmental step of building an aircraft carrier capability was therefore a logical next 
step for the PLAN. 
Conceptually, the aircraft carrier is not alien to Chinese maritime strategy.  Liu 
Huaqing advocated the strengths of an aircraft carrier capability to strengthen the 
PLAN’s ability to execute its maritime strategy.  Liu was also known as the father of 
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China’s aircraft carrier program and he was the most senior and staunch advocate for the 
acquisition of an aircraft carrier capability.89   Liu advocated “a medium-sized, 
conventionally-powered aircraft carrier for limited, air-defense dominated missions,” as 
opposed to large, nuclear powered ones for maritime dominance.90   
To project power to the southern and eastern fringes of the first island chain, 
China needed to have portable air power to provide its fleets with adequate air defense.  
This is especially so in the southern regions of the South China Sea which are beyond the 
ranges of shore-based aircraft in China yet well within the range of shore-based aircraft 
of the littoral states that are potential adversaries.91  Storey and You outlined China’s 
maritime doctrine and the role of aircraft carriers, stating that China’s aircraft carrier 
ambitions grew from the realization that sea control can only be achieved through air 
superiority.92  This was especially the case in the South China Sea which stretches up to 
950 miles from the Chinese coast, thus well beyond the range of any Chinese fighter 
aircraft.  Apart from power projection, carriers can also be used to support humanitarian 
and disaster relief operations, and maritime security operations.93  Thus, the operational 
need for an aircraft carrier is clear if China intends to exercise effective sea control in the 
South China Sea and be ready to defend its interests, support operations in the Asia-
Pacific and portray itself as a major naval power in the region. 
China’s need for a carrier capability has thus only increased in the past decade 
and with the commissioning of the Liaoning, China has taken a big stride towards 
building a naval capability that is aligned with the strategic military goal of achieving sea 
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control in the South China Sea.  Storey and You assessed in 2004 that China had shelved 
its carrier plans in deference to more urgent concerns over Taiwan.94  Since then, the 
Kuomintang victory in Taiwan’s Presidential elections in 2008 and 2012 by the pro-
Beijing Ma Ying-jeou has decreased China’s apprehensions about Taiwanese agitation 
for independence; and the South China Sea has returned to be a top foreign policy 
priority for China.  Not only has China pushed ahead with its carrier development, it has 
also increased its maritime activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea,  driving 
the Western Pacific to the top of its foreign policy agenda. 
With the commissioning of its first aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012, China has 
demonstrated its technical ability to construct and operate a medium sized, 
conventionally powered aircraft carrier.  Although the Liaoning’s organic fighter 
capability is still being built, there is little doubt that China possesses the resources, 
systems, knowledge and motivation to eventually stand up a fully functional carrier 
capability.95 
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the heritage of China’s maritime forces and 
development of the PLAN.  Mindful not to let history repeat itself and neglect her 
strategic maritime interests, China has therefore developed a forward based defensive 
maritime strategy to protect her mainland and secure her coasts. 
It also highlighted China’s current maritime strategy, and justifications for its 
aircraft carrier capability.  As the PLAN has grown in size and capability, its reach has 
also grown to secure China’s maritime and economic interests in the region and around 
the world.  In the scheme of China’s maritime strategy, the aircraft carrier has a definite 
strategic role. 
By clarifying the strategic coherence and operational requirement of a carrier 
capability for the PLAN, this chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent chapters 
where strategic deception concerning the acquisition and development of the Liaoning 
will be examined in detail. 
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V. STRATEGIC DECEPTION: EASTERN STRATAGEMS 
EXPLOIT WESTERN SENSIBILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the unique qualities found in Chinese conceptions of 
strategic deception and its employment as a strategic tool.  First, strategic deception as a 
concept will be contrasted between East and West.  Second, we examine Deng 
Xiaoping’s strategic guidance and its application to the Liaoning deception.  Finally, the 
Thirty-Six Stratagems from Chinese military history are examined for their relevance to 
the Liaoning deception.  This allows us to better unravel China’s deception with regards 
to the Liaoning through the lens of Chinese strategic culture concerning deception.  
References to the peculiar characteristics of Chinese strategic deception in this chapter 
are specific to the circumstances of the Liaoning deception and are thus not exhaustive.  
B. WHAT IS STRATEGIC DECEPTION? 
In 1981, Heuer defined strategic deception as actions that “aim to manipulate elite 
perceptions in order to gain competitive advantage.  It is usually achieved by passage of 
information to national or military decision makers either directly or via a nation’s 
intelligence services. Channels for passing such information include public or private 
statements by government officials, leaks to journalists, double agents and spoofing of 
technical sensors.”96  While Heuer’s 1981 deception is still applicable today, the 
proliferation of mass media, social media and the internet’s associated technologies have 
certainly increased the vectors for deception and their potential effectiveness.  
In this thesis, we examine China’s employment of strategic deception to obfuscate 
its acquisition and development of its first aircraft carrier until the point of no return was 
passed in its development and a fait accompli was presented to the world.  To achieve 
this, the Chinese executed a strategic deception that not only hoodwinked its own 
citizens, but other states that may have had an interest in blocking the Chinese from 
                                                 
96 Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counter-Deception,” 294. 
 50 
acquiring such a capability.  What were the unique characteristics of this Chinese 
strategic deception that allowed it to be successful in our contemporary environment? 
C. CHINESE CONCEPTION OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION   
“The Chinese have the oldest (and virtually unbroken) tradition of theory and 
doctrine on surprise and deception.”97  Among the principles of warfare discussed by Sun 
Tzu in the first chapter of his treatise on the art of war, he states that soldiers engaged in 
military warfare should have an endless array of stratagems and ploys to ceaselessly 
catch the adversary off-guard (兵者, 诡道也).  This principle has been popularly 
translated as “all warfare is based on deception” in Western literature.98   
The idea that one need not necessarily be forthright and be strategically 
ambiguous so as to leave maximum space for strategic maneuver has long tradition in 
Chinese culture.  Many of these principles are captured in Chinese idioms of expression 
that are often laden with historical references and meaning.  Chinese leaders have used 
such expressions to guide and inform national strategy.  To non-native Chinese speakers, 
such expressions become a linguistic firewall that is opaque and confusing.  It is thus 
instructive to study the principles behind the face of modern Chinese strategic deception 
that draw inspiration from Deng’s 24 Character strategy and the Thirty-Six Stratagems.  
Before diving into poetic expressions, it is important to understand China’s employment 
of strategic deception in peacetime. 
1. Strategic Deception in Peace 
Western strategic tradition is hardly alien to the concept of strategic deception, 
having employed deception in warfare throughout history.  Examples include Napolean’s 
deceptive campaign maneuvers, Britain’s withdrawal from Gallipoli and the Allies’ 
Calais deception for D-day at Normandy.99  However, Western states have mainly 
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limited the use of strategic deception to war and have been less prolific about deception 
in peace and the interstate competition.  In the period leading up to the Second World 
War, Hitler employed strategic deception to build up his Wehrmacht, influence foreign 
perceptions of his military strength and conceal Germany’s foreign policy goals.100  
Perhaps because it was so successively employed by Hitler, peacetime national strategic 
deception post Second World War has been ostracized and rarely practiced by Western 
states.  Instead, Western practice of statecraft, diplomacy and governance has been driven 
by puritan and politically-correct values such as freedom, democracy, honesty and 
efficiency.  Conversely, concepts like deception and propaganda have become associated 
with dishonesty and ill-intentions—generally frowned upon and best avoided as a policy 
tool.  
Chinese nationalism, on the other hand, was born of a different experience as 
explained in Chapter II.  The war against Japanese aggressors and the civil war between 
the Communists and Nationalists were marked by strategic deception by both sides 
before and after hostilities.  But peacetime strategic deception had roots in Chinese 
strategic culture long before the 20th century, and persisted thereafter as well.  Chinese 
history is replete with accounts of statesmen and strategists employing deception to 
outsmart potential aggressors or achieve strategic advantage - shi (势) is a concept 
regarding one’s strategic position or state.101  Deception has therefore become 
synonymous with mature statecraft, and the ability to employ strategic deception to 
achieve national objectives is a quality that endears an astute statesman to his 
constituents.  The achievement of strategic goals through deception is seen as a triumph 
of superior strategy avoiding the need to resort to war.  Therefore, unlike the West that 
has vilified deception as a peacetime strategic tool, China has embraced deception as a 
legitimate and powerful strategic tool.  Examples of Chinese strategic deception include 
China’s diplomatic deceptions in dealing with the U.S. and Soviet Union at the Treaty of 
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Versailles102, the involvement of Chinese “volunteers” in the 1950 Korean War103, and 
the investments in U.S. securities made by China’s sovereign wealth fund.104  Two 
significant non-Chinese but still Eastern examples of strategic deception against the West 
come to mind: Japan’s foreign policy deception against the U.S. leading up to the 1941 
Pearl Harbor attack and North Korea’s deception before its attack on South Korea in 
1950.105   
The most celebrated strategists and statesmen in Chinese history were less 
warriors than crafty strategists.  These wise counsels excelled through sharpness of mind 
—using guile and deception to defeat foes who relied on superior military strength.  
Among the most well-known are the deceptive exploits of military strategists like Wei 
(魏) kingdom’s Xun Yu (旬余), Wu (吴) kingdom’s Zhou Yu (周瑜) and Shu (蜀) 
kingdom’s Zhuge Liang (诸葛亮) of the Three Kingdoms era.  These exploits are still 
celebrated in Chinese literature and popular culture.  The wisest Chinese rulers were 
those who had in their employment shrewd strategists who could win battles without the 
need to be fight.  The legacies of Marshal Peng Dehuai (彭德怀) in the PLA and Admiral 
Liu Huaqing (刘华清) in shaping the PLAN and China’s maritime strategy are more 
recent examples.  
In Chinese imperial bureaucracies, a Chinese ruler and his strategist ranked above 
his civilian wen (文) and military wu (武) courtiers, thus both military and non-military 
policies were subsets of a larger national strategy.  This unity of command and civilian 
control over the military was a result of generations of emphasis on the primacy of 
intellectual progress (through Confucian teachings and imperial examinations) and 
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enlightened civilian policies.106  War as a policy outcome became a choice of last resort 
and an indication that civilian policy had failed.107  The employment of strategic 
deception in civilian policy in peacetime was therefore considered a viable strategy to 
avoid war and achieve strategic gains that would delay or render war unnecessary. 
Although communist China has distanced itself from its imperial past, the 
intellectual heritage of employing strategic deception in peacetime lived on its literature 
and culture.  Mao was known to have studied the Chinese classics including the Romance 
of the Three Kingdoms and handily quoted strategy and tactics from its stories.  Drawing 
on the rich Chinese historical literature, Mao’s generals even used the strategic alliance of 
Shu and Wu kingdoms against the powerful Wei kingdom in the Three Kingdoms era as a 
conceptual comparison for their own deliberations about China’s alliance strategy with 
the Soviet Union and the U.S.108 
Figure 3 compares various aspects of the Three Kingdoms era and modern day 
China, looking specifically at the rulers, principal strategists and the strategies of each 
kingdom.  The Wei kingdom controlled Northern China and was in possession of 
abundant resources and troops.  Thus its strategy was to use its superior force against the 
Shu and Wu kingdoms.  Wei ruler Cao Cao recognized talents and recruited them using 
material rewards.  Shu kingdom occupied China’s Southern interior and was militarily 
inferior to Wei.  Thus it sought an alliance with the Wu kingdom against Wei.  However, 
Shu’s Liu Bei was assisted by the extremely capable talent strategist Zhuge Liang and 
generals whom he recruited with his sincerity and altruistic cause of restoring the Han 
dynasty.  The Wu kingdom occupied the riverine and mountainous southern coastal 
region.  Similar to Shu kingdom, its military force was weaker than Wei’s but unlike Shu, 
its geography made it easily to defend and repel Wei.  Thus Wu was quite content to 
remain isolated from both even though Shu constantly broached an alliance with Wu.  
The Wu kingdom was matriarchal so family and community ties were strong.  Its talents 
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and generals came mainly from its own community and many were skilled in maritime 
warfare on the rivers and lakes that dominated Wu terrain.  Contrasting all this with modern 
day China, Xi Jinping reigns as the de facto leader of the Communist state.  His strategists in 
military affairs are likely to come from the Central Military Commission members.  China’s 
military today is moving away from the preponderance of numerical superiority and toward 
modern technology and methods.  Talented people in the military service can be recruited 
and are convinced of their cause as a result of nationalistic communist machinery that 
pervades Chinese society at all levels.  Today’s China strives towards the “China 
Dream,” seeking both material and spiritual wealth as the national utopia. 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Chinese Rulers, Strategists, Strategies  
The propensity for China to employ strategic deception in peacetime is therefore 
accessed to be likely based on its historical behavior as well as its strategic culture.  The 
following two sections highlight the principles that serve as vehicles for the application 
of Chinese strategic deception. 
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2. Deng Xiaoping’s “24 Character” Strategy 
A 2008 Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) report on the Military Power of 
China referred to Deng Xiaoping’s “24 Character” strategy which the Chinese leader 
developed in 1991. The 24 characters were from Deng’s famous guidance that consisted 
of six four-word idioms:  ‘冷静观察, 站稳脚跟, 沉着应付, 韬光养晦, 善于守拙, 
绝不当头.’109 The OSD translated each four-word phrase in the six phrases to mean 
“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and 
bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”110  It 
also reported that “taken as a whole, the “24 Character” strategy remains instructive in 
that it suggests a strategy to maximize future options through avoiding unnecessary 
provocations, shunning excessive international burdens, and building up China’s power 
over a long-term.”111  The OSD also stated Deng’s strategy has endured beyond his 
tenure and continues to be a part of China’s strategic psyche.112  The “24 Character” 
strategy succinctly summarizes the core principles driving Chinese strategic deception.  
Of particular interest to us is the fourth phrase, “韬光养晦”, which when read in 
conjunction with the fifth “善于守拙” and sixth “绝不当头” phrases collectively advices 
the nation to hide and bide, observe with strategic patience and keep a low profile.  These 
strategic actions are synergistic and mutually reinforcing. 
The Chinese idiom”韬光养晦” conveys the intention to hide one’s own capacities 
and bide one’s time for an opportune moment.  It is often used in situations where one’s 
adversary is stronger and one requires sufficient time to build capabilities that can deal 
with the opponent and then shift the strategic situation to one’s own advantage at an 
opportune moment.  This strategy requires more than just the cultivation of strategic 
patience.  In Chinese literature, it includes the grudging acceptance of humiliation by a 
stronger adversary until one is ready and the time is right.  While the stronger adversary 
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gloats in his domination, the weaker army betrays a posture of weakness and quietly 
builds his strength.  Sun Tzu makes a similar observation in the Art of War: “Therefore, 
when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity.”113 
China has operationalized this hide and bide strategy in its Liaoning deception.  
First, even though China today has the largest Asian Navy in terms of numbers major 
combatants, it is still a long way from catching up with the U.S. Navy in terms of its 
ability to project power offshore.114  Throughout the late 1990s and the first decade of the 
new millennium when the Liaoning was being developed, the state of the PLAN was 
even worse.  Thus, the PLAN saw itself occupying a position of weakness against the 
U.S. Navy.  This relative weakness of the PLAN was capitalized upon by the U.S. in 
1996 when the U.S. deployed its carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Straits following 
tensions brought on by Chinese missile tests aimed at intimidating Taiwan.115  
Second, while China acquired and developed its aircraft carrier, it continued to 
insist that it was merely studying the capability and had no plans to construct one.  In 
acquiring the Varyag, it insisted that the rusting hulk was meant to be a floating casino in 
Macau.  Even when China first acknowledged constructing a carrier in 2011, the PLAN 
made no bold claims about its capabilities or function.  When the Liaoning was 
commissioned in 2012, the PLAN merely stated that it was for research and training.116  
These understated comments were designed to portray the aircraft carrier Liaoning in non-
threatening light and to create the perception that it posed little or no threat to the region.   
Third, China bided its time in not officially acknowledging the carrier until 2011 
because it wanted to delay an acknowledgement for as long as practically possible to 
prevent any foreign obstructions to the development of its first aircraft carrier.  It is 
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highly possible that by 2011, the development of the carrier had already passed the point 
of no return and the critical technologies and systems required were already completed. 
Chinese behavior regarding the Liaoning acquisition and development was a 
classical exhibition of the hide and bide strategy, and manifestation of Deng’s “24 
Character” strategy.  
3. The Thirty-Six Stratagems117 
Many Chinese historical accounts have been condensed into idioms of expression 
that convey the narrative core of the stratagem in achieving an objective.  The Thirty-Six 
Stratagems (三十六计) commonly found in Chinese literature and referred to in its 
military history are examples of such idioms.  The Thirty-Six Stratagems, like many 
other ancient Chinese literary artifacts, are difficult to attribute to a single source.  Thirty-
six is the product of ‘six and six’—which in the Chinese linguistic tradition is used as a 
prop to simply mean ‘numerous.’  Current understanding of the Thirty-Six Stratagems 
come from 20th century popular literature, especially by Chinese Communist Party 
newspapers.118  The Thirty-Six Stratagems are organized into six chapters of six 
stratagems.  Each chapter relates to a specific strategic situation for stratagem 
employment.  The six chapters are: 
• Chapter 1(胜战计): Stratagems employed when in a strategically 
advantageous posture (绝对优势) 
• Chapter 2(敌战计): Stratagems employed when one’s strategically posture 
is equal to the enemy (势均力敌态势) 
• Chapter 3 (攻战计): Stratagems employed when in an offensive strategic 
posture (进攻态势) 
• Chapter 4 (混战计): Stratagems employed when in a chaotic strategic 
posture (军阀混战态势) 
• Chapter 5 (并战计): Stratagems employed when in a strategically 
ambiguous posture (友军反为敌态势) 
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• Chapter 6 (败战计): Stratagems employed when in a disadvantageous 
strategic posture (败军态势) 
The following section will explain selected stratagems employed in deception that 
shed light on the Liaoning deception. 
Stratagem 1: Man Tian Guo Hai (瞒天过海): “Crossing the Oceans without Heaven’s 
Knowledge”119 
The translation has two implied meanings: (1) Those who believe they have taken 
ample precautions are liable to be caught off guard. (2) Familiarity breeds desensitization 
and lowers arousal of suspicions. 
In the case of the Liaoning deception, the rusting hulk of the Varyag literally 
crossed the oceans under the noses and scrutiny of the surveillance satellites in the 
heavens as it sailed from the Black Sea to China.  Closer to the intended meaning of the 
term, by the time the Varyag was on its way to China after substantial delay in the Black 
Sea, world media was no longer interested in its voyage and other world events had taken 
precedence.  This was a result of China’s cover story for the purchase of the Varyag that 
deflected unnecessary attention from the media.  The unforeseen almost year long delay 
that the ship encountered in exiting the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Straits also 
lessened media attention.  Combined, these events led to little media scrutiny about the 
Varyag’s journey.  Thus, the Varyag was able to complete its voyage with little undue 
attention or obstruction.  
Stratagem 5: Cheng Huo Da Jie (趁火打劫): “Loot a Burning House”120 
When the enemy suffers a major crisis, seize the chance to gain advantage.  In the 
Liaoning deception, China was fortunate that the attention and resources of the U.S. were 
fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 onwards.  This allowed for much of the 
Liaoning’s development to proceed without undue scrutiny and interference from the 
U.S.  While China may not have been complicit in the events leading up to the U.S. 
campaigns, China capitalized on U.S. distractions in Central Asia to maximize its own 
strategic gains. 
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Stratagem 7: Wu Zhong Sheng You (无中生有): “Create Something Out of Nothing”121 
To make a deliberate false move and to transform it into a genuine one after the 
enemy has been convinced of its falsity.  The false move that China made was to state 
that the Varyag would not be refurbished into an operational carrier.  It was allegedly to 
have been a floating casino in Macau and this was China’s position despite contradicting 
reports about the lack of sufficient depth of water in Macau and the Macau government’s 
own ignorance.  Eventually, the idea that the Varyag would be anything but an 
operational carrier was accepted as the convenient truth by the broader media.  Western 
intelligence reported that the difficulties involved in converting the rusting Varyag hulk 
into an aircraft carrier were too complex to be overcome and China did nothing to 
contradict such reporting.  The false move having been believed, China spent more than a 
decade of work rebuilding the Varyag which was re-launched in 2012 as the PLAN’s first 
aircraft carrier Liaoning. 
Stratagem 10: Xiao Li Cang Dao (笑里藏刀): “Conceal a Dagger Behind a Smile”122 
Reassure the adversary to cause him to be complacent while working in secret to 
subdue him.  Alternatively, to prepare in secret before taking decisive action to preclude 
the enemy any opportunity to change his position.  The Varyag was being refurbished in 
secret for a decade, during that time China gave multiple reassurances that no carrier 
construction was underway, allaying the concerns of regional countries.  When it was 
finally revealed in 2011 that the Varyag was being made into an operational carrier, a fait 
accompli by China had already been accomplished. 
Stratagem 14: Jie Shi Huan Hun (借尸还魂): “To Revive A Corpse”123 
Advocates the masterful use of the apparently useless in order to achieve a goal 
without the adversary’s suspicion.  The Varyag was originally literally a corpse of a 
ship—gutted of its organs and left to rust in disrepair.  China purchased the corpse of the 
Varyag at three times its scrap value and reincarnated it as the Liaoning after a decade of 
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refurbishment—much to the surprise of experts who thought the task was above China’s 
capabilities or simply not worth the effort and resources required. 
Stratagem 20: Hun Shui Mo Yu (混水摸鱼): “Catch a Fish in Muddled Waters”124 
Take advantage of an adversary’s difficult situation and exploit his weaknesses 
and lack of judgment.  If the Varyag was the fish, the muddled waters would be the 
chaotic international environment after the September 11 attacks, including the decade 
long U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that were a major distraction of U.S. 
attention away from East Asia and the Asia Pacific region.  China therefore caught its 
carrier “fish” in the muddled waters of the Global War on Terror, among other “fish” that 
it also netted during America’s decade lost to two voluntary wars. 
Stratagem 21: Jin Chan Tuo Qiao (金蝉脱壳): “The Cicada Sloughs its Skin”125 
Maintaining the appearance of inaction while in fact, taking action in secret.  In 
sloughing its skin, the cicada leaves behind a shell of apparent inaction to deceive the 
predator when it has in fact fled.  In its statements regarding the development and 
refurbishment of the Varyag, China maintained a line of apparent inaction towards its 
hidden objectives until very late in the development of the aircraft carrier Liaoning. 
 
Stratagem 27: Jia Chi Bu Dian (假痴不癫): Feign Foolishness even if not Insane.126 
Feign foolish ignorance and inaction to hide your intentions while allowing the 
enemy to believe you to be foolish and therefore lower his guard.  In developing the 
Varyag, China never claimed any ability to do so nor did it contradict foreign 
assessments about its apparent inability to refurbish Varyag into a functional carrier.  By 
feigning apparent inability and passively encouraging pessimistic projections of its 
capability, China achieved its strategic objective of building the Liaoning with minimal 
interference. 
Stratagem 29: Shu Sang Kai Hua (树上开花): To Make a Tree Blossom127 
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Exploit external appearances to create an advantageous situation.  One can 
obscure the truth by creating an illusion that the enemy believes in.  In Liaoning’s case, 
the conversion of the other two carriers that China acquired into entertainment facilities 
perpetuated the belief that the Varyag would be similarly converted.  This obscured the 
true purpose of the Varyag’s acquisition for development into an operational carrier. 
Stratagem 32: Kong Cheng Ji (空城计): Empty City Stratagem128 
Bear a confident outward appearance when in a weak position to give the 
impression of strength and sow doubt in a stronger adversary about the true nature of 
your strength.  While China lacked an aircraft carrier (a weakness), it developed and 
demonstrated other weapons systems like the anti-satellite missile and anti-ship cruise 
missile to give the impression that it was self-confident in its own abilities and 
nonchalant about U.S. military strength. It also gave the impression that there was no 
urgency to develop her own aircraft carrier. 
While we have no direct knowledge about China’s employment of the stratagems 
in a conscious and deliberate manner, we can use our understanding of the stratagems and 
examine the Liaoning deception from that perspective.  Such explanations also help non-
Chinese scholars understand what could be going through Chinese minds in their 
strategic conception of situations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 Chinese deception has a rich and long history that has been captured in 
Chinese cultural consciousness and popular literature.  While Western martial and 
political culture has employed strategic deception before, its employment in today’s 
politically correct and ethically constrained Western societies is stymied.  This contrasts 
with China’s sophisticated and nuanced employment of strategic deception in many 
spheres of national interest.  Deng’s 24 Character strategy and the Thirty-Six Stratagems 
were used as platforms to analyze the Liaoning deception.  While it is unclear how China 
exactly employed the Chinese civilization’s collective experience and knowledge of 
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strategic deception, sufficient evidence exists for the reconstruction of events and 
application of known deception concepts to the events.  The Chinese perspective on 
strategic deception provided in this chapter will serve as a useful platform for comparison 
with a Western method of analyzing deception utilizing Heuer’s Theory of Competing 
Hypothesis examined in the Chapter VII. 
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VI. THE LIAONING DECEPTION: “CROSSING THE OCEAN 
WITHOUT HEAVEN’S KNOWLEDGE” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2012, China commissioned the Liaoning into the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  She was China’s first aircraft carrier and was built 
based on the former USSR’s Admiral Kutznetsov class multi-role carrier design129.  To 
many observers, this marked a significant Chinese stride towards the development of its 
blue-water naval capability that would allow the PLAN to better project its power and 
influence in maritime East Asia.130 
The commissioning of China’s first carrier should have come as no surprise as its 
procurement, construction and development were constantly followed by defense and 
intelligence agencies internationally since a Macau-based Chinese company first bought 
the de-activated hull from Ukraine in 1998.131  However, the fruition of China’s initial 
carrier development constituted a coup for China for the following reasons: the 
development of a significant naval capability; proving detractors about its military 
capabilities wrong; showcasing its naval and shipbuilding capabilities; and strengthening 
its credentials as a shrewd strategic player.  This chapter posits that the commissioning of 
the Liaoning was a masterful coup by China and a strategic surprise to its detractors.  As 
late as 2009, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) estimated that China’s carrier capability 
would not be realized before 2015.132 
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The commissioning of the aircraft carrier was a significant event on both the 
domestic and international fronts for China.  International media outlets outside China 
gave the Liaoning’s commissioning more than its fair share of coverage expressing a 
spectrum of opinions ranging from grudging respect and concern for Chinese military 
modernization to dismissals about the operational inadequacy of a single carrier and the 
lingering requirement for China to build a credible carrier air capability. 
This chapter investigates Chinese use of strategic military deception in building 
its nascent carrier capability and argues that China successfully employed deception to 
achieve a significant milestone towards the development of its carrier capability.  The 
chapter will begin with an examination of the timeline of the Liaoning’s acquisition and 
development.  This is followed by an examination of reports concerning the building of 
China’s aircraft carrier capability during the period that the Liaoning was being 
refurbished.  The discrepancies between the Liaoning’s actual refurbishment and China’s 
official position on aircraft carrier development will lead to the explanation of a plausible 
deception ploy in the development of the Liaoning.  The final phase of analysis proposes 
various measures employed by China to manage the Liaoning deception. 
B. CHINESE AIRCRAFT CARRIER LIAONING: ACQUISITION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
This section covers the acquisition and development of the Liaoning.  There are 
numerous websites and articles that have detailed the process of Liaoning’s 
transformation.  This section simply provides a brief summary of the main developmental 
milestones of the Liaoning and lays the foundation for the analysis of the deception that 
will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.  
The Liaoning began life as the ex-Soviet Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier 
Varyag that was launched in 1985 and was structurally complete but without any systems 
when construction ceased in 1992.  Ownership was transferred to Ukraine after the USSR 
broke up and the unfinished carrier was initially put up for sale in 1992.  China was 
reportedly on the verge of completing the transfer with the Ukrainian government when 
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the deal fell apart.133   By 1998 the rusting hulk was put up for sale again.  This time, the 
Macau-based private travel agency Chong Lot won the auction for the hulk with a US$20 
million bid that was triple its scrap value.134  From the Black Sea, the Varyag took four 
years to reach the Chinese port of Dalian in 2002.  The Varyag was stuck in the Black 
Sea for more than 15 months because Turkey had declined to allow what it deemed as a 
navigational-hazard through the Bosphorous Straits.135  This impasse was only resolved 
when the China’s Deputy Foreign Minister intervened in 2001 and made promises of 
economic aid to Turkey in exchange for the Varyag’s passage.136  From 2002 to 2004, 
there was very little official news about the Varyag.  However, satellite pictures showed 
that work had already begun on refurbishing the Varyag in dry dock during this time.137  
It is surmised that a decision on the Varyag’s long term development was also made in 
China during this time because after 2004, the development of the Varyag rapidly ramped 
up.  By 2005, Jane’s reported that the Varyag was being repainted in a naval paint 
scheme and suggested that it was not going to be an entertainment facility in Macau.138  
In 2006, U.S. and Taiwan analysts surmised that the Varyag would be refurbished as an 
operational carrier for training, however China continued to dismiss any claims that 
suggest a military function for the Varyag.139  In 2007, the U.S. DOD reported that the 
Varyag was undergoing extensive refurbishment but was still unsure about when China 
could actually field an operational carrier.  By 2009, the Varyag was towed to a larger dry 
dock in Dalian where it was assessed to have been fitted with major machinery and 
systems.140  During the next year, weapon systems were installed and in 2011, China 
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officially confirmed that it was building an aircraft carrier.141  In September 2012, after 
12 months of extensive sea trials, the Varyag was officially commissioned into the PLAN 
as the Liaoning in a symbolic ceremony attended by the highest levels of China’s 
leadership.  Table 5 below summarizes the events directly related to the Varyag’s 
transformation into the Liaoning. 
The metamorphosis of the Varyag from a rusting hulk to the pride of the PLAN 
was an engineering and publicity coup for China.  China proved detractors who said that 
it would not be feasible or prohibitively expensive wrong.  Additionally, the success of 
the Liaoning showed that China exceeded the capabilities with regard to what other 
countries thought it could achieve.  The refurbishment of the Varyag was also 
accomplished in a relatively short time, surpassing most foreign estimates of how long it 
would take.  The Varyag’s transformation suggests not just quality technical resources 
and skills but also elaborate and effective planning and execution by China’s military 
industrial complex.  Keeping this in mind, the next section examines China’s public 
positions about the Varyag’s transformation and carrier development during the same 
period as the Varyag’s refurbishment. 
Table 5.   Events Directly Related to China’s Transformation of the Aircraft 
Carrier  Varyag into the Liaoning 
Year Events 
1988 Original carrier was launched as the Riga by Soviet Navy in 1988. Renamed 
Varyag in 1998. 
1992 August.  China reputed to be interested in initial sale of Varyag through official 
channels.1 
October. China says not planning to buy Varyag from Ukraine.2 
1998 March.  Purchase of the Varyag hulk for US$20 million by Macau-based private 
company Chong Lot for conversion to a floating casino.3 
2000 From June and for the next 15 months, the Varyag is stuck in the Black Sea 
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2001 September. Turkey calls for $1 billion guarantee for passage through Bosphorus.4 
November.  Turkey relents to allow passage through Bosphorus Strait after 
protracted negotiations with Chinese government acting on behalf of Macau 
company Chong Lot.  China reportedly offered $360 million in economic aid to 
Turkey.  The Varyag rounds Cape of Good Hope enroute to China. 
2002 February.  Macau company Chong Lot is not granted casino license by Macau 
authorities, harbor in Macau also assessed to be too shallow for the Varyag.5  
China insists the Varyag is designated to be a floating casino. 
March.  The Varyag finally enters Chinese naval port of Dalian after completing 
4-year journey from Ukraine.6 
2003-
2004 
March.  China employs retired Ukrainian admiral as a tour guide for the Varyag.7 
Little news about the Varyag.  Assessed to be an important period as it was likely 
during this period that a decision was made by the Chinese government to 
develop the Varyag into a functional carrier if it had not been already made prior.  
Ownership of the Varyag was likely transferred from Chong Lot to the Chinese 
government during this period. 
2005 August. Jane’s reports that the Varyag has been repainted in military colors and 
being refurbished in Dalian. Chong Lot’s casino claim discredited.8  Satellite 
photos show extensive preparation of deck and superstructure for possible flight 
operations. 
China reported to be repairing the Varyag. 9 
2006 U.S. and Taiwan analysts assess the Varyag is to be rebuilt as a carrier for 
training.  PLA denies claims.10  
2007 Refurbishment and outfitting of the Varyag reported by U.S Department of 
Defence.11 
 
2009 The Varyag is moved to another dry dock for suspected installation of engines 
and heavy equipment. Janes reports the Varyag moved to new Dalian drydock 
and activities consistent with refurbishment of the ship.12 
2011 June.  Chief General Staff of PLA officially acknowledges that China is building 
an aircraft carrier for first time.13 
August.  Varyag begins sea trials.14 
2012 August.  Varyag sea trials reported completed. 
September. Varyag handed over to PLAN. Commissioned as Liaoning. 
ources: 
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plan for warship,” South China Morning Post, 11 November 1998, 3. 
4 “Turkey calls for more guarantees over Varyag,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 September 2001. 
5 “Soviet carriers find a new home in China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 21 March 2002. 
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7 “China employs retired Ukrainian admiral,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 March 2003. 
8 “Is China building a carrier?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 August 2005. 
9 “Chinese navy repairing unfinished Ukrainian aircraft carrier Varyag,” Zhongguo Tongxun She 
中国通讯社 (Hong Kong), 16 August 2005. 
10 David Lague, “Do China’s strategic ambitions include a carrier?” The International Herald Tribune, 
31 January 2006. 
11 “China’s naval ambitions: Congressional report details major warship programmes,” Jane’s Navy 
International, 20 June 2007. 
12 “China continues development of an aircraft carrier,” Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, 27 May 
2009. 
13 Yinan Hu, Xiaokun Li and Haipei Cui, “Official confirms China building aircraft carrier,” China 
Daily, 12 July 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/12/content_12881089.htm. 
14 “U.S. Satellite pictures China aircraft carrier Varyag,” BBC News, 14 December 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16190926. 
 
C. DISPARITY BETWEEN CHINA’S POSITIONS ON AIRCRAFT 
CARRIER DEVELOPMENT AND REALITY 
This section examines China’s position on the issue of aircraft carrier 
development and contrasts it with the reality of known developments with the Varyag 
and associated capabilities.  The intent of this comparison is to highlight the difference 
between China’s official positions and the reality of actual developments so that the 
depth and magnitude of China’s deception is apparent. 
An examination of China’s positions from 1998 to 2011 reflected a picture of 
consistent official denial about any carrier construction and the Varyag’s refurbishment.  
However, there were occasional statements by PLA officials about the viability of aircraft 
carriers for China as well as speculative dates about when China may unveil its carrier 
capability.  Table 6 below summarizes the events relating to China’s aircraft carrier 
development as well as China’s stated positions on the issue. 
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Table 6.   Events relating to China’s Aircraft Carrier Development 
Year Events 
1993 June.  Hong Kong journal reports about China’s apparent urgency to build 
aircraft carriers.1 
1997 January.  Hong Kong paper reports about China’s “two craft” plans to build an 
aircraft carrier by 2000.  Alleges Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
has advanced building plans by 5 years. 2 
1998 March.  Macau based company purchases Varyag for three times the scrap value.  
Media reports that it will be converted into a floating hotel based at Macau.3 
China makes no official comment. 
2000 January.  Hong Kong paper reports China embarking on plans to build first 
carrier.4 
PLA debunks foreign reports about China’s carrier plans and insists carriers are 
outside China’s national strategy.5 
2002 March.  Jane’s reports that China’s carrier plans are stalled due to more pressing 
national priorities and postulates that refurbishing Varyag would be prohibitively 
expensive.6 
2004 Speculation by independent observers that China will build three carriers by 
2010.7 
2005 China reported to be repairing Varyag.8 
2006 January.  International Herald Tribune reports China’s aircraft carrier 
construction underway.  China denies any construction.9 
October.  PLA General Armament Department Vice Chairman states China’s 
study of carrier construction and indispensability of carriers in protecting 
maritime interests.10  
2007 March. PLA claims China may have aircraft carrier by 2010.11 
April. PLA debunks Chinese aircraft carrier threat theory with Kiev and Minsk as 
examples.12 
May. Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet confirms China’s interest in carriers after 
official visit to the country.13 
November.  Korean paper reports Chinese nuclear-powered carrier scheduled to 
be completed by 2020. Also reports Shanghai shipyard capable of handling 
30,000 ton class vessel.  Reports Chinese interest in $2.5 billion purchase of 50 
Su-33 aircraft from Russia.14 
2008 September.  Jane’s reports PLAN naval aviators begin training.  Also reports 
earliest carrier flight training in 2010.15 
November.  China’s Ministry of National Defense’s Foreign Affairs Office 
director states that having carrier is dream of any great power and question is not 
whether one possesses carrier but what one does with it.16 
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December.  China’s Ministry of National Defense states that China is seriously 
considering adding aircraft carriers to its fleet because the carrier is a symbol of 
a country’s national strength and the competitiveness of it naval force.18 
China uses deployment of counter-piracy naval task force to Somalia to develop 
and project its forces. A precursor to carrier deployment?19 
2009 January.  HK paper reports China expected to announce carrier project at 60th 
anniversary of PRC.20 Also reports Chinese plans to deploy carriers to South 
China Sea to protect SLOCs and territories. 
March.  U.S. D.O.D reports to Congress that China’s carrier ambitions unlikely 
to be realized before 2015.21 
Jane’s reports PLAN program to train 50 navy pilots for fixed-wing operations 
on carriers. 
April.  CCP paper justifies aircraft carrier capability.22 
Wuhan Naval Research Lab observed to have full logistics training deck and 
aircraft carrier island mock-up for training.23 
2011 January. HK business fails in attempt to buy the United Kingdom’s HMS 
Invincible for scrap.24 
July.  China’s Ministry of Defence confirms that first aircraft carrier will be 
ready and says it would not be for combat missions but for training.25 
2012 August.  Varyag’s tenth and final sea trial completed.26 
September. Varyag handed over to PLAN. Commissioned as Liaoning. 
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Drawing data points from the two earlier tables, Table 7 on the following page 
shows a side by side comparison of the Varyag’s actual developments and China’s stated 
positions about carriers.  It is clear that China started off with its official, overt interest in 
the Varyag from 1992 with a fairly consistent position that was coherent with actual 
developments.  However, perhaps as a result of the experience of its failed 1992 purchase 
where U.S. and Japanese pressure on Ukraine is assessed to have scuttled the transfer, 
China adopted a more devious route towards it carrier acquisition.142 When the Macau 
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company acquired the Varyag in 1998, China treated it as a private commercial matter, 
minimizing its role in the process despite obvious state interest just six years earlier.  
However, the impasse over passage through the Bosphorus Straits compelled the state to 
negotiate with Turkey which was ultimately successful.143  Even then, China’s state 
machinery minimized publicity on its role in the negotiations.  During the Varyag’s 
passage and even after its arrival in Dalian, China, China’s state media minimized 
reporting on the Varyag, keeping its role ambiguous.  When refurbishment work started 
in earnest on Varyag, China never admitted to carrier construction or work on the Varyag 
specifically.  The closest it came to doing so was a 2007 statement that China would have 
carriers by 2010 which was then swiftly denied.  Only in 2011 did China admit to 
working specifically on a carrier.  At the same time however, China never hid its interest 
in carrier developments in general or its belief in the operational need for carriers.  This 
dichotomy between China’s conceptual acceptance of carriers and its actual construction 
of such a capability is of interest to us in the study of China’s employment of deception 
in the Liaoning’s development. 
Table 7.   Comparison of Varyag/Liaoning Developments versus China’s Positions 
about Carrier Development 
Year Varyag/Liaoning Development China’s Official Position Consistent 
1992 Varyag is put up for military 
sale. 
China shows interest with 
military study delegation but 
deal falls through as result of 
U.S. and Japanese pressure on 
Ukraine.144 
Yes  
1998 Varyag is put up for scrap sale. No official interest. Private 
company purchase. 
Yes 
2001 Varyag is stranded outside the 
Bosphorus Strait. 
China acts on behalf of private 
company. 
Yes 
2002 Varyag berths at Dalian naval 
port. 





Superficial work begins on the 
Varyag but inconclusive as to 
carrier’s functions. 
China makes no statement. 
Maintains distance. 
- 
Continued on next page. 
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Continued from previous page. 
2005 Varyag painted in naval colors. China denies carrier 
construction. 
No 
2006 U.S. and Taiwan assess the 
Varyag to be refurbished for 
naval training purposes. 
China denies construction. 
PLA says carriers are useful 
and being studied. 
No 
Yes 
2007 U.S. D.O.D reports 
refurbishment of the Varyag for 
naval use but is unable to 
provide a clear estimate of 
completion. 
PLA initially says carriers will 
be ready by 2010. 
PLA then denies any carrier 
construction. 
Commander of U.S. Pacific 
Fleet confirms China’s interest 






2008 PLAN aviators begin carrier 
flight training.145 
Varyag refurbishment continues. 
PLA says carrier capability is a 
national dream. 
PLA denies carrier 
construction. 
China reports that carrier 
confers status as major naval 







2009 Varyag moved to larger dry 
dock for large scale engineering 
work. 
China justifies conceptual need 
for carriers but admits no 
carrier construction. 
Yes 
2011 Varyag sea trials commence 
after weapon systems mounted. 
China acknowledges carrier 
under construction for first 
time. 
Yes. 
2012 Commissioning of Liaoning into 
PLAN 
China says carrier for research 
and training. 
Yes 
D. RATIONALE FOR DECEPTION IN THE ACQUISITION OF CHINA’S 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER  
From the examination of China’s national and maritime goals in the earlier 
chapters, it was established that the acquisition of a carrier capability was consistent with 
China’s long-term strategic goals.  Having established cause, the question of what 
motivated China’s deception ploy regarding the Varyag remains.  As can be seen from 
the previous section, there was consideration disparity between China’s public position of 
denial regarding the Varyag’s refurbishment and the reality of actual developments 
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onboard the Varyag in Dalian.  This sections identifies the possible reasons for China to 
employ deception in its acquisition and development of its first aircraft carrier. 
1. Rationale One: Disguise the Military Employment of its First Aircraft 
Carrier Acquisition 
We posit that the first goal of Chinese deception on the acquisition of a carrier 
capability was to deflect any notion that it was seeking to acquire one for military 
purposes.  Despite China’s heavy marine industrial capability, China had no experience 
building a carrier and little knowledge about how to go about doing so, thus obtaining 
one that was already largely built would have been the prudent and most expedient 
option.  However, given Chinese efforts to acquire an aircraft carrier in the 1990s, first 
from the Russians (Varyag in 1992), then the French (Clemenceau in 1995) and 
Brazilians (SAC 200/220 in 1995); it would have been difficult for the Chinese to mask 
their goal of acquiring a carrier for military purposes.146  To build a viable deception, the 
Chinese needed to build a different narrative about their interest in carriers and explore 
other means of acquiring the ships. 
Fortuitously, the Chinese came across another way to acquire a carrier outside of 
the formal defence industry and country-to-country channels.  Despite their unsuccessful 
attempts to acquire a carrier through official channels in the 1990s, the Chinese acquired 
the Australian Navy’s retired flagship and carrier—the HMAS Melbourne in 1985.  The 
Melbourne had been decommissioned in 1982 and the Australian government had 
approved its sale to a Chinese ship breaker for A$1.4 million in 1985 after its initial 
A$1.7 million sale to an Australian company in 1984 fell through.147  As the Melbourne 
was broken up in Dalian, Chinese naval architects and engineers studied its design and 
construction.148  The Melbourne’s flight deck was preserved for Chinese pilots to 
practice carrier take-offs and landings ashore.149  Despite Colonel General Xu Xing’s 
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denial in 1987 that China wanted to acquire an aircraft carrier capability, China’s interest 
in carriers in the 1990s proved otherwise.150  Thus, with the Melbourne experience, the 
Chinese had now come upon a viable alternate means of acquiring aircraft carriers—
albeit retired or scrap quality hulls without operational capabilities.  The scrap acquisition 
method had been validated and had demonstrated utility for a modest capital outlay. 
2. Rationale Two: Outflank Opposition to China’s Aircraft Carrier 
Ambitions 
China expected opposition to its intention to acquire an aircraft carrier to enhance 
its military capability.  Regional opposition from rival Japan and international opposition 
from its strategic competitor the United States were expected to be significant.  In fact, 
the failed 1992 deal for China to purchase the Varyag from Ukraine through official 
government channels was presumably scuttled by U.S and Japanese pressure on Ukraine 
not to transfer carrier technology to China.  Thus, China sought a way to acquire an 
aircraft carrier without arousing the opposition of known objectors.  A deception ploy 
was therefore necessary to out-maneuver any official opposition to China’s acquisition of 
an aircraft carrier—that meant that the Chinese state machinery could not be involved in 
the acquisition.  Thus, the 1998 acquisition of the Varyag was spearheaded by a Macau-
based private company and the Chinese state consciously distanced itself from any 
involvement. 
3. Rationale Three: Establish Organic Aircraft Carrier Construction 
Capability  
From the beginning, China sought to purchase an existing hull rather than to build 
one from the keel up.  Although buying rather than building one seemed detrimental to 
China’s military industrial complex.  From the perspective of establishing a national 
aircraft carrier building capability, there were two reasons that explain why this course 
may be beneficial in the long run.  The first was the maturity and competency of China’s 
warship building industry.  As the world’s leading commercial ship builder with 40% of 
global shipbuilding capacity, China certainly did not lack facilities or scale in its 
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shipbuilding industry.151  However, building warships was a more complex task 
requiring higher levels of expertise across different skill areas.  China’s industry has 
mainly been focused on large volume construction of simpler commercial designs like 
bulk cargo carriers and small tankers despite state efforts to increase production of more 
complex vessels like cruise ships, very large crude oil carriers and gas carriers.152  By 
buying a carrier and refurbishing it, China allowed its industry to take progressive steps 
in building its capabilities and fine-tuning itself for the eventual task of building a carrier 
from scratch.  The additional time also allowed for commercial modernization to take 
effect as China’s shipbuilding industry continued to make qualitative improvements. 
The second reason for acquiring a carrier rather than building one is that China 
may be seeking a conservative, progressive approach towards building its carrier 
capability.  For comparison, each modern aircraft carrier in the U.S. CVN-21 carrier 
program is estimated to cost around US$12 billion. 153  Rather than embarking on the 
expensive construction of a new aircraft carrier with the attendant risks of building one 
from the keel up for the first time, China sought a more pragmatic approach.  Acquiring a 
partially built or used aircraft carrier would not only have been more economical, in the 
long term it would also prove more beneficial to the strength of China’s nascent aircraft 
carrier program.  By first operating an aircraft carrier, China can better understand her 
operational requirements and eventually build one according to the lessons learnedfrom 
operating her first carrier.  This would be critical in determining the capabilities that 
China would need in the shipbuilding, aviation, electronics and other associated 
industries so that she may build a capable carrier appropriate to her needs.   
Lastly, in terms of fielding an aircraft carrier for immediate operational use, 
acquiring a partially constructed one would certainly have shortened the lead-time 
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compared to building such a complex warship for the first time.  Fielding an aircraft 
carrier earlier would also allow for associated developments in carrier aviation and 
doctrine development to be accelerated.  Therefore, for China there were compelling 
reasons to buy rather than build her first aircraft carrier. 
The rationale for China to employ strategic deception in the acquisition of her 
first aircraft carrier is compelling and very much driven by her 1992 experience in failing 
to acquire the Varyag the first time around.  The next section proposes how China could 
have employed strategic deception in the acquisition of its first aircraft carrier. 
E. THE TRIPLE LAYERED SOVIET COVER: MINSK, VARYAG AND KIEV 
 China’s experience with the HMAS Melbourne revealed an alternate path to 
acquire the body of an aircraft carrier through scrap acquisition.  Accordingly, the first 
step in the formulation of its strategic deception was to develop a believable cover story.  
The Chinese proved resourceful, creative and enterprising in building a narrative around 
the aircraft carrier amusement park.  Between 1995 and 2000, private Chinese companies 
acquired three ex-Soviet carriers—the Minsk, Varyag and Kiev as hulls intended for 
scrap.  All three were eventually kept intact after their transfer to China in an intriguing 
chain of events.   
The flagship of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Minsk, was decommissioned from the 
Russian Navy in 1993 and sold in 1995 to a South Korean company for scrap.  In June 
1998, a Chinese firm, the Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry, bought the Minsk for five 
million dollars under the condition that it would not be used for military purposes.154   
The Minsk was subsequently towed to Guangdong for a four million dollar conversion 
into a floating museum and finally relocated to Shenzhen where it became the centerpiece 
of the “Minsk World” military theme park.155 
In March 1998, the Varyag was acquired by the Macau-based private company 
Chong Lot for 20 million dollars—three times its scrap value.  In November 1998, Chong 
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Lot declared that the Varyag would be turned into a floating casino and entertainment 
complex anchored in Macau harbour.156  Was it pure coincidence that both the Minsk and 
Varyag plans for conversion into entertainment platforms would dovetail nicely in the 
second half of 1998?  Does the fact that the Varyag charted such a different course from 
the Minsk at the end not evoke suspicion—with the Varyag being re-commissioned into 
the PLAN as a sea-worthy aircraft carrier?  If the purchase of the Minsk and Varyag were 
indeed part of an elaborate Chinese deception, what role did the acquisition of the Kiev 
play then? 
In May 2000, the Kiev was purchased from the Russian government by the 
Tianma Shipbreaking Company based in Tianjin, China for $8.4 million.157  In 
November 2000, the original contract that stipulated the scrapping of Kiev was re-
negotiated between the Chinese and Russian governments to allow for the Kiev to be used 
for tourism purposes.158  After a £9.6m refit, the Kiev was re-opened to the public in Feb 
2012 as a tourist attraction and hotel.159  What role did the Kiev play in China’s 
deception cover story given that both the Minsk and Varyag had already laid the 
foundations of the deception narrative?  The authors believe the Kiev served as a second 
red-herring to deflect attention from the Varyag and to give the amusement park narrative 
further credibility so that any lingering suspicion arising from the investigations of 
Varyag’s true purpose would be dispelled.  At the time of the Kiev acquisition in 2000, 
the Varyag was still stuck in the Black Sea due to Turkey barring her passage through the 
Bosphorus Strait.  Publicity over the Varyag’s difficulties would have been unwelcome to 
the Chinese deception ploy. 
The authors propose that the timing of the acquisition of the Minsk, Varyag and 
Kiev; and the cover story concerning their conversion into entertainment centers were an 
elaborate deception by the Chinese to achieve their goal of acquiring a carrier that would 
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eventually be made sea-worthy again.  First, we know that China’s interest in the Varyag 
existed based on their inquiries with the Ukrainian government and the failed transfer in 
1992.  Second, the short window between 1998 to 2000 was used to make the acquisition 
of the three carriers Minsk, Varyag and Kiev to minimize exposure, confuse scrutiny and 
intensify the deception.  Third, the Varyag was likely identified to be the platform for 
resuscitation early on and the Minsk and Kiev were acquired not only for technical 
investigations but also as red-herrings to divert any investigation into the Varyag and 
strengthen the cover story.   
Fourth, the order of acquisition and development of the three carriers supports the 
narrative and desired outcome of the deception.  Although the Varyag was acquired first, 
the Minsk was developed into an entertainment center much earlier (by 2004).  This 
essentially allowed the Minsk to set the tone for the cover story and be the primary 
vehicle for its development.  The Varyag, due to its location in the Black Sea, would take 
almost 4 years to complete its transit to China in Mar 2002.  This is where the Kiev came 
into the narrative to sustain the cover story about China’s interest in aircraft carrier 
themed entertainment centers and to deflect attention away from the tortuous transfer of 
the Varyag.  Due to the difficulties associated with the acquisition and transfer of the 
Varyag, the Kiev served as timely foil to sustain the cover story and buy time for the 
transfer of the Varyag to be completed. 
F. DECEPTION MANAGEMENT BY CHINA 
Assuming that the Chinese had attempted to deceive the world about the 
development of the Varyag, it would still have been necessary to manage the deception 
plot to sustain the deception.  Whenever reports surfaced about China’s development of 
the Varyag or a carrier capability, the Chinese found it necessary to contradict, confuse or 
otherwise deny information so that no correct, definitive conclusion could be made.  This 
section studies the various means used by the Chinese to manage their deception 
regarding the development of the Varyag specifically and China’s aircraft carrier 
capabilities in general.  There were three broad approaches that the Chinese used to 
manage the deception about the Varyag.  First, China maintained the Varyag’s cover 
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story for as long as it could.  Second, China never denied interest in the value of an 
aircraft carrier capability.  Third, China employed contradictory messaging to confuse the 
truth with deceit.   
1. Maintenance of Cover Narrative about the Varyag’s Purpose 
The PLA maintained a single cover narrative to explain the purpose of the Varyag 
purchase—conversion into a floating casino.  Regardless of the difficulties the Chinese 
encountered in transporting the Varyag to China and foreign intelligence estimates, China 
never wavered in its narrative on the Varyag’s purpose.  This was important for a few 
reasons: 
Minimize suspicion and scrutiny.  China maintained the cover story through the 
Varyag’s arrival in China in 2002 and after that until official acknowledgement that the 
Varyag was being refurbished as a carrier in 2011.  From the point of purchase in 1998 to 
2011, the Chinese had to sustain the cover story for 13 years and try to hide the true 
function of something as large and recognizable as an aircraft carrier.  Although foreign 
interests postulated the development of an aircraft carrier capability by China throughout 
the period, the Varyag was not always the focus of attention.  There were numerous 
assessments that were made in those 13 years that made no reference to the Varyag and 
instead postulated about the construction of new build carriers.  The earliest accurate 
assessments of the actual role of the Varyag were made in 2005 by Jane’s and in 2006 by 
U.S. and Taiwanese analysts who correctly surmised that the Varyag was being 
refurbished as an aircraft carrier training platform.160  China denied those claims.  China 
adroitly avoided making references to the Varyag whenever possible and merely issued 
denials to any claims about the Varyag without volunteering additional information.  This 
strategy of sticking to staid uninformative denials allowed China to wear down the 
resistance and curiosity of foreign intelligence.  Even though the Varyag was berthed in 
plain view to the Chinese public, the interminable stance taken by the Chinese kept 
interest levels in the Varyag to a minimum and probably led to Varyag-fatigue in 
reporting agencies—which would have served Chinese interests. 
                                                 
160 Lague, “Do China’s strategic ambitions include a carrier?” 
 81 
Allow other elements of the deception ploy (Kiev and Minsk) to serve 
supporting roles.  By maintaining its cover story of carrier-themed entertainment, China 
would constantly point to the Kiev and Minsk as evidence that its acquisition of old 
carriers was for scientific and economic purposes and not military ends.  It is also telling 
to note that whenever China made references to the Kiev and Minsk, it would not make 
any reference to the Varyag, like it last did in 2007.161  This was a deliberate attempt to 
allow the Varyag to fall out of the limelight.  However, to knowing external observers, 
this glaring omission should have aroused suspicion and further reinforce the argument 
that China’s intention was to hide the true purpose of the Varyag.  Fortunately for China, 
curiosity about the Varyag never reached troublesome levels and the development of the 
Varyag was never jeopardized. 
Maximize probability of success for the transfer of the Varyag.  The most 
critical phase of the Varyag’s development was its successful transfer to China.  If 
foreign powers had learned of the Varyag’s true purpose, various diplomatic and military 
measures could have been imposed to disrupt her transit or even sabotage the rusting hulk 
itself.  Once the Varyag was in Chinese waters, the most vulnerable phase of the 
Varyag’s development would have been successfully overcome.  There were actually two 
occasions during the Varyag’s voyage that it encountered foreign interventions.  The first 
was Turkey’s opposition to its transit of the Bosphorus Strait that caught China by 
surprise and led to the significant 15 month confinement of the Varyag in the Black Sea.  
The second incident happened while the Varyag was doing tug-towed circuits within the 
Black Sea when an unidentified helicopter landed on the Varyag and disembarked three 
men who appeared to take measurements of the ship.  They left before the Varyag’s tug 
crew arrived onboard and reportedly scrawled “The French was here” on the Varyag’s 
deck.162  The first incident was resolved through diplomacy, the second was quietly 
forgotten.  While neither incident ultimately stopped China’s plans to develop the 
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Varyag, the incidents portended what could have been more serious attempts to sink 
China’s carrier ambitions for the Varyag. 
Minimize expectations about Chinese technical ability.  There was also the 
under-estimation by the West of Varyag’s viability as a possible hull for eventual 
reconstitution as an operational aircraft carrier as well as China’s technical capability to 
complete such a task.163  China never publicly contradicted Western perceptions about its 
perceived weaknesses which would have undermined China’s interests in reducing 
attention and obstruction to its construction of the Varyag.  Chinese strategic philosophy 
encourages such a posture through the concepts of “hide and bide” espoused within Deng 
Xiaopoing’s “24 Character Strategy” and “feigning foolishness even if not insane” from 
the Thirty-Six Stratagems.164  The most significant sign of the success of this strategy 
was the assertion from the Asia-Pacific editor of Jane’s Defense Weekly that the Varyag 
“has been sitting around too long in too unclean conditions to be used as an operational 
warship,” and that “China is a sovereign country. It’s unlikely they would go through the 
charade of using a front company in Macau.  They don’t have to sneak around.”165  How 
wrong Jane’s was on both counts, much to the relief of China.  
2. Never Denying Chinese Interest in Aircraft Carrier Capability 
China never denied its interest in aircraft carriers and acknowledged the strengths 
that a carrier could add to the PLA’s military capabilities.  China knew that its 
institutional interest in aircraft carriers was well known through the PLAN commander 
and Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing’s assertions in the 1980s 
and never sought to conceal such an interest.166  At the same time, China downplayed 
security concerns that might arise from any future carrier capability by emphasizing the 
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territorial security (as opposed to regional power projection) and non-combat roles of the 
carrier in providing humanitarian and disaster assistance.167 
This was a sensible long-term strategy for China as it would have been 
disingenuous of the Chinese if they denied ever having an interest in aircraft carriers, 
only to operationalize one later in the future.  Thus China never sought to deny its interest 
in possessing such a capability.  Instead, it held close to its chest the building and 
realization of such a capability.  This strategy reduced unwanted attention on its carrier 
development programs because if China had denied any interest in carrier capabilities, it 
may have triggered investigative attempts to prove otherwise.  However, by admitting 
interest, China could overtly carry on its research and development programs for a carrier 
capability without undue attention or suspicion.  China’s positive position regarding 
carriers also facilitated its carrier-associated acquisitions of technology or material from 
its partners without undue alarm.  This strategy allowed the construction of the Varyag to 
proceed without an internal contradiction within the Chinese system and without having 
to deal with any controversy that may have been stirred by outright denial about any 
interest in carrier capability. 
Maintaining a positive position on aircraft carrier capability also allowed the 
Chinese to better maintain their overall deception by pulling other elements into play that 
would not have been available if they had issued an outright denial of interest.  These 
including self-deception by foreign intelligence about new aircraft carrier constructions in 
China and the actual completion of Varyag’s refurbishment (which were mostly too 
pessimistic).  In essence, open interest in an aircraft carrier capability not only served the 
strategic needs of concealing Varyag’s refurbishment, it also served China’s broader 
strategic military calculus and allowed considerable uncertainty to be injected into the 
strategic considerations of competing states. 
 China’s declared interest in developing an aircraft carrier capability was the wiser 
strategic choice compared to outright denial.  A denial would have imposed an inordinate 
amount of constraint on its research and development efforts as well as a publicity 
                                                 
167 Shuyan Wan, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier is Not Intended for Combat Missions.” 
 84 
nightmare with the Varyag largely in plain sight in the Dalian shipyard.  Thus, China’s 
openness about its interest in carriers was a master stroke in perception management and 
protecting its deception regarding the Varyag.   
3. Employing Contradictory Signals to Confuse  
While China never hid its aspiration for a carrier capability, it was never clear 
about when it would build one to fulfill that aspiration.  Chinese and foreign reports about 
carriers being built only served to confuse and perhaps conceal the development of the 
Varyag under the suspicion of other spurious programs.  China came out several times to 
deny carrier construction projects—one in April 2007 even citing the Minsk and Kiev as 
examples to the contrary.168  Between 2002 (when Varyag arrived in China) and 2011 
(when the Varyag’s refurbishment was officially acknowledged), the PLA consistently 
denied construction of aircraft carriers in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.  Jane’s 2005 revelation 
that the Varyag had been repainted in PLAN colors represented a watershed in foreign 
assessment of Varyag’s true purpose because it was the clearest indicator of the role 
intended for Varyag.  Jane’s had discredited the casino cover story.169  Even so, China 
stuck to its cover story about a non-military role for Varyag (as evidenced by its 2007 
assertion) and never publicly acknowledged the actual role of the Varyag until the official 
announcement in 2011.  This Chinese poker-face when Jane’s had effectively called its 
bluff in 2005 was essential to maintaining its deception and denying foreign intelligence 
what would have been confirmation of Varyag’s role more than 7 years before it was 
commissioned. 
While Chinese denials of carrier construction were perhaps expected, China also 
unexpectedly moved in the opposite direction on the question of developing aircraft 
carrier capabilities.  The most telling example is the Commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet’s comment that all the Chinese leaders he met on a visit in May 2007 had voiced 
considerable interest about developing aircraft carriers.170  What is the reason for this 
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apparently contradictory behavior by China within the space of two months in 2007—
with a denial about construction issued in April and interest in carrier construction stated 
by Chinese leaders meeting the most senior military leader in charge of the Pacific region 
in May?171  Was it poor coordination by the Chinese to maintain their policy lines 
regarding carriers?  Or was it a deliberate attempt to send mixed signals and confuse 
foreign intelligence?  The authors believe it latter reason may be valid because each 
message was targeted at a specific audience to achieve specific goals.   
The first message involving denial of carrier construction was broadcast on Chinese 
television and ostensibly targeted the Chinese domestic audience to debunk the “Chinese 
carrier threat theory” espoused by foreign governments and to educate them about the 
justifications for Chinese self-determination in terms of military capability development.  The 
second message was not directed at a broad audience but at an individual leader of a 
competing military system who would influence security policy in Asia.  The Chinese would 
not have known whether comments made to the U.S. Commander of Pacific Command, 
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, would have been transmitted to the public realm but they 
certainly left him in no doubt about their interest in developing an aircraft carrier 
capability.172  That Admiral Keating was only two months into his Pacific command tour 
when he visited China may have urged the Chinese to cultivate an impression in him about 
their carrier ambitions for reasons of strategic posture.   
Whatever the reasons may have been, the near simultaneous denial of carrier 
construction and declaration of interest in carriers would have been confusing to foreign 
observers and the Chinese may have wanted nothing more than to inject doubt and 
uncertainty into foreign projections regarding China’s carrier capability.  To leave the 
adversary guessing may not be the ideal end state in typical deception ploys because the 
deceiver would normally want the deceived to fall into a specific position of belief.  
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However, in the case of China’s aircraft carrier development, to leave foreign intelligence 
in a state of uncertainty about the true intent for Varyag may have been a favorable end 
state given the significant physical evidence of the Varyag being refurbished in plain 
sight of the world.  
The arguments above have shown that through material (Kiev and Minsk) and 
psychological measures, China was able to manage its deception about the Varyag’s 
intended refurbishment into a functional aircraft carrier and establish an important 
foothold in the long term development of a viable aircraft carrier capability for the 
PLAN.  While the deception surrounding the Varyag neither masked its existence nor hid 
the fact that China was interested in developing a carrier capability; the deception ploy 
was sufficiently effective to allow China to develop the Varyag to operational status 
through the achievement of the following objectives: 
• Acquire the Varyag in the face of reluctance from Ukraine; competing 
acquisition attempts from competitors; and regional and global concerns 
about Chinese military modernization. 
• Physically relocate the Varyag from the Black Sea to China’s coast 
through a tortuous voyage that not only caused delays but potentially 
threatened the transfer of the Varyag back to China.  The economic cost 
and physical difficulty of the Varyag’s voyage were real threats to the 
viability of the Chinese plans for the Varyag. 
• Refurbish and rebuild the Varyag in China over a period of more than 10 
years under international and regional scrutiny without significant 
obstacles and negative publicity.  During this time, there were many 
postulations about China’s potential carrier capability and estimations 
about when such a capability would be achieved.  Few proved to be right 
and even the correct suspicions were sufficiently covered by the overall 
Chinese deception that they never amounted to much. 
• Achieve a public relations coup when the Varyag was officially 
commissioned into the PLAN.  The Varyag symbolized not just the 
triumph of Chinese military planning and industrial expertise, but also 
carried the hopes of a nation and had a symbolic significance that far 
outweighed its military utility.  It also represented Chinese triumph in the 
face of regional and international obstacles; and most significantly, it 
became a symbol of defiance to the hegemony of the United States in East 
Asia which was most evidently embodied in its aircraft carrier battle 
groups in the Pacific. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the strategic deception employed by China to ensure 
that is plans for the acquisition and development of the former Russian carrier Varyag 
into its first aircraft carrier the Liaoning achieved fruition.  By contrasting China’s 
official position on aircraft carriers and its intentions for the Liaoning with the reality of 
the refurbishment work that was done on the Liaoning, the duplicity of China’s deception 
was pointed out.  The motivation behind China’s deception and the mechanics of the 
Liaoning deception were elaborated to provide deeper understanding of the deception 
ploy’s genesis and evolution.  Finally, the measures taken by China to maximize the 
effects of the Liaoning deception were elaborated to explain China’s actions and 
statements as the Liaoning deception played out to its logical conclusion.   
The Liaoning deception the world has witnessed may have only been the first 
phase of a larger plan to mask China’s development of a larger carrier force and 
capability.  Now that the deception surrounding the Liaoning’s acquisition and 
development has been explained, the next chapter investigates the possible roles that 
could be undertaken by the Liaoning as China’s first aircraft carrier.  The findings about 
Liaoning’s role will provide some indication of the trajectory to be expected as China 
develops its carrier capability and hopefully provide observers with greater insight to 
penetrate the fog of China’s deception. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES FOR THE ROLE 
OF CHINA’S FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter V examined strategic deception with Chinese characteristics while 
Chapter VI investigated the intricacies of the Liaoning deception.  This chapter shall 
employ Richards Heuer’s Analysis of Competitive Hypotheses (ACH) to assess the likely 
roles to be performed by China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning as it matures into service 
with the PLAN.   
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the most likely role for the Liaoning.  
The rationale for this analysis is driven by China’s assertion that the Liaoning is to be 
used for “research and training purposes.”  While the carrier will undoubtedly be 
employed for such purposes as China continues to build and strengthen its carrier 
capability, the question is whether the Liaoning will play a bigger role than mere research 
and training.  Thus, this chapter will employ Heuer’s ACH to assess if China is revealing 
only a small portion of the Liaoning’s actual role in China’s maritime strategy.  The 
findings from ACH should reveal if China is being economical with the truth and 
employing deception to mask the Liaoning’s true roles in the PLAN. 
B. THE ROLE OF CHINA’S FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER—THE 
LIAONING 
On 27 July 2011, China revealed to the world that her first aircraft carrier —the 
Liaoning was under construction.  In the same report, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, a 
professor at the PLA’s National Defense University pointed out that “China’s first 
aircraft carrier will not perform combat missions.  Instead, it will be mainly used for 
training and experimentation purposes.”173  He elaborated that training activities would 
include “training personnel working on carrier platforms, pilots of carrier-based aircraft 
and operators of the carrier.174”  He also explained that experimentation would include 
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ironing out compatibility issues between the various systems onboard; evaluation of the 
carrier and its equipment and systems; and examination of carrier design and building 
technologies.175  During the commissioning of the Liaoning, China reaffirmed Liaoning’s 
training and research roles.  The 2012 U.S. DOD report to Congress on China’s military 
developments echoed similar expectations for the Liaoning’s role.176 
Why does an accurate understanding of the Liaoning’s role matter?  It is critical to 
understanding China’s broader strategy concerning aircraft carriers and estimating the 
possible role that the Liaoning may play in the unforeseen scenarios that may arise in the 
near future.  A clear understanding of the Liaoning’s potential and its role will allow for 
better assessment of the strategic situation and allow interested countries to adopt the 
necessary measures to deal with the Liaoning’s envisaged role. 
C. THEORY OF ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE HYPOTHESES 
Heuer conceptualized ACH as “a tool to aid judgement on important issues 
requiring careful weighting of alternative explanations or conclusions.”177  ACH has 
been influential in refining intelligence analysis and has been used by intelligence 
agencies to improve their analysis of information and make more refined assessments.178  
At the core of ACH is the notion of competition among plausible hypotheses to determine 
which ones survive a gauntlet of testing with available information.179  Heuer outlined 
eight steps for the execution of ACH and the following sections will discuss all eight as 
we try to determine the most probable role for the Liaoning as China’s first aircraft 
carrier. 
                                                 
175 Wan, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier is Not Intended for Combat Missions.” 
176 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, May 2012, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_cmpr_final.pdf. 
177 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 95. 
178 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, xxiii. 
179 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 95. 
 91 
Step 1: Identifying Competing Hypotheses 
The first step in ACH calls for the identification of all possible hypotheses 
pertaining to the issue of interest—the role of the Liaoning as China’s first aircraft 
carrier. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The Liaoning will spearhead the operational deployment 
of China’s aircraft carrier capability. 
Our first hypothesis (H1) postulates that the Liaoning will spearhead the operational 
deployment of China’s aircraft carriers.  H1 basically refutes China’s claims that the 
Liaoning will only be used for research and training purposes.  H1 believes that the 
Liaoning’s role will extend beyond research and training and will eventually encompass 
operational capability in the full spectrum of operations for China’s first aircraft carrier.  
H1 assesses that the Liaoning will be deployed for actual operations where necessary and 
will be a flagship for operations when it is  deployed.  H1 suggests that the Liaoning will 
naturally ascend to the position of flagship for the PLAN and be a warship of special 
significance and symbolic importance to China.  H1 is the most optimistic assessment of 
the Liaoning’s capabilities and accords it a wide and expansive role. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The Liaoning will serve only a limited research and 
training role.  
The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that the Liaoning will only perform research 
and training duties within the PLAN.  H2 takes China’s proclamation about the 
Liaoning’s role at face value and postulates that the Liaoning’s development will not 
reach full operational capability as a warship.  H2 would see the Liaoning gradually fade 
into obscurity as the PLAN’s aircraft carrier capability improves and new carriers replace 
the Liaoning as the symbolic figurehead of the PLAN.  H2 represents a conservative 




Hypothesis 3 (H3):  The Liaoning will be an operational failure, unable to 
fulfill even its designated role in research and training.   
The third hypothesis (H3) suggests that the Liaoning is incapable of performing 
its stated roles of research and training.  H3 suggests that either due to design 
inadequacies, technical limitations, environmental constraints or strategic considerations, 
the Liaoning will not be able to fulfill the roles that China has envisaged for her.  She 
would become the PLAN’s floating 60,000 ton white elephant that is not deployable for 
research, training or operations.  H3 includes constraints on the Liaoning’s deployment 
from within the Chinese system like inadequate resource allocation for the carrier’s 
operation (environmental constraint), and from the international environment like 
political pressure from regional countries or the U.S. (strategic considerations).  H3 
suggests the worst case scenario for the Liaoning and represents the most pessimistic 
hypothesis for Liaoning’s future role. 
Disproved Hypothesis: The Liaoning as a commercial entertainment facility. 
When formulating hypotheses, Heuer urges caution in differentiating between 
unproven ones and disproved ones.180  In formulating possible hypotheses, we want to 
avoid the error of omitting unproven hypotheses as opposed to disproved ones.  One of 
the disproved hypothesis in the consideration of the Liaoning’s role is its potential as a 
commercial entertainment facility.  This was the role used as a cover for China’s 
deception during the acquisition and development of the Varyag into the Liaoning.  This 
hypothesis was clearly disproved by the commissioning of Liaoning into the PLAN on 25 
September 2012 and the huge investments made in ensuring that the ship is seaworthy 
and suitable for carrier flight operations.  Therefore it will not be considered among the 
possible hypotheses. 
Step 2: Listing of Consistent and Inconsistent Evidence and Arguments for 
Hypotheses 
The second step of ACH calls for the listing of evidence and arguments for each 
hypothesis.  Heuer advises an expansive definition of evidence and for the inclusion of 
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assumptions and logical deductions about the subject of study as these generate “strong 
preconceptions of which hypothesis is most likely.181 
Hypothesis 1: Consistent and Inconsistent Evidence and Arguments 
Evidence consistent with H1 that the Liaoning will spearhead operational 
deployment of China’s aircraft carrier capability is as follows: 
1. The Liaoning was touted as a “landmark in the country’s modernization of 
armed forces and national defense” by the Chinese government.182  If the 
Liaoning is indeed perceived by China to be a symbol of its military’s 
modernization and ability, it would be counter-intuitive to limit its role to 
mere research and training.   
2. Once operational capabilities are built up, the transition from research and 
training to actual operational deployment is easily achieved.  In fact, most 
naval ships deployed for operations are in a constant state of internal 
training for their ship’s crews, so the transition from training to operations 
hardly requires a stretch of the imagination. 
3. The Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right.  Although the Liaoning 
was built from the hull of a scrapped carrier, its internal machinery and 
systems are presumably modern having only been recently installed during 
refurbishment.  Thus, as a naval platform, the Liaoning is no laggard 
based on outdated technology.  In terms of size, the Liaoning is only 30 
meters shorter (300m versus 330m) than the Nimitz-class carriers that are 
the most modern class of carriers in current service.183  Although the 
Liaoning is significantly lighter (67,000 ton versus 100,000 ton 
displacement) than the Nimitz-class, it is by no means a small carrier.  
Thus the Liaoning is a capable warship by any standard. 
4. The difficulty of producing aircraft carriers means that the Liaoning must 
hold the operational fort for some time yet.  Although China’s 
shipbuilding industry made impressive strides in recent decades, 
construction of a modern aircraft carrier is complex and demanding work.  
The previous chapter outlined the difficulties of carrier construction for 
China—which explained why China acquired the Varyag instead of 
constructing a carrier of its own.  That being the case, it would be hard to 
fathom that the Liaoning would not be deployed for operations if it was 
capable and the need arose. 
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5. To restrict the Liaoning to research and training roles would be a great 
waste of resources.  China invested at least US$26 million just to acquire 
and tow the Varyag back to China.184  There is no estimate on the cost of 
refurbishing and equipping the Varyag to bring it up to operational 
condition.  The operating cost of the carrier must also be significant.  
Taking these into account, it would appear that a limitation on the 
Liaoning’s role to mere training and research would be short-sighted.  
Moreover, modern carriers can operate for up to 50 years. 185  The 
Liaoning’s role must be expected to grow as it matures and it is only 
natural that as its capability grows, its operational utility would expand 
beyond training and research. 
6. The Liaoning has significant operational value as the largest warship and 
possibly most capable aircraft carrier of its size in the East Asia region.  
The PLAN is already the largest navy in the Asia Pacific region and 
although fleet size is not the best indicator of operational effectiveness, it 
is an indicator of operational reach and enduring naval presence that is of 
great value in the context of peacetime engagement and limited conflict. 
7. Operational urgency may compel China to deploy Liaoning for operations.  
Tensions in the East and South China Seas are rising after the 2009 
submissions of territorial claims to the United Nations.  Frequent naval 
confrontations between China and regional competitors have raised the 
stakes and may compel China to deploy the Liaoning to strengthen its 
ability to protect its territorial claims. 
8. Father of China’s maritime strategy - Admiral Liu Huaqing’s plan was to 
deploy the aircraft carrier to the South China Sea.186  The late Liu 
Huaqing had stated in his memoirs that China would need to deploy 
aircraft carriers to the South China Sea to protect its sea lines of 
communications.  The trajectory of China’s naval development so far has 
been largely in concert with the maritime strategy laid out of Liu.  It 
appears more likely than not that the Liaoning will be deployed for an 
operational role in the South China Sea once she is ready. 
Evidence inconsistent with H1’s assertion that the Liaoning will spearhead 
operational deployment of China’s aircraft carrier capability is as follows: 
1. The Liaoning will not be ready for operational deployment.  Aircraft 
carriers need aircraft and the Liaoning was commissioned without an 
organic fighter wing.  Carrier aviation is still in its infancy in China and it 
will not be possible for China to stand up a full aircraft carrier capability 
                                                 
184 “China pays S$45m for carrier hull,” The Straits Times (Singapore), 6 March 2002. 
185 “Aircraft Carriers – CVN,” United States Navy Fact File, updated 23 October 2012, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4 
186 Paul, “The great Chinese aircraft carrier mystery.” 
 95 
within a short time window.  In May 2013, China just stood up its first 
carrier aviation wing, but the number of trained pilots is still very small 
and it will take years to build up a sustainable pool of pilots.187 
2. One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational 
deployment188.  Naval operations typically require at least three naval 
platforms of any type for sustainable operations.  While one is in 
operation, the second one is being worked up for deployment and the third 
is undergoing maintenance.  All naval ships go through a similar 
deployment cycle and having just one carrier makes it extremely taxing on 
the ship and its crew for sustained operations.  Thus, it is unlikely that the 
Liaoning will be deployed for sustained operations.  
3. Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too aggressive and 
counter to China’s assertions that it believes in peaceful development and 
the resolution of disputes without force.  China has repeatedly asserted its 
belief in peaceful development and its belief in the peaceful resolution of 
issues.189  Deploying the Liaoning for operations in the South China East 
would be viewed by regional countries as an escalation of force and would 
be contrary to China’s diplomatic assertions.190   
4. Rest of the PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning with the 
protective carrier escort due to lack of suitable ships, doctrinal clarity and 
capabilities.  Without a proper escort, an aircraft carrier becomes a high-
value target for adversaries and China may be unwilling to risk its first and 
only carrier. 
5. China wants the world to believe the Liaoning is only for research and 
training.  This narrative would best serve China’s interests as it downplays 
the potential military value of the Liaoning as well as obscuring the 
expected enhancements that will be made to the Liaoning as the ship, 
naval aviation, operating doctrines and procedures are enhanced over time. 
Hypothesis 2: Consistent and Inconsistent Evidence and Arguments 
Evidence consistent with H2’s assertion that the Liaoning will only be used for 
research and training purposes is as follows: 
1. The official position of China on the Liaoning’s role is its use for research 
and training purposes.  While China has not said that the Liaoning will 
only be restricted to such a role, it has also emphasized the importance of 
research and training at this stage of China’s carrier capability 
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development.  China stands to gain much goodwill and build trust by 
sticking to its non-aggressive deployment plans for the Liaoning. 
2. It is logical for research and training to be the Liaoning’s first priority 
because it is the first platform of a brand new capability for China.  
Therefore, there are many areas in which China has to conduct research 
and training to realize new capabilities.  Carrier aviation is one significant 
area of research and training for the PLAN and it is apparent from recent 
developments that substantial training will still be required to generate the 
requisite quantity and quality of carrier pilots. 
3. Research and training is more beneficial to the long term development of 
China’s aircraft carrier capability than the short term deployment of the 
Liaoning for operations.  The marginal gains from devoting the Liaoning 
for carrier focused research and training may outweigh the operational 
experience that the Liaoning may acquire if deployed for actual 
operations.   
4. Research and training trumps all the other factors if the objective of the 
PLAN is to build a critical mass of talent, skills, knowledge and leadership 
to operate China’s next generation of aircraft carriers.  The pioneer crew 
and pilots of the Liaoning will not only need to excel in what they do, they 
will need to educate and train the next generation of carrier personnel.  
This will drain the resources of the first set of crew and may result in 
insufficient capacity to deploy the Liaoning for operations. 
5. There is an urgency to focus on research and training because if China’s 
intent is to build a credible carrier force, it will need to commence work 
on construction, shipbuilding and personnel training as soon as possible.  
However, this work cannot realistically commence unless the necessary 
research and study of the strengths and weaknesses of the carrier’s 
systems are completed.  Thus, there is an urgent need for comprehensive 
research to be performed on the Liaoning’s performance so that the next 
generation of carriers can take onboard all the recommendations. 
Evidence inconsistent with H2’s assertion that the Liaoning will only be used for 
research and training is as follows: 
1. Research and training priorities can easily be superseded by operational 
concerns where national interests and pride are at stake.  Unless the PLAN 
and Central Military Commission leadership have a clear and 
unambiguous understanding of the research and training priorities, the 
exigencies of serving the national interest will easily overcome such lofty 
goals. 
2. The Liaoning was built as a warship for the PLAN, with the attendant 
weapon systems and highly trained and experienced crew.  Unlike 
dedicated research and training platforms that may be unarmed and were 
obviously designed for such functions, the Liaoning was built for naval 
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operations.  Thus, to expect that research and training will be long term 
priorities for the Liaoning is naïve. 
Hypothesis 3: Consistent and Inconsistent Evidence and Arguments 
There was little evidence in support of H3’s assertion that the Liaoning will be an 
operational failure, unable to fulfill even its research and training role.  While the 
Liaoning has obviously had its share of challenges trying to operationalize a challenging 
capability such as carrier aviation, there has not been any evidence to suggest that the 
Liaoning project may end in catastrophic failure.191  In fact, evidence from China that the 
carrier’s development program has its share of challenges suggests that the PLAN is not 
blind to the potential risks of developing Liaoning’s capabilities.192  Apart from the 
absence of catastrophic failures with Liaoning’s development, the dearth of consistent 
evidence for H3 may also be a result of China’s censorship of negative reports and 
unknown difficulties about Liaoning’s development.  This possibility cannot be 
discounted so observers will need to be vigilant for negative reports.  H3 will still be 
pursued for analysis to examine if evidence for H1 and H2 could have a possible impact 
on H3. 
Evidence inconsistent with H3’s assertion that the Liaoning will be an operational 
failure, unable to fulfill even its research and training role, is as follows: 
1. The Liaoning has had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier 
flight trials.  The PLAN appears to have a comprehensive plan for the 
development and enhancement of Liaoning’s capabilities that would 
minimize any catastrophic failure.  The development of the Liaoning since 
its commissioning in September 2012 suggests that the Liaoning’s 
development is progressive and moving in the right direction for the 
PLAN. 
2. Significant resources have been commitment for Liaoning’s development.  
While the magnitude of resource commitment does not directly reduce the 
risks associated with carrier development, it increases the probability of 
success.  As more resources are committed within a functional and 
effective professional organization for the fulfillment of a goal, more 
mitigating measures and customized solutions can be implemented to 
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facilitate success. An example is the Liaoning’s re-basing to a dedicated 
home base within the Qingdao naval base that took four years to 
construct.193 Various land-based carrier flight training facilities like the 
facility in Wuhan also reduce the chance of catastrophic failure out at 
sea.194  China’s possible carrier catapult research facility demonstrates 
that considerable research and testing is performed before technology is 
fielded by the PLAN.195 
3. China’s Defense Ministry announced in April 2013 that the Liaoning was 
slated for a “high-seas voyage” within the year.196  This announcement is 
a demonstration of the PLAN’s confidence in the performance of the 
Liaoning and its availability and performance for a high-seas voyage that 
will likely be much publicized.    
4. In April 2013, China announced that the PLAN’s first carrier aviation unit 
was inaugurated.197  Although the fact that the Liaoning had no dedicated 
organic aviation wing when it was commissioned in September 2012 
became a source of ridicule for some foreign observers.  The fact that 
China took careful and measured steps towards the building of such a 
demanding capability should instead give cause for concern.  It is evident 
that China has given deliberate thought and planning towards the 
development of the Liaoning and is motivated to succeed even if more 
time and resources are required. 
Step 3: Evidence Matrix for Comparison of Hypotheses  
Step 3 of the ACH process calls for the construction of a matrix to compare the 
competing hypotheses against the assembled evidence from Step 2.198  The purpose of 
Step 3 is to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the evidence and to determine which items of 
evidence are “most useful in judging the relative likelihood of alternative hypotheses.”199   
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In the matrix, the alphabet “C” indicates that a certain item of evidence is 
consistent with a particular hypothesis.  The alphabet “I” indicates that a certain item of 
evidence is inconsistent with a particular hypothesis.  If a particular piece of evidence 
indicates more consistency or inconsistency than others, a numerical value is added in 
front of the alphabet give it additional weight. 
The type of evidence compiled for this case has been separated into three categories. 
“News” refers to evidence from open source news media that do not include official news 
media outlets from China.  “China” refers to evidence from official news media outlets in 
China that are the government’s mouthpieces.  “Analyst” refers to opinions from external 
military domain experts and analysts including the authors of this paper. 
Apart from listing the evidence and their correlation to the respective hypotheses, 
the matrix will evaluate the evidence on three criteria—Type, Credibility and Relevance.  
Type refers to the evidence type that is usually connected to the source of the evidence.  
Credibility measures the credibility of evidence that is normally linked to the credibility of 
the source.  There are three degrees of credibility (high, medium and low) and the default is 
medium.  Lastly, relevance measures how relevant particular evidence may be in relation to 
the issue being analyzed.  There are three degrees of relevance (high, medium and low) and 
the default is medium.  The ACH matrix is shown in Table 8 below. 
The Competing Hypotheses regarding the Liaoning’s Role in the PLAN:  
• H1 (Ops): Liaoning will spearhead operational deployment of China’s 
aircraft carrier capability. 
• H2 (R&D / Trng): Liaoning will be deployed for research and training 
purposes. 
• H2 (Fail): Liaoning will be an operational failure, unable to fulfill even its 
research and training role. 
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 Weighted Inconsistency Score       
 EVIDENCE       
1 Liaoning touted as landmark of China’s modernization of armed forces and 
national defense. 
China H H C C C 
2 Transition from research and training to operational deployment easily achieved. Analyst M H C C I 
3 Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right. Analyst M M C C I 
4 Liaoning must hold the operational fort until other aircraft carriers are ready. Analyst M H 2C I I 
5 Restricting Liaoning to research and training is a waste of operational resources. Analyst M M C I I 
6 Liaoning has significant operational value in East Asia. Analyst M H 2C I I 
7 Operational urgency may compel China to deploy Liaoning for operations. Analyst M H C I I 
8 Strategic maritime plan was to deploy the aircraft carrier for force projection. China H H 2C I I 
9 Liaoning will not be ready for operational deployment. Analyst M H I 2C C 
10 One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational deployment. News H H I C C 
11 Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too aggressive. News H H I 2C I 
12 Rest of PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning. News H H I 2C C 
13 China wants the world to believe the Liaoning is only for research and training. Analyst M M I C I 
14 Official position on the Liaoning’s role is that it serves research and training 
purposes. 
China M H I C I 
15 Logical for research and training to be the Liaoning’s first priority. China M M I C I 
16 Research and training is more beneficial to the long term development of China’s 
carriers. 
Analyst M M I C I 
17 Research and training trumps all the other factors if the objective of the PLAN is to 
build a critical mass of talent, skills, knowledge and leadership for next generation 
of aircraft carriers.   
Analyst M M I C C 
18 Urgency to focus on research and training because China will need to commence 
work on construction, shipbuilding and personnel training for next generation of 
carriers soonest.   
Analyst M H I C C 
19 Research and training priorities can be superseded by operational concerns. Analyst M H C I I 
20 Liaoning was built as a warship for the PLAN, with the attendant weapon systems 
and highly trained and experienced crew. 
Analyst M H C I I 
Continued on next page. 
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Continued from previous page. 
21 Liaoning had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials. Analyst H M C C I 
22 Significant resources have been commitment for Liaoning’s development. Analyst M M C C I 
23 Liaoning slated for a “high-seas voyage” to demonstrate its capability. China M M C C I 
24 PLAN’s first carrier aviation unit has been inaugurated. China M M C C I 
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a. Findings from Analysis of ACH Matrix (First Iteration) 
Analysis of the initial comparison of the competing hypotheses with collated evidence 
offers the following insights: 
1. Evidence for H1 and H2 can overlap.  It appears that some evidence for H1 and 
H2 are either consistent or inconsistent for both hypotheses concurrently.  This 
finding suggests that such evidence do not sufficiently make a distinction between 
H1 and H2. 
2. Evidence consistent for H1 and H2 are mostly inconsistent with H3.  Since H3 is 
predicated on the failure of both H1 and H2, most evidence that is consistent for 
H1 and H2 is inconsistent with H3.  This is not unexpected as there was little 
evidence that was consistent with H3 to begin with.  This finding strengthens the 
initial expectation during the formulation of H3 that it may be an unlikely result. 
3. Elimination of H3?  Given that the only evidence that is consistent with H3 is also 
compatible with H2 and lacks specific diagnosticity for H3, H3 was considered 
for elimination.  However, there was no evidence that could disprove H3 
conclusively.  H3 simply remains unproven because there is a lack of diagnostic 
evidence, therefore it remains in consideration. 
4. Re-evaluation of evidence that is consistent with both H1 and H2.  To improve 
the diagnosticity of evidence for comparison, evidence that is consistent with both 
H1 and H2 will be re-evaluated for both hypotheses and re-examined.  If the 
evidence continues to provide a lack of specific diagnosticity for either 
hypotheses, this evidence will be eliminated from consideration. 
The findings from the initial analysis of the evidence matrix in Step 3 of ACH will be 
implemented in Step 4 of the ACH below. 
Step 4: Refining the Evidence Matrix for Comparison of Hypotheses  
To refine the presentation of evidence in the matrix, the evidence has been re-ordered, 
evidence with greater diagnosticity has been placed at the top, non-diagnostic evidence has been 
moved down.  In addition, evidence with greater sensitivity based on their credibility and 
relevance has also been moved up.  This allows for clearer analysis of diagnostic evidence that is 
sensitive to the hypotheses.   
a. Reassessment of Evidence Diagnosticity. 
The following evidence in Table 9 was consistent with both H1 and H2.  They will be re-
evaluated to improve their respective diagnosticity for either H1 or H2.  
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Table 9.   Evidence consistent with both H1 and H2. 







2 Transition from research and training to operational deployment easily achieved. C C I 
3 Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right. C C I 
21 Liaoning had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials. C C I 
22 Significant resources have been commitment for Liaoning’s development. C C I 
23 Liaoning slated for a “high-seas voyage” to demonstrate its capability. C C I 
24 PLAN’s first carrier aviation unit has been inaugurated. C C I 
 
1. Transition from research and training to operational deployment is easily 
achieved.  Upon closer examination, this evidence is actually more consistent for 
H1 than H2.  This is because even if the Liaoning could be used for research and 
training, it is the ease with which it can be converted for operational deployment 
that is critical to our analysis.  The fact that it can be easily deployed for 
operations as well weighs the evidence in favor of H1 and against H2. 
2. Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right.  Since the Liaoning is a capable 
warship on its own, that makes it even more likely to be deployed for operations 
as opposed to just research and training.  There will be a greater temptation for 
policy makers to employ it in operations and there will be fewer obstacles to it 
being so deployed.  Therefore this evidence is weighed in favor of H1 and against 
H2. 
3. Liaoning had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials.  The 
smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials should come down in 
favor of H1 because it is likely to lead to a greater propensity to deploy the 
Liaoning for operations.  In fact, the smoother the developments and 
enhancements to the Liaoning, the greater is the likelihood that the carrier will be 
deployed for operations.  After all, the purpose of research and training is to 
improve operations.  For the same reason, the inauguration of the PLAN’s first 
carrier aviation unit will also be considered as evidence in favor of H1. 
4. Liaoning slated for a “high-seas voyage” to demonstrate its capability.  Even 
though the details of the high-seas voyage have not been announced, the 
declaration and the nature of the voyage points towards a desire to demonstrate 
Liaoning’s capability in a regional tour de force.  Such a motivation must come 
down in favor of H1 since a demonstration of potential force is only credible if 
that force can be operationalized with ease.  
The re-evaluated diagnostics for the ambiguous evidence is presented in Table 10: 
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Table 10.   Re-evaluated evidence consistent with both H1 and H2. 







2 Transition from research and training to operational deployment easily achieved. 2C C I 
3 Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right. 2C C I 
21 Liaoning had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials. 2C C I 
22 Significant resources have been commitment for Liaoning’s development. 2C C I 
23 Liaoning slated for a “high-seas voyage” to demonstrate its capability. 2C C I 
24 PLAN’s first carrier aviation unit has been inaugurated. 2C C I 
 
b. Value of Evidence Inconsistent with Hypotheses.   
One of the advantages of using the ACH is the consideration of inconsistent evidence.  
Heuer explained that the failings of many intelligence analyses are caused by over-emphasis on 
consistent evidence and insufficient attention on inconsistent evidence.200  Consistent data can 
often support more than one hypothesis and inconsistent data can prove to be of greater value in 
disproving particular hypotheses than consistent data in proving them.  The other pitfall with 
consistent evidence is that analysts will naturally look for consistent evidence to support their 
hunches and preferred hypotheses rather than seeking inconsistent evidence to disprove their 
preferred hypotheses.  Lastly, the adversary who employs deception will plant evidence to 
mislead the intelligence analyst and steer him towards a hypothesis preferred by the enemy.  This 
means that evidence consistent with a particular hypothesis may be planted by the adversary to 
lead one towards the hypothesis that the enemy wants him to believe. 
To account for the evidence that is inconsistent with the hypotheses, a “weighted 
inconsistency score” will be calculated for each hypotheses based on the Credibility, Relevance 
and degree of Inconsistency for each piece of relevant evidence.  Every piece of inconsistent 
evidence will be assigned a score relevant to its hypothesis and the total “weighted inconsistency 
score” for each hypothesis will be compiled.  The “weighted inconsistency score” will be derived 
from the weighted inconsistency counting algorithm shown in Table 11 below that assigns a 
score based on the interaction of three values: Credibility, Relevance and degree of 
Inconsistency.201 
  
                                                 
200 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 104. 
201 The Weighted Inconsistency Counting algorithm was developed by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Hy 
Rothstein to improve the utility of Richards Heuer’s Analysis of Competitive Hypotheses. 
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Table 11.   Weighted Inconsistency Counting Algorithm 
Credibility Relevance Inconsistency (I) Inconsistency - significant (2I) 
High (H) High (H) 2 4 
Medium (M) High (H) 1.414 2.828 
Low (L) High (H) 1 2 
High (H) Medium (M) 1.414 2.828 
Medium (M) Medium (M) 1 2 
Low (L) Medium (M) 0.707 1.414 
High (H) Low (L) 1 2 
Medium (M) Low (L) 0.705 1.414 
Low (L) Low (L) 0.5 1 
 
Therefore, the refined ACH matrix is as presented in Table 12. 
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 Weighted Inconsistency Score    14.242 10.07 18.484 
 EVIDENCE       
8 Strategic maritime plan was to deploy the aircraft carrier for force projection. China H H 2C I I 
10 One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational deployment. News H H I C C 
11 Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too aggressive. News H H I 2C I 
12 Rest of PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning. News H H I 2C C 
4 Liaoning must hold the operational fort until other aircraft carriers are ready. Analyst M H 2C I I 
6 Liaoning has significant operational value in East Asia. Analyst M H 2C I I 
7 Operational urgency may compel China to deploy Liaoning for operations. Analyst M H C I I 
9 Liaoning will not be ready for operational deployment. Analyst M H I 2C C 
14 Official position on the Liaoning’s role is that it serves research and training 
purposes. 
China M H I C I 
18 Urgency to focus on research and training because China will need to 
commence work on construction, shipbuilding and personnel training for next 
generation of carriers soonest.   
Analyst M H I C C 
19 Research and training priorities can be superseded by operational concerns. Analyst M H C I I 
20 Liaoning was built as a warship for the PLAN, with the attendant weapon 
systems and highly trained and experienced crew. 
Analyst M H C I I 
5 Restricting Liaoning to research and training is a waste of operational 
resources. 
Analyst M M C I I 
13 China wants the world to believe the Liaoning is only for research and training. Analyst M M I C I 
15 Logical for research and training to be the Liaoning’s first priority. China M M I C I 
16 Research and training is more beneficial to the long term development of 
China’s carriers. 
Analyst M M I C I 
17 Research and training trumps all the other factors if the objective of the PLAN 
is to build a critical mass of talent, skills, knowledge and leadership for next 
generation of aircraft carriers.   
Analyst M M I C C 
21 Liaoning had a smooth transition from refurbishment to carrier flight trials. Analyst H M 2C C I 
22 Significant resources have been commitment for Liaoning’s development. Analyst M M 2C C I 
23 Liaoning slated for a “high-seas voyage” to demonstrate its capability. China M M 2C C I 
24 PLAN’s first carrier aviation unit has been inaugurated. China M M 2C C I 
2 Transition from research and training to operational deployment easily 
achieved. 
Analyst M H 2C C I 
Continued on next page. 
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Continued from previous page. 
3 Liaoning is a capable warship in its own right. Analyst M M 2C C I 
1 Liaoning touted as landmark of China’s modernization of armed forces and 
national defense. 








a. Findings from Analysis of Evidence Matrix for Competing Hypotheses 
1. Evidence for H1 and H2 are evenly matched.  Considering both consistent and 
inconsistent evidence for H1 and H2, they appear to be quite evenly matched 
across the spectrum of evidence.  The bottom third of the matrix also suggests that 
there is significant evidence that appears to be consistent across both hypotheses.  
This finding suggests that H1 and H2 are evenly matched, and it may even be 
hard to distinguish one from the other.  This is not surprising as the difference 
between operational activities and research /training activities can be difficult to 
distinguish especially in peacetime and at the early stages of a new military 
capability like an aircraft carrier’s evolution when many dual purpose activities 
may be ongoing.  This also suggests that it could be easy for China to disguise 
some operational activity as training activity. 
2. H3 is very unlikely.  H3 has very little evidence that is consistent and the highest 
weighted inconsistency score of 18.484 among the three hypotheses.  This finding 
is not surprising given the initial expectations and the weight of evidence against 
H3.  Thus, although H3 cannot be disproved, its likelihood is the least among the 
three hypotheses considered.  This would leave the ACH process as a two-horse 
race between H1 and H2.  
3. Removal of non-diagnostic evidence from consideration.  Some of the non-
diagnostic evidence in the bottom third of the matrix that are consistent across 
both H1 and H2 will be removed in the next iteration of the ACH matrix to allow 
for greater focus on more diagnostic evidence.  
4. Relevant evidence that is missing.  When examining H1 and the evidence 
compiled thus far, there appears to be relevant evidence that is missing.  
Additional evidence that may indicate that the Liaoning will be deployed for 
operations are described below and will be included as additional evidence in the 
next iteration of the ACH matrix. 
i. Evidence of Liaoning’s basing near possible areas of operation.  Is the 
Liaoning being located nearer to possible operational areas?  Its new base 
in Qingdao is the headquarters of the North Sea Fleet and it appears that 
the Liaoning’s basing there instead of farther east with the East Sea Fleet 
or farther south with the South Sea Fleet is ostensibly to impress external 
observers that the Liaoning should not be seen as a threat to the region.202  
A more practical reason is that it would be easier for the integration and 
training of carrier-based aircraft being based out of Liaoning province.   
At the same time, the construction of a large new naval base at Yulin on 
Hainan Island farther south and existing bases do not preclude the 
possibility that the Liaoning may be relocated farther east or south when it 
is ready for operations. 
                                                 
202 Christian Le Miere, “Why China sent its aircraft carrier to Qingdao,” International Institute for Strategic 




ii. Build-up of a possible carrier task force.  Are there signs that a new carrier 
task force is being built up for possible operation with the Liaoning?  The 
PLAN is Asia’s largest Navy and operates modern warships of the type 
that can be deployed as part of an aircraft carrier task force.  China 
reported that the PLAN’s ships have been conducting concerted training in 
preparation for aircraft carrier task force operations and mentioned a five 
to ten year horizon to realize the carrier task force’s full operational 
capabilities.203  Thus, it is not inconceivable that ships may be assigned 
for carrier task force operations in the future. 
5. Preponderance of evidence consistent with H2.  Due to the fact that the Liaoning 
is a new capability for the PLAN and significant components of it (like the carrier 
air wing) are still being developed, there will be a preponderance of evidence 
consistent with H2 rather than H1.  The danger in discounting H1 lies in the fact 
that training and research are phases that all military capabilities must go through 
to achieve operational status.  The question with the Liaoning is whether its role 
ends with training and research or does it go beyond that to actual operations.  
China would like us to believe the former even as it prepares for the latter.  We 
have to be aware of this as we consider each hypothesis and its relevant evidence. 
Step 5: Draw Tentative Conclusions about the Likelihood of Each Hypothesis   
After considering evidence against respective hypothesis, Heuer recommends examining 
each hypothesis as a whole in Step 5 of ACH with the objective of trying to disprove them.204  
This is to avoid the pitfall of assigning more weight of consistent evidence to a preferred 
hypothesis instead of examining critical evidence that refutes it.  For this, the weighted 
inconsistency score of each hypothesis will be critical to assessing their plausibility.  The 
updated ACH matrix is shown as shown in Table 13. 
The Competing Hypotheses regarding the Liaoning’s Role in the PLAN:  
• H1 (Ops): Liaoning will spearhead operational deployment of China’s aircraft 
carrier capability. 
• H2 (R&D / Trng): Liaoning will be deployed for research and training purposes. 
• H2 (Fail): Liaoning will be an operational failure, unable to fulfill even its 
research and training role. 
 
                                                 
203 Tao Hai, “PLA Navy makes preparations for aircraft carrier formation,” Xinhua (China), 13 December 
2012, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2012-12/13/content_5140986.htm. 
204 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 104. 
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 Weighted Inconsistency Score    16.242 12.07 20.484 
 EVIDENCE       
8 Strategic maritime plan was to deploy the aircraft carrier for force projection. China H H 2C I I 
10 One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational deployment. News H H I C C 
11 Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too aggressive. News H H I 2C I 
12 Rest of PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning. News H H I 2C C 
25 Build up of possible carrier task force. China H H 2C I I 
26 Basing of Liaoning with North Sea Fleet in Qingdao. China H H I C I 
4 Liaoning must hold the operational fort until other aircraft carriers are ready. Analyst M H 2C I I 
6 Liaoning has significant operational value in East Asia. Analyst M H 2C I I 
7 Operational urgency may compel China to deploy Liaoning for operations. Analyst M H C I I 
9 Liaoning will not be ready for operational deployment. Analyst M H I 2C C 
14 Official position on the Liaoning’s role is that it serves research and training 
purposes. 
China M H I C I 
18 Urgency to focus on research and training because China will need to 
commence work on construction, shipbuilding and personnel training for next 
generation of carriers soonest.   
Analyst M H I C C 
19 Research and training priorities can be superseded by operational concerns. Analyst M H C I I 
20 Liaoning was built as a warship for the PLAN, with the attendant weapon 
systems and highly trained and experienced crew. 
Analyst M H C I I 
5 Restricting Liaoning to research and training is a waste of operational 
resources. 
Analyst M M C I I 
13 China wants the world to believe the Liaoning is only for research and training. Analyst M M I C I 
15 Logical for research and training to be the Liaoning’s first priority. China M M I C I 
16 Research and training is more beneficial to the long term development of 
China’s carriers. 
Analyst M M I C I 
17 Research and training trumps all the other factors if the objective of the PLAN 
is to build a critical mass of talent, skills, knowledge and leadership for next 
generation of aircraft carriers.   
Analyst M M I C C 
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a. Findings from Analysis of Evidence Matrix for Competing Hypotheses 
1. Weighted Inconsistency Scores.  To Heuer, the presence of less 
contradictory evidence for a particular hypothesis was more critical than 
the presence of more supporting evidence because supporting evidence 
could be consistent with other hypotheses that were not taken into 
consideration.205  The weighted inconsistency scores for each hypothesis 
measure the extent of inconsistent evidence for each hypothesis.  H3 still 
has the highest score of 20.484, followed by H1 at 16.242 and H2 at 
12.07.   It appears that H3 is the most unlikely hypothesis and H2 the most 
likely one since it has the lowest score of inconsistent evidence.  Although 
H2 has the lowest inconsistency score, we shall discuss why H1 should be 
examined farther. 
2. Inconsistency score for H1 higher than H2.  Although the inconsistency 
score for H1 is higher than H2, there is room for greater analysis for why 
that is the case.  A major contributor to H1’s high inconsistency score is 
H1’s inconsistent evidence that have both high credibility and high 
relevance.  These four sensitive items of evidence are: 
10 One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational deployment. 
11 Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too aggressive. 
12 Rest of PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning. 
26 Basing of Liaoning with North Sea Fleet in Qingdao. 
 
3. If any one of these sensitive evidence changes in consistency, the 
weighted inconsistency scores of both H1 and H2 will be significantly 
affected and achieve near parity.  In Step 6 of the ACH, the implications 
of changes in these items of critical evidence will be elaborated. 
4. H2 as the least inconsistent hypothesis.  With the lowest weighted 
inconsistency score, H2 is the most likely of the three hypotheses.  This 
means that the outcome of our analysis of competitive hypotheses has 
yielded an outcome that is congruent with China’s official version of the 
Liaoning’s purpose.  Cognizant of the possibility of China’s manipulation 
of evidence to favor an impression that the Liaoning’s role is for training 
and research, we should accept this initial finding with an eye for re-
evaluation at a later date as developments in China’s carrier development 
continue.  This early phase of the Liaoning’s development may also result 
in evidence favoring a training and research role, as the Liaoning matures, 
this assessment must be re-evaluated. 
 
                                                 
205 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 104. 
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Therefore the tentative conclusion is that H2 is the most likely among the three 
hypotheses—the Liaoning will be deployed for research and training purposes. 
Step 6: Analysis of Conclusion for Sensitivity to Critical Evidence 
Step 6 of the ACH calls for the examination of the conclusion arrived at Step 5 
with critical pieces of evidence that may significantly alter the conclusion if the evidence 
was wrong or misleading.  At this stage, we want to question if there were questionable 
assumptions that have led us to this particular conclusion.  Could incomplete evidence 
have misled us to make an erroneous conclusion? Are there alternative explanations that 
fit the same evidence considered? 
Evidence critical to H2 have been highlighted in yellow in Table 14 and will be 




Table 14.   Review of ACH Matrix (Third Iteration) 











 Weighted Inconsistency Score    16.2 12.07 20.4 
 EVIDENCE       
8 Strategic maritime plan was to deploy the aircraft carrier 
for force projection. 
China H H 2C I I 
10 One aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable 
operational deployment. 
News H H I C C 
11 Deploying the Liaoning for operations would be too 
aggressive. 
News H H I 2C I 
12 Rest of PLAN may not be ready to support Liaoning. News H H I 2C C 
25 Build up of possible carrier task force. China H H 2C I I 
26 Basing of Liaoning with North Sea Fleet in Qingdao. China H H I C I 
4 Liaoning must hold the operational fort until other 
aircraft carriers are ready. 
Analy
st 
M H 2C I I 
6 Liaoning has significant operational value in East Asia. Analy
st 
M H 2C I I 
7 Operational urgency may compel China to deploy 
Liaoning for operations. 
Analy
st 
M H C I I 
Continued on next page. 
Continued from previous page. 
9 Liaoning will not be ready for operational deployment. Analy
st 
M H I 2C C 
14 Official position on the Liaoning’s role is that it serves 
research and training purposes. 
China M H I C I 
18 Urgency to focus on research and training because China 
will need to commence work on construction, 
shipbuilding and personnel training for next generation 
of carriers soonest.   
Analy
st 
M H I C C 




M H C I I 
20 Liaoning was built as a warship for the PLAN, with the 




M H C I I 
5 Restricting Liaoning to research and training is a waste 
of operational resources. 
Analy
st 
M M C I I 
13 China wants the world to believe the Liaoning is only for 
research and training. 
Analy
st 
M M I C I 
15 Logical for research and training to be the Liaoning’s 
first priority. 
China M M I C I 
16 Research and training is more beneficial to the long term 
development of China’s carriers. 
Analy
st 
M M I C I 
17 Research and training trumps all the other factors if the 
objective of the PLAN is to build a critical mass of 
talent, skills, knowledge and leadership for next 
generation of aircraft carriers.   
Analy
st 





a. Examination of Critical Evidence 
• Delicate Balance of Weighted Inconsistency Scores between H1 and H2.  
If the weighted inconsistency scores of H1 and H2 are pivotal to our 
judgment of which is the most likely hypothesis, we must consider how 
close their separation actually is when considering the impact of critical 
evidence.  The high credibility and high relevance critical evidence of H2 
have been highlighted in yellow in Table 7 above.  If any one of these four 
items of evidence turns out to be inconsistent, the weighted inconsistency 
scores between H1 and H2 would almost be equal—14.242 for H1 and 
14.07 for H2.  This highlights the sensitivity of the weighted inconsistency 
scores to the critical evidence.  As alluded to in the findings of Step 5 of 
the ACH, the possibility that these critical items of evidence may change 
cannot be ruled out.  We discuss these four items of critical evidence next. 
• Critical Consistent Evidence for H2.  The first of these is the assertion that 
one aircraft carrier is insufficient for sustainable operational deployment.  
While this operating constraint remains true, it does not preclude the 
possibility that the Liaoning may be deployed for one-off limited 
operations should the need arise.  Prolonged deployments of the Liaoning 
should not be the only definition of its operational use.   
The second critical inconsistent evidence for H1 is that deploying the 
Liaoning for operations may be perceived as being too aggressive for 
China’s narrative about peaceful development.  Perceptions about 
acceptable levels of aggressiveness can change quickly with circumstances 
and the possibility that operational deployment of the Liaoning would not 
be perceived by China as aggressive should not be totally discounted.  
China’s 2013 statement on the legitimacy of its patrols in disputed waters 
in the South and East China Seas gives credence to the possibility that the 
Liaoning’s deployment may not necessarily be perceived as aggressive by 
China in the long term.206 
The third critical inconsistent evidence for H1 claims that the rest of the 
PLAN may not be ready to support the Liaoning’s deployment is possibly 
subject to rapid change.  The PLAN is a large navy and it is not 
inconceivable that its naval assets may be re-organized to support the 
Liaoning for operations.  There are already signs that the PLAN is 
preparing for carrier task force operations so the possibility of Liaoning’s 
deployment cannot be definitively ruled out.207 
 
                                                 
206 “China patrols in Asian seas ‘legitimate’: General,”Agence France-Presse, 2 June 2013, 
http://www.afp.com/en/news/topstories/chinese-patrols-asian-seas-legitimate-general/. 
207 Tao Hai, “PLA Navy makes preparations for aircraft carrier formation.” 
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Last, the deployment of the Liaoning to the North Sea Fleet in Qingdao 
should not be taken as a long term move.  The Liaoning’s current 
deployment to Qingdao facilitates the integration of its fledging carrier air 
wing onboard.  However, should the operational need arise, it is possible 
that the Liaoning may be stationed farther south at the newly constructed 
naval base in Yulin on Hainan Island that is 2,500km closer to the South 
China Sea; or farther East in Ningbo that is 1000km closer to the East 
China Sea.208 
• It is assessed that H2 is sensitive to the critical evidence identified above.  
It is also noted that three out of the four critical items of evidence are 
essentially assumptions made about China’s military capabilities and 
posture.  Apart from the fact that China has only one operational aircraft 
carrier, the other items of evidence are not based on the presence or 
absence of physical specimens, but projections of China’s behavior.  This 
makes the critical evidence subject to major changes from the influence of 
politics, leadership personalities and geopolitics.  The fickle nature of the 
critical evidence is both its strength (for its explanatory power) and 
weakness (for its potential ephemerality). 
Step 7: Conclusions and Likelihood of All Hypotheses 
This thesis will not be providing a statistical probability for each hypothesis.  It 
will instead rank the hypotheses by three broad categories that are not quantified 
numerically but that provide a narrative assessment of each hypothesis.  Heuer advocated 
the consideration of alternate hypotheses even after their evaluation in earlier steps 
because it is important to consider why alternative hypotheses are assessed to be weaker 
and therefore rejected.209 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) postulates that the Liaoning will spearhead the operational 
deployment of China’s aircraft carrier capability. H1 provides a realistic assessment of 
the Liaoning’s role based on the Liaoning’s envisaged capabilities, the scarcity of 
alternate options to the Liaoning and the manipulative nature of China’s strategic ethos.  
Based on the analysis of competitive hypotheses, H1 is assessed to be the second most 
likely hypothesis among the three.  It was ranked lower than H2 because its weighted 
                                                 
208 Christian Le Miere, “Why China sent its aircraft carrier to Qingdao.” 
 
209 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 107. 
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inconsistency score was higher than H2’s.  However, in light of the sensitivity of the 
evidence dividing H1 and H2, it is advised that observers continue to evaluate the 
developing situation as the chances of the evidence turning in favor of H1 are significant. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) postulates that the Liaoning will serve limited research and 
training roles.  H2 is an idealistic assessment of the Liaoning’s role that is encouraged by 
China but it underweights the importance of political and military realities and their 
effects on the Liaoning’s role in the PLAN.  H2 provides expedient political and military 
cover for China’s development of the Liaoning.  As the delineation between training and 
operations is not always clear, the evidence in support of H2 is susceptible to 
manipulation by China.  Based on the analysis of competitive hypothesis, H2 is currently 
the most likely hypothesis of the three.  Its weighted inconsistency score is the lowest.  
Although it has been assessed to be the most likely hypothesis, the sensitive nature of the 
critical evidence in support of H2 is susceptible to drastic change.  Thus, the Liaoning’s 
development must be monitored and updates to the evidence should be evaluated against 
the hypotheses when appropriate. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  The Liaoning will be an operational failure, unable to fulfill 
even its roles in research and training.  H3 exemplifies wishful thinking from China’s 
opponents and exceedingly pessimistic estimates by Liaoning’s detractors.  The 
acquisition and development of the Liaoning has demonstrated careful planning and 
implementation of strategy and policy by China—attributes that are likely to pre-empt 
catastrophic failures rather than precipitate them.  H3 is the least likely of the three 
hypotheses and is very unlikely compared with H1 and H2.  Its weighted inconsistency 
score is the highest of the three.  Although it is the least likely of the three hypotheses, it 
has not been disproved so it remains an outside possibility.  
Step 8: Milestones for Observation and Reassessment 
Step 8 takes the analysis and the conclusion regarding the most likely hypothesis 
a farther step into the future by identifying milestones for observation of evidence that 
may be consistent or inconsistent with the current assessments.  Heuer advised that 
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“analytical conclusions should always be tentative” because reality may change in ways 
that affect postulated appraisals of a situation.210  By identifying in advance the kind of 
evidence that would cause the analyst to reconsider his evaluation and reassess the 
situation, Heuer believes we can pre-empt the human tendency to rationalize away future 
developments as inconsequential and irrelevant to potential modifications of earlier 
judgements.211 
Given the assessment that H2 is most likely, and the sensitive nature of the critical 
evidence relevant to that assessment, the following milestones are assessed to be 
significant and relevant to the continued validity of H2’s likelihood and changes in them 
should be reasons for reassessment of the conclusions about the Liaoning’s role in the 
PLAN. 
1. Operationalization of the carrier fighter wing onboard the Liaoning for 
regular flight operations at sea.  This would represent a major 
developmental milestone for the Liaoning, undermine H2 and strengthen 
the likelihood of H1. 
2. Deployment of the Liaoning for any type of operation that is beyond 
research and training.  Regardless of what sort of capabilities the Liaoning 
may be deployed with, its deployment for operations would set a 
precedent that increases the likelihood that it will be deployed again.  
Deployment of Liaoning for any operations will disprove H2. 
3. Major incidents that are detrimental to the development of the Liaoning, 
e.g. significant accidents, damage to the ship, loss of confidence in the 
ability of the carrier, loss of funding etc.  Such incidents would retard the 
Liaoning’s development and result in a backlash that would likely result in 
a more conservative approach to Liaoning’s development and deployment.  
Such negative incidents would strengthen H2 and H3 and weaken H1. 
4. Major developments that result in the usurpation of the Liaoning’s roles 
like the commissioning of new carriers in the PLAN, or new operational 
concepts that render the Liaoning’s roles redundant, like the construction 
of new airbases in the South or East China Sea that extend the air coverage 
of China’s land based aircraft.  Such incidents would weaken H1.  The 
oddity would then be that the Liaoning may no longer be the vessel for 
projecting China’s influence, some other platform or capability would take 
its place. 
                                                 
210 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,108. 




This chapter has attempted to postulate what the Liaoning’s role in the PLAN will 
be.  This inquiry is a natural progression from the study about the acquisition and 
refurbishment of China’s first aircraft carrier.  Although the assessment has been made 
that the Liaoning will most likely be deployed for training and research at this phase of its 
development, this assessment is by no means final and is subject to revision based on 
actual developments of the Liaoning’s capabilities.  The alternate hypotheses H1 and H3 
have not been disproven, they merely remain unproven and may yet come to pass.  
Important developmental milestones have been identified for continued assessment of 





This thesis set out to explain the motivation and method behind China’s 
employment of deception in the acquisition and development of its first aircraft carrier, 
the Liaoning.  This task was accomplished by examining the following key areas of 
significance to the Liaoning deception: 
• China’s strategic psyche and its relation to deception 
• China’s national goals and strategy that drove its interest in the maritime 
arena 
• China’s maritime goals and strategy that motivated the acquisition of an 
aircraft carrier 
• The PLA Navy’s heritage and its influence on China’s naval development 
• China’s employment of strategic deception 
• Details of the Liaoning acquisition and development 
The approach was to first seek a broad understanding of China and its culture 
towards deception; then its motivations and strategies; and finally its methods and 
implementation efforts.  It was a story about the Chinese navy’s evolution from a 
fledging coastal force to the largest navy in Asia today—one that is on the precipice of 
joining the ranks of blue water naval powers like the United States.  The main actor of 
our slice of China’s naval story was the former Soviet aircraft carrier, the Varyag, which 
was given a new lease of life through the classic Chinese deception concept of “reviving 
a corpse” and reincarnating the Varyag as the Liaoning—the pride of the PLAN fleet 
today and the most visible symbol of China’s maritime ambitions for East Asia. 
The thesis also assessed the likely role of the Liaoning in the PLAN after its 
commissioning in September 2012.  We believed that China’s stratagem with the 
Liaoning did not culminate at its commissioning.  China has continued to deceive by 
pulling a veil over the Liaoning’s obvious purpose as a power-projecting aircraft carrier.  
Instead, China insisted that the Liaoning’s capabilities were far from complete, that it 
would require more time and resources to build a competent carrier force and therefore 
the Liaoning would focus on training and research, insinuating that operations were not 
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the Liaoning’s primary function.  We investigated whether China’s assertions about the 
Liaoning’s role were truthful or deceitful. 
A. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The study of the Liaoning deception revealed the following: 
1. China’s deception regarding the acquisition and development of the 
Liaoning was rational in its motivation, complex in its planning, simple in 
execution, patient in perspective and highly effective despite its bluff 
being called on more than one occasion.  It was not a one-off fluke 
because it was the result of a series of conscious and calculated  decisions. 
2. China’s deception management was skillfully executed after the Liaoning 
deception was underway to maximize the desired effects of deception even 
after its bluff was called.  With its desired objectives driving its stratagem, 
China implemented various mitigating measures and behaviors to ensure 
the success of the deception ploy. 
3. China effectively exploited foreign perceptions about its alleged 
weaknesses.  It allowed China to reinforce under-estimation of its own 
capabilities and obfuscate its ultimate goals for the Varyag.  Apart from 
active measures to shape perceptions about its intentions and ability, 
China took reactive measures targeted at independent reports that allowed 
it to exploit the attention directed towards the Varyag for further 
deception.  Even after China’s declaration of carrier construction in 2011, 
estimates of the carrier’s launch dates were well off the mark—pointing to 
China’s success in deceiving foreign intelligence estimates of its aircraft 
carrier development efforts for more than a decade. 
4. China was unapologetic about its employment of deception regarding the 
Liaoning and saw its success as a strategic victory to be celebrated.  China 
considered its disingenuous positions on the Varyag’s development as 
sophisticated strategic maneuvering and did not feel obliged to express 
remorse or provide any ex-post facto explanation.  After the Liaoning’s 
commissioning, China’s silence on justifications for its misleading 
statements, actions and positions about the Varyag reinforces the belief 
that the bodyguard of lies surrounding its first aircraft carrier has not been 
lifted.  It also demonstrates the value of not disclosing one’s employment 
of deception even after objectives have been achieved because it then 
perpetuates the various doubts in the mind of the adversary, leaves him 
open to further deception and gives his inferior strategic state of 
cognizance no relief. 
5. China had no qualms about deceiving its own population as part of the 
Liaoning deception and in fact exploited its own population as part of the 
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ruse to provide cover for the Varyag.  By employing the Minsk and Kiev 
as highly visible lures to direct attention away from the Varyag, China 
exploited its own populace by employing them as unknowing participants 
through commercialization of the Minsk and Kiev entertainment theme 
parks.  When the Varyag failed to materialize in Macau and became a long 
term resident of Dalian’s shipyards, China never saw a need to explain this 
alteration of plan.  
6. There was no discernible start or finish for China’s employment of 
strategic deception.  It was a continuous and purposeful balancing of truth 
and deceit that was fluid and amorphous.  Even after the Liaoning was 
commissioned, the deception ploy did not just “end.”  It presumably 
entered another phase to downplay the Liaoning’s operational importance 
and influence foreign perceptions about the capability and operational 
relevance of the Liaoning. 
7. Western principles and values leave them susceptible to China’s deception 
ploys which are tailored for maximum effectiveness against the target 
audience.  The West operates on the basis of truth, while China operates 
on more than just the truth—to include uninformative silence, half-truths 
that confuse and outright deceit.  China does not perceive such behavior as 
dishonest or demeaning.  Deception that serves strategic outcomes vital to 
the national interest is not just accepted but expected of Chinese 
strategists.  Success is attributed to astute strategic scheming and 
recognized as strategic excellence.  China does not employ deception to 
humiliate its adversaries; it uses deception as a legitimate method to 
pursue tangible national interests.  In other words, when employing 
deception, China does not mean to give offense.  Therefore, the targets of 
its deception should take no offense in being deceived because strategic 
deception is not personal, it is merely part of national strategy. 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
The implications of our findings can serve to educate policy makers and analysts 
in understanding and dealing with China’s propensity to employ deception.  Consider the 
following: 
1. Assume that China will employ strategic deception in pursuit of its 
national interests.  It is critical to consider if deception will serve China’s 
national interests, because if it does not, there is no motivation to use 
deception.  Deceiving others without clear strategic interests does not 




2. Do not expect China to come clean about its deception ploys or admit that 
its bluff has been called.  Deception is considered a part of China’s 
strategic calculus, and since there is no clear or fixed boundary on matters 
of national strategy, China will keep its options open by not admitting to 
deception or providing information to suggest than deception was even 
employed.  Even if its bluff is called, China will likely respond with a 
poker face, because in a strategic game, the end remains flexible.  Creating 
doubt is easier as long as no admission is made. 
3. China facilitates the under-estimation by opponents of its capabilities 
because it is cognizant of Sun Tzu’s guidance that: 
He who has a thorough knowledge of his conditions as well as the 
enemy’s conditions is sure to win all battles.  He who has a thorough 
knowledge of his conditions but not the conditions of the enemy has an 
even chance of winning or losing a battle.  He who has neither a 
knowledge of his own condition nor of the enemy’s is sure to lose in every 
battle.212 
Contrary to the Western concept of deterrence through the exhibition of 
force and capability, providing lesser indications of one’s strength is 
meant to lull the opponent into a false sense of security and to cultivate 
over-confidence in the opponent’s estimates of himself.  Thus, when 
making estimates of China’s capabilities, one must consider deception 
designed to make an opponent under-estimate their true capabilities and 
intentions. 
4. China’s strategic competitors should not feel affronted by China’s 
employment of deception because it is part of their strategy psyche.  China 
employs deception not to demean but to pursue national interests.  This is 
important because if countries feel affronted by Chinese deception and 
prematurely close negotiations or dialogues, they may be shortchanging 
themselves of more beneficial outcomes from continued engagement of 
China.  Instead, countries should continue to engage China and even 
employ deception against the Chinese to gain strategic parity or advantage 
over them. 
5. Employ strong intelligence analysis tools to analyze evidence in areas of 
interest and to reduce the effectiveness of deception.  Relevant agencies 
and analysts need to be educated about the analytical tools that exist to 
investigate evidence and compare hypotheses so that deception can be 
properly identified during the intelligence analysis process.  Richards J. 
Heuer’s Analysis of Competitive Hypothesis is an excellent analytical 
tool. 
                                                 




6. Do not take China’s statements at face value.  Look beyond ostensible 
facts and evidence.  Give thought to what is not being said as much as 
what is said.  In the spirit of Heuer’s suspicion of consistent evidence, 
seek evidence that is inconsistent with hypotheses assumed to be true, as 
consistent evidence is insufficient to confirm the veracity of hypotheses.  
Consistent evidence may be an indicator of successful deception by the 
adversary who would provide consistent evidence supporting a hypothesis 
that the adversary wants us to believe.  With such knowledge and skills, 
we can uncover deception. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Using the Liaoning’s acquisition and development as the basis for the study, this 
thesis has explored China’s employment of deception to conceal its intentions, 
capabilities and plans.  Much of the evidence investigated was directly related to the 
Liaoning’s acquisition and development.  There was much indirect evidence concerning 
carrier-borne aircraft, research and training facilities and military industrial facilities that 
was insufficiently investigated.  Those may yield more evidence that may have an impact 
on the findings of this thesis.  
Chapter VIII’s analysis on the future role of the Liaoning in the PLAN using 
Heuer’s analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) proved inconclusive.  Continued 
reassessment of the Liaoning’s role should provide a stronger analysis as more evidence 
becomes available for evaluation.  ACH should drive the collection of additional 
intelligence that could ultimately disprove selected hypotheses. 
D. HOPES FOR THE FUTURE 
Interest and concern about China’s military capabilities and strategic intentions 
will continue to increase in the future as the signs point towards continued growth and 
development in China.  The U.S. is ending its major military commitments in 
Afghanistan and has shifted its emphasis and attention to the Asia-Pacific region after 
focusing the first decade of the 21st century to on Iraq and Afghanistan.  Neither the U.S. 
nor China would benefit from aggressive strategic rivalry.  Both stand to gain from 
positive strategic co-existence and partnership.  However, the cultural and strategic 
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chasm between the two countries is still significant and the case of the Liaoning 
deception illustrates the difference in strategic psyches and perceptions.   
The ongoing (2013) tensions between the U.S. and China over cyber-espionage 
concerns is illustrative.  While the U.S. may feel affronted by what it considers as theft 
from its cyber vaults, China may consider cyber-espionage no more sinister than 
traditional espionage—everyone does it, no one admits to it and the only rule that matters 
is not getting caught.  It is a struggle for strategic advantage, albeit through the cyber 
realm.  What rules govern behavior between countries at the strategic level when there is 
no open conflict and diplomatic ties remain cordial?  Is China’s deceit about its cyber 
espionage activities very different from its deceit about the Liaoning’s acquisition and 
development?  How should the U.S. deal with China over such strategic competition 
without jeopardizing mutually beneficial relationships and bilateral dialogue? What has 
the U.S. done to communicate its concerns to China without further complicating the 
situation?  Perhaps to China, the U.S. detailing its alleged cyber espionage activities in 
the public domain is unnecessary and unhelpful.  It restricts China’s ability to maneuver 
and undermines official relations.  Just as China does not publicize or even acknowledge 
the details of its deception regarding the Liaoning, it does not publish details about its 
cyber espionage activities against the U.S because it may regard such activities to be 
subject to a separate code of behavior to be dealt with outside the usual channels of 
communications.  The U.S. obviously views matters quite differently.  Will an improved 
understanding of China’s strategic psyche and modus operandi allow for more effective 
communication in the future? 
As China’s naval prowess grows, she will likely build more aircraft carriers.  The 
case of the Liaoning provides significant insights into how China employs strategic 
deception in the development of a significant and visible military capability.  Gaining an 
improved understanding of China’s strategic behavior is an important part of Sun Tzu’s 
“knowledge of the enemy.”  It will allow nation states dealing with China to better deal 
with her unique strategic behavior and employ the most effective means for engaging her. 
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This thesis has focused on the “what”, “why” and “how” of Chinese strategic 
deception, using a modern case study to investigate and illustrate the important points of 
our findings.  This thesis does not claim to have deciphered China’s Liaoning deception 
definitively but it has attempted to provide an understanding into how China carried out 
the Liaoning deception.  Hopefully, this understanding will lead to greater engagement 
between the U.S. and China in Asia and a healthy respect for each other’s strategic 
customs and traditions.  The Middle Kingdom has awakened, but a fight is not the 








APPENDIX: THIRTY-SIX STRATAGEMS FROM CHINESE 
HISTORY 
No. Chinese Expression Meaning 
Chapter 1(胜战计) 
Stratagems employed when in a strategically advantageous posture (绝对优势) 
1 瞒天过海Mán 
Tiān Guò Hǎi 
Cross the oceans 
without heaven’s 
knowledge 
(1) Those who believe they have taken ample 
precautions are liable to be caught off guard. (2) 
Familiarity breeds desensitization and lowers 
arousal of suspicions. 
2 围魏救赵 
Wéi Wèi Jiù 
Zhào 
Besiege Wei to 
save Zhao 
Instead of attacking a concentrated enemy, break 
it up into smaller, vulnerable groups. Bide your 
time and strike only after the enemy has 
committed his forces elsewhere. 
3 借刀杀人 
Jiè Dāo Shā 
Rén 
Murder with a 
borrowed knife 
When enemy intent is clear and allies are 
hesitant—induce the allies to fight the enemy 
while preserving oneself. 
4 以逸待劳 
Yǐ Yì Dài Láo 
Wait while the 
enemy exhausts 
himself 
Lead the enemy into an impasse without fighting 
or wasting resources.  Weaken the active enemy 
aggressor to strengthen the passive defender. 
5 趁火打劫 
Chèn Huǒ Dǎ 
Jié 
Loot a burning 
house 
When the enemy suffers a major crisis, seize the 
chance to gain an advantage. 
6 声东击西 
Shēng Dōng Jī 
Xī 
Arouse the East 
but attack the West 
Confuse the enemy about your true intentions and 
strike where his guard is down. 
Chapter 2(敌战计) 






out of nothing 
Make a deliberate false move and transform that 
move into a genuine one after the enemy has been 
convinced of its falsity.   
8 暗渡陈仓 




Induce enemy belief in one’s original intent while 




Gé An Guān 
Huǒ 
Watch your 
enemies burn from 
across the river 
When enemy discord is apparent, take no action. 
Instead, wait for the enemy’s oncoming internal 
upheaval. Internecine struggles cause the enemy 
to die at its own hand. 
10 笑里藏刀 
Xiào Lǐ Cáng 
Dāo 
Conceal a dagger 
behind a smile 
Reassure the adversary to cause him to be 
complacent while working in secret to subdue 
him.  Alternatively, to prepare fully in secret 
before taking decisive action that does not allow 




Lǐ Dài Táo 
Jiāng 
Sacrifice the plum 
to save the peach 
Make small tactical sacrifices in order to achieve 




Lead away a goat 
in passing 
Take advantage of the smallest flaw to seize the 
smallest profit. Make use of a minor mistake of 
the enemy to gain a minor victory. 
Chapter 3 (攻战计) 
Stratagems employed when in an offensive strategic posture (进攻态势) 
 
13 打草惊蛇 
Dǎ Cǎo Jīnɡ 
Shé 
Beat the grass to 
frighten the snake 
out of hiding 
Ascertain the doubtful; find out intelligence about 
the enemy before taking action. Return and bring 
the enemy’s secrets to light. 
14 借尸还魂 
Jiè Shī Huán 
Hún 
To revive a corpse Advocates the masterful use of the apparently 
useless in order to achieve a goal without the 
adversary’s suspicion.   
15 调虎离山 
Diào Hǔ Lí 
Shān 
Lure the tiger out 
of the mountain 
Avoid attacking the enemy at his position of 
strength. Plot to entice him into a situation 
advantageous to you. Also a reminder to 
reconsider strategy if initial plans fail. 
16 欲擒故纵 
Yù Qín Gù 
Zòng 
By leaving at 
large, the better to 
capture 
Pressing the target raises his guard. Leave it 
unmolested and its guard will lower. Track it but 
do not press. Fritter away its strength and sap its 
will. After the target is spent and its guard down, 
subdue it without undue losses. 
17 抛砖引玉 
Pāo Zhuān Yǐn 
Yù 
Cast a brick lure to 
attract jade 
(1) Lure the enemy to expend precious resources 
by the use of counterfeits. (2) Entice the enemy to 
reveal his motives by making false moves that 
will arouse his interest. 
18 擒贼擒王 
Qín Zéi Qín 
Wáng 
To defeat bandits, 
capture the 
ringleader 
To crush the enemy’s main force, capture its 
leader to decapitate, demoralize and disintegrate 
the force. The better the leader, the greater the 
impact of his removal. 
Chapter 4 (混战计) 
Stratagems employed when in a chaotic strategic posture (军阀混战态势) 
19 釜底抽薪 
Fǔ Dǐ Chōu Xīn 
Remove firewood 
from under the 
cauldron 
Avoid a contest of strength with the enemy, 
instead undermine his position by attacking the 
fundamental sources of his strength—so that his 
position will become weaker. 
20 混水摸鱼 
Hún Shuǐ Mō 
Yú 
Catch a fish in 
muddled waters 
(1) Take advantage of the enemy’s internecine 
fight and exploit its weakness and lack of 
judgment. (2) Exploit chaos in the enemy’s 
situation or strategic environment. 
21 金蝉脱壳Jīn 
Chán Tuō Qiào 
The cicada sloughs 
its skin 
Maintain one’s original shape and play out the 
supposed pose, so that the ally does not doubt and 
the enemy does not move. Maintaining the 
appearance of inaction while in fact, taking action 






Bolt the door to 
trap the thief 
(1) Force a weak enemy into a position of no 
retreat so that he has nothing to fight for.  (2) 
There is little strategic value in pursuing a 
defeated enemy at length. 
23 远交近攻 
Yuǎn Jiāo Jìn 
Gōng 
Forge distant allies 
and exploit nearby 
enemies 
When circumscribed in situation and restricted in 
disposition, seek to profit from those nearby and 
keep peril at a distance. 
24 假途伐虢 
Jiǎ Tú Miè Guó 
Attack via false 
intentions 
For a small state sandwiched between two great 
powers,  if one great power attempts to bring it to 
submission, the other will impose itself under the 
pretext of aiding it. 
Chapter 5 (并战计) 




Steal the beams 
and swap the 
pillars 
Swap the real with fakes, deceive the enemy into 
erroneous self-belief about his own strength or 
one’s weakness. 
26 指桑骂槐 






To channel one’s direct criticism at a weaker 
target (Mulberry plant) while indirectly 
criticizing the actual stronger target (Pagoda 
tree). Use indirect methods to achieve one’s 
goals. 
27 假痴不癫 
Jiǎ Chī Bù Diān 
Feign folly even if 
not insane 
Feign foolish ignorance and inaction to hide 
one’s intentions while allowing the enemy to 





Upon his reaching 
the roof, remove 
his ladder 
Provide the enemy with an apparent opportunity 
to entice it to advance. When it is cut off, trap it 
in disadvantageous ground to your advantage. 
29 树上开花 
Shù Shàng Kāi 
Huā 
To make a tree 
blossom 
Exploit external appearances to create an 
advantageous situation. One can obscure the truth 
by creating an illusion that the enemy believes in.   
30 反客为主 
Fǎn Kè Wéi 
Zhǔ 
Reverse the 
positions of host 
and guest 
To switch strategic posture from passive to 
active, taking the initiative to the enemy and 
surprising him. 
Chapter 6 (败战计): Stratagems employed when in a disadvantageous strategic posture 
(败军态势) 
31 美人计 
Měi Rén Jì 
Use beauty to 
ensnare the 
opponent  
Use ploys to ensnare the enemy by targeting the 
personal weaknesses of their leader. Once 
corrupted, discredited and undermined, one’s 
strategic position can be improved. 
32 空城计 
Kōng Chéng Jì 
Empty City 
stratagem 
Use ploys to confuse the enemy’s psychology and 
induce further doubt into his estimations. 
Typically involves doing what the enemy does 
not expect one to do. 
33 反间计 
Fǎn Jiān Jì 
Sow distrust in the 
enemy 
Turn the enemy’s ploy against him—thus sowing 
confusion and eroding his strength. Can involve 
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foreknowledge of enemy ploy or turning his 
spies. 
34 苦肉计 
Kǔ Ròu Jì 
Use Self-Inflicted 
Injury to Beguile 
the Enemy 
Inflict injury upon one’s own spy so that he may 
gain acceptance by the enemy.  Capitalize on the 
known sympathies of the enemy camp to exploit 
their emotions. 
35 连环计 
Lián Huán Jì 
Use Interlaced 
Stratagems 
Do not engage a stronger enemy head on, instead 
use stratagems to confuse and weaken him. When 
stratagems are interlaced, they can produce 
strategic effects on the enemy and allow the weak 
to triumph over the strong. 
36 走为上计 
Zou Wei Shang 
Ji 
When All Else 
Fails, Retreat is the 
Best Option 
When faced with a superior enemy, one can come 
to a truce, surrender or retreat.  Retreat allows for 
a counter-attack and can be used to ensnare 
enemy in pursuit.  Retreat is a norm of warfare 
and does not imply strategic failure. 
 
Sources:  
Haichen Sun, The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies From Ancient China (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1991). 
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